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ABSTRACT 
Successful post-contract relationships determine whether an IT outsourcing 
project is fully successful, partially successful or a failure. The purpose of this study is to 
further the understanding of IT outsourcing relationships in the post-contract phase. This 
study adopts a social exchange theory perspective and examines the impact of trust in IT 
outsourcing vendor, various modes of trust and trustworthiness factors, perceptions of 
risk, perceptions of strategic salience and service quality on relationship quality and 
outsourcing success. Perceptions of trustworthiness of the vendor, and the various bases 
of IT outsourcing decision making such as institution-based trust, transference-based 
trust, calculative-based trust and the past experiences with the vendor and their impact on 
the trust in vendor are examined in an IT outsourcing context.  
This research used a cross-sectional, correlational design. The data were collected 
using an online survey. The sample consisted of 163 professionals working in the area of 
IT outsourcing. The study results indicated that managing client-vendor relationships is a 
very important factor in the implementation phase of the IT outsourcing contracts. 
Relationship quality was significantly related to IT outsourcing success. The factors 
influencing relationship quality, tested in this study were: trust in vendor, 
interdependence, service quality, perceptions of risk and perceptions of strategic salience. 
Perceptions of risk was not related to relationship quality. Interdependence was 
 xii
moderately significant. Trust, service quality, and perceptions of strategic salience were 
significantly related to relationship quality. The study posited trust as a moderator 
because high or low levels of trust can have a profound effect in ongoing relationships. 
Though the original hypotheses of moderation were not supported, the study found in the 
post-hoc analyses that trust indeed moderated the relationship between the perceptions of 
strategic salience and relationship quality. The study posited that institutional-based trust, 
calculative-based trust, transference-based trust and knowledge-based trust were 
positively related to trust in vendor. Surprisingly, institutional based trust was not 
significant. The other modes of trust were significantly related to trust in vendor.  
The study’s important contribution to theory is examining the role of trust as a moderator. 
The results about the interdependence of client and the vendor could offer some ideas on 
resolving the conflicting findings about interdependence in the context of IT outsourcing 
client-vendor relationships. In the context of IT outsourcing projects which are very 
service intensive, and time and cost sensitive, this study concludes that though good 
client-vendor relationships are not the only ingredient of a project success, the 
importance of relationships built on mutual trust between the parties, interdependence 
and service quality in ensuring project success cannot be understated. 
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CHAPTER 1:  INTRODUCTION 
IT Outsourcing is defined as handing over of all or a part of an organization’s IT 
services to a vendor in order to expedite achievement of organizational goals (Cheon et 
al. 1995). In simple terms, IT outsourcing is accomplishing an IT related task through an 
external service provider called vendor. The organization that obtains the service is 
known as the client. The vendor provides or manages a part or all of the IT assets, people 
and or activities to achieve certain objectives (Willcocks et al. 1998b). Common IT 
functions that are outsourced include systems operations, applications development, 
applications maintenance, networks and telecommunications management, help desk and 
end user support, and systems planning and management (Dibbern et al. 2004; Grover et 
al. 1994a).  
The objective of outsourcing is to achieve economies of cost, increase 
profitability, financial leverage, access to expertise, and better quality (Lacity et al. 1994; 
Lacity et al. 1993b; Lacity et al. 2001; Loh et al. 1992a). IT outsourcing has grown 
remarkably because of general economic factors, pressures on profitability, and attractive 
economic incentives promised by many Information Technology (IT) services providers 
(vendors) (DiamondCluster 2002). The objective of outsourcing is to achieve economies 
of cost, increase profitability, financial leverage, access to expertise, and better quality 
(Lacity et al. 1994; Lacity et al. 1993b; Lacity et al. 2001; Loh et al. 1992a) This growing 
trend in volume, range and complexity of IT outsourcing is likely to continue at least in 
the foreseeable future.  
Despite a steep growth trend, IT outsourcing however, is not without problems. A 
survey of 25 large enterprises in a range of industries by Deloitte Consulting LLP (2005) 
found that 70% of the companies experienced negative outcomes in their outsourcing 
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contracts. Similar results were reported in DiamondCluster International’s two successive 
studies (2002; 2005). Market reports indicate that approximately 80% of all outsourcing 
contracts require re-negotiation (Deloitte 2005; Gartner 2005) because of lack of 
flexibility between the outsourcing vendor and the client (Anon 2005).  
Problems associated with IT outsourcing 
The reasons for the problems in IT outsourcing deals are many. The special nature 
of IT adds to the complexity of managing IT outsourcing projects (Kern et al. 2002a; 
Lacity et al. 2001; Willcocks et al. 1996). IT is not a single function but a combination of 
diverse activities making it very complex. Because of the dynamic and fast changing 
nature of IT, outsourcing IT is also subject to rapid changes over time and therefore 
fraught with uncertainty (Grover et al. 1994a). Large switching costs are associated with 
outsourcing at the time of outsourcing IT function to an outside vendor, or subsequent 
switching of vendors or bringing back the outsourced IT function in-house. Measurement 
of IT performance and economics associated with IT is problematic (Kern et al. 2002a; 
Lacity et al. 2001; Willcocks et al. 1996). 
 More frequent problems in IT outsourcing include hidden costs, vendor’s 
exaggerated claims of cost reduction and savings (Barthelemy 2001; Lacity et al. 2001) 
and vendor’s lack of awareness of the client’s business and IT requirements (Lacity et al. 
2003). Formal contracts often proved incomplete (Kern et al. 2001); most contracts were 
either too loose (Lacity et al. 2003) or too inflexible (Barthelemy 2001; Sabherwal 1999). 
Many executives acknowledge that there is a wide negative gap between the expectations 
and actual performance of the outsourcing contracts (Lacity et al. 1994). In almost all the 
outsourcing contracts where the expectations were not realized, the problems were due to 
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improper vendor selection, improper assessment of in-house skills versus that of the 
vendor, lack of understanding of the nature of the IT function among the executives of 
the client firm, and lack of client involvement and participation in the post-contract phase 
(Lacity et al. 1993b; Willcocks et al. 1996). 
The post-contract phase is the longer phase in the life of an outsourcing contract, 
lasting on an average of about five years, compared to the pre-contract phase (Currie et 
al. 1998; Kern et al. 2001; Lacity et al. 1993b). Most of the problems in the outsourcing 
mentioned above occur during this phase. Managing the vendor-relationships during the 
post-contract phase helps maintain the balance between the formal contracts and the 
informal exchanges of mutual client-vendor expectations (Kern et al. 2001; Ring et al. 
1994) and mitigate the problems during this phase.  
Managing the outsourcing relationship is critical for success of the IT outsourcing 
(Kern et al. 2001; Sabherwal 1999). Quality of the relationship between the outsourcing 
vendor and the client could potentially reduce the hidden costs of outsourcing 
(Barthelemy 2001).  
Outsourcing relationship involves stakeholders – having similar perceptions, 
expectations and goals (Lacity et al. 2001). Stakeholders are the managers, the staff and 
the users of the vendor and the client, who are involved in the project. Successful 
management of the post-contract phase of IT outsourcing involves among other things, 
managing the IT outsourcing relationship. Successful post-contract relationships 
determine whether the project is fully successful, partially successful or a failure.  
Relationships in the post-contract phase has been relatively under-researched 
(Kern et al. 2001). Even though there have been studies on outsourcing relationships 
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(example: Grover et al. 1996c; Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; 
Klepper 1995a; Koh et al. 2004; Lee et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2005; Sabherwal 1999), most 
of the above studies are based on a small sample qualitative techniques (examples: Kern 
et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; Sabherwal 1999).  
Purpose of this study 
The current study aims to address post-contract phase relationship management 
issues. This research examines the factors contributing to relationship quality and 
outsourcing success. Relationship quality is the overall evaluation of the effectiveness of 
a relationship measured by the extent to which the parties in the relationship meet mutual 
needs and expectations through mutual commitment, cooperation and coordination. 
Outsourcing success is the accomplishment of the objectives of outsourcing – strategic, 
financial, technical and relational. The factors contributing to relationship quality that are 
tested in this study are: client’s trust in vendor, client’s perceptions of risks associated 
with outsourcing in the post-contract phase and the client’s perceptions of 
interdependence of parties in the relationship, and client’s perceptions of strategic 
salience of outsourcing contract. The gaps in the literature identified and the research 
questions addressed by this study are explained in the following paragraphs. An outline 
of other chapters in this study is presented at the end. 
Gap in Literature and Contribution of the Current Research to Theory 
Though outsourcing research has recognized the importance of maintaining 
healthy business relationships, research on the post-contract phase relationships has been 
relatively scarce (Kern et al. 2001; Lee et al. 1999). Most of the past research focused 
extensively on the determinants of IT outsourcing decisions, vendor selection, contracting 
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and advantages of outsourcing. From a social exchange perspective, the relationships in 
IT outsourcing have not been extensively tested. Social exchange theory (Blau 1964b; 
Homans 1961; Molm et al. 2000) explains the human behavior in social relationships, 
based on mutual give and take of rewards. Social exchange perspective recognizes the 
existence of risks such as opportunism, and imbalance of power, and explains the 
development, continuance and disintegration of relationships. The specific gaps in 
literature in the areas of risk and trust are explained in the following paragraphs. 
Risks in outsourcing have been identified and analyzed in the outsourcing 
literature (Lacity et al. 1998; Willcocks et al. 1999a; Willcocks et al. 1999b). Even in 
practitioner surveys, executives expressed their apprehensions about risks in outsourcing 
(Deloitte 2005; DiamondCluster 2002; DiamondCluster 2005; Gartner 2005). Such risk 
perceptions of the stakeholders play a major role in outsourcing relationships. The risk 
factors have not been tested empirically in post-contract relationship phases. The current 
study proposes to address this gap, by testing the impact of risk perceptions on 
relationship quality. The study tests the risks specific to the relationship phase of the IT 
outsourcing: risk of vendor’s opportunistic behavior, risk of conflict of interests, and risk 
of the users losing involvement or the client firm’s loss of skills and expertise.  
Impact of interdependence of parties in IT outsourcing relationships has varied 
and conflicting results in various studies. Many researchers found a positive relationship 
between interdependence and relationship quality (Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; 
Kern et al. 2002a; Klepper 1995a; Sabherwal 1999). However, Lee and Kim (1999) 
found a significant negative relationship between client-vendor interdependence and 
relationship quality. This result is attributed by the authors to the perceptions of risk and 
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opportunistic behavior because of imbalances in power arising due to interdependence 
(Lee et al. 1999). None of the above studies empirically tested risk and interdependence 
simultaneously. The present study tests the impact of interdependence on relationship 
quality, simultaneously with post-contract risks in IT outsourcing, to empirically test the 
impact of interdependence and risk simultaneously in IT outsourcing relationships. 
From a social exchange perspective, trust is considered as a response to the 
parties’ perceptions of risk (Blau 1964b; Molm et al. 2000). Trust is important in 
relationships because, from a social exchange perspective, trust is built based on the 
positive experiences of individuals within relationships (Blau 1964b; Thibaut et al. 1959). 
Trust develops over time (Luhmann 1979) and helps to strengthen relationships over the 
longer term (Blau 1964b). Trust plays a significant role in reducing the perceptions of 
risk (Gefen et al. 2003b; Luhmann 1979; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998). 
Impact of post-contract risks in outsourcing and impact of trust on outsourcing 
relationships have not been tested in an IT outsourcing context. The current study 
proposes to test the impact of trust in vendor on risk perceptions in the context of 
outsourcing.  
Research dealing with the post-contract phase relationship management in IT 
outsourcing recognizes the importance of trust in the relationships (Kern and Willcocks 
2000; Kern and Willcocks 2001; Lee and Kim 1999; Sabherwal 1999). Lee and Kim 
(1999) assessed the partnership quality based on trust, business understanding, benefit 
and risk share, conflict and commitment. Trust was defined and operationalized as the 
degree of confidence and willingness to provide assistance between the partners. 
However, theoretical linkages such as trustworthiness of the vendor, or the modes of trust 
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that influence client’s beliefs about vendor’s trustworthiness were not tested in the 
context of outsourcing relationships (Gefen et al. 2003a; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et 
al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998). This study proposes to address this gap by testing the 
impact of trust in vendor on relationship quality; impact of trustworthiness beliefs: 
ability, benevolence and integrity on overall trust in vendor; and impact of various modes 
of trust on trustworthiness beliefs and overall trust in vendor.  
In almost all the outsourcing contracts where the expectations were not realized, 
the problems were due to improper vendor selection, and improper assessment of in-
house skills versus that of the vendor, seriously affecting the delivery of desired level of 
service quality of the outsourced IT function in the post-contract phase, (Lacity and 
Hirschheim 1993; Willcocks Fitzgerald and Lacity 1996). This study tests the impact of 
perceptions of service quality on the IT outsourcing relationship. Service quality is the 
evaluation of actual level of service of the vendor against the client’s expectations 
(Grover et al. 1996b; Parasuraman et al. 1985).  
Another contributory reason for failure of IT outsourcing contracts (Lacity et al. 
1994) was the lack of understanding of the nature of the IT function among the 
executives of the client firm. This study proposes to test the impact of the managers’ 
perceptions of strategic salience on the relationship quality. Strategic salience is the 
perception of the stakeholders that the outsourcing relationship could result in potential 
business advantage (Lacity et al. 2001).  
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In order to address the above issues, this research examines the factors 
contributing to relationship quality and outsourcing success. The research addresses the 
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following research questions addressed by this study. What are the factors that influence 
the quality of relationship between the IT outsourcing vendor and client and how does 
relationship quality impact outsourcing success? What is the effect of trust and 
perceptions of risk on relationship quality? How does trust in vendor interact with other 
determinants of relationship quality? contribution to theory and implications to practice 
are presented below. 
Contributions to theory 
A significant contribution of this study to theory is the interaction effects of trust 
in an IT outsourcing vendor and the relationships between risk and relationship quality, 
service quality and relationship quality and strategic salience and relationship quality. 
The interaction effects of trust have largely been understudied. Interaction effects of trust 
have not been empirically tested in the context of business relationships. Trust literature 
has largely concerned itself only with the direct effects of trust in various settings and on 
various constructs (Dirks et al. 2001). Traditionally the literature considered only the 
effects of higher levels of trust leading to more positive outcomes. However, the 
outcomes vary depending upon the levels of trust (Mishra et al. 1998). Understanding the 
interaction effects of high or low levels of trust can help better understand and interpret 
the past findings of consequences of trust and potentially integrating the understanding of 
impact of trust across various contexts and various disciplines.  
Even though IT outsourcing research (Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et 
al. 2002a; Klepper 1995a; Sabherwal 1999) has recognized trust as an important factor in 
ongoing relationships, in the context of IT outsourcing, the concept of trust and the 
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various trust constructs have not been empirically tested in the past research. This study 
proposes to test the impact of trust on IT outsourcing relationships.  
Implications for Practice 
There are several studies which stress the importance of maintaining relationships 
(Grover et al. 1996b; Kern et al. 2002a; Klepper 1995a; Lee et al. 1999). But this study 
draws attention to the specific aspects of relationships such as risk and trust. The study 
analyzes the specific aspects of risk for the practitioner in the post-contract phase of the 
outsourcing relationship. The specific modes of trust: institutional-based, transference-
based, knowledge-based and calculative-based, provide a basis for forming trust in the 
vendor. Some of the institutional-based trust inducing clauses could be potentially 
customized and introduced into the formal contract at the time of entering into the 
outsourcing contract itself. The study points to the fact that the risks exists even in a 
trusted relationship with the vendor. Therefore, the outsourcing outcomes are not 
automatically assured, unless the risks are either mitigated or effectively managed during 
the during the execution phase.  
Re-negotiation of contracts and lack of flexibility have been identified as 
problems in outsourcing. This research takes the next step of pointing to those aspects in 
a relationship that can avoid the need for the process of renegotiation if possible through 
efficient post-contract management. Maintaining healthy relationships between the 
stakeholders makes the process of negotiation and conflict resolution easy and reduces 
escalation of costs. This research points to those aspects which can keep the process of 
re-negotiation flexible and acceptable to both parties through healthy understanding 
between the parties in the relationship. Flexibility in the outsourcing contract is ensured 
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and execution of the contract will be smooth and beneficial to both parties. Where there is 
a possibility for vendor’s opportunistic behavior, developing relationships and trust 
building can reduce the uncertainty and risk. 
Vendors can know in more detail the expectations of their clients by 
understanding their relationships with their clients. Building trust can provide a platform 
for better negotiation with clients if and when needed. Active participation of the client, 
trust, cooperation and coordination can be built into the relationship, which could help 
not only in smooth execution of the contract but also at the time of renewal of the 
contracts. 
Overview of chapters to come 
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of the existing research on outsourcing. Then, 
Chapter 3 provides a review of the existing research on Trust and social exchange. The 
research model, the constructs that are being tested in this study and their definitions and 
the rationale for the relationships proposed in the model are discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 5 presents the proposed methodology for the study. Chapter 6 presents the data 
analysis and results of the study. Chapter 7 discusses the findings of the study, theoretical 
contributions and practical implications of the results, limitations of the study and the 
conclusions.  
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CHAPTER 2:  REVIEW OF IT OUTSOURCING LITERATURE 
This chapter reviews the past research on outsourcing. Research on outsourcing 
can be broadly classified into pre-contract studies, and post-contract studies. Pre-contract 
studies examined the evolution of IT outsourcing, types of outsourcing deals and decision 
making, issues in vendor selection, determinants of outsourcing decisions, risks 
associated with outsourcing and trends in outsourcing decisions. Post-contract studies 
evaluated the outcomes, the relational exchanges, and the factors contributing to overall 
success or failure of the outsourcing decisions. First the past research on pre-contract 
studies is presented followed by the post contract outsourcing research. The various 
theoretical bases used in the research are explained, and finally, a comprehensive model 
of findings in the past research is presented. 
PRE-CONTRACT STUDIES 
Evolution of IT outsourcing 
Outsourcing during the 60’s was limited mostly to sharing computer hardware. 
During the 1960’s time-sharing was a popular method of bulk data processing with the 
IBM mainframes (Lee et al. 2003). Time-sharing is a method of allowing multiple users 
to simultaneously access to a central mainframe through remote dumb-terminals. During 
1963, Frito-Lay and Blue Cross & Blue Shield outsourced their data processing functions 
to Electronic Data Systems (Lacity et al. 1993b). These two deals were among the earliest 
of the IT outsourcing deals. During 70’s when the cost of application development was 
high, companies hired contract programmers which was a type of outsourcing (Lee et al. 
2003). It was a common practice to outsource routine IT tasks like payroll processing and 
data processing during this time period. During the 1980’s the scope of outsourcing 
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activities expanded to many more areas like accounting services, payroll processing, 
billing, and data processing. 
The most influential of outsourcing decisions was Kodak’s 1989 decision to 
outsource its IT operations to IBM, BusinessLand and Digital Equipment Company (Loh 
et al. 1992b). Though outsourcing deals were prevalent even before the Kodak deal, the 
$1 billion deal generated widespread interest in outsourcing. Following Kodak’s decision 
to outsource its IT function, many other big companies such as General Dynamics, Delta 
Airlines, Continental Bank, Xerox, McDonnel Douglas, Chevron, DuPont, JP Morgan, 
and Bell South decided to outsource their IT functions (Dibbern et al. 2004; Hirschheim 
et al. 2005). The spurt in number of outsourcing deals following the Kodak deal therefore 
is often referred to as the “Kodak effect” (Loh et al. 1992b).  
  Empirically, Loh and Venkatraman (1992b) found that Kodak effect had a 
significant impact on the subsequent outsourcing decisions. However, a replication of the 
Loh and Venkatraman (1992b) found that the Kodak effect was not significant (Hu et al. 
1997). The differences in the results were due to the larger sample size, methodological 
differences and data spanning over longer period after the Kodak deal.  
Others (Lacity et al. 1993a; Lacity et al. 1995a) called the spurt in number of 
outsourcing deals as the “bandwagon effect”. Lacity and Hirschheim (1993a) observe that 
in addition to Kodak, other major deals like American Bankshares, Southeast and 
Continental airlines outsourcing deals also might have had influence on subsequent 
outsourcing deals.  
Ever since, outsourcing has grown at a rapid pace. Latest figures indicate that in 
companies, by 2005 outsourcing will represent 59% of IT services, and IT staff numbers 
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will reduce by 15% by 2010 (Clarke 2005). The fundamental nature of IT outsourcing 
has undergone numerous changes as companies began to pursue outsourcing aggressively 
as a cost saving measure and strategic option. Various types of outsourcing and various 
strategies of outsourcing have emerged as the scope of outsourcing expanded for meeting 
diverse IT outsourcing needs of the firms. The developments are discussed below. 
Types of outsourcing 
Research classified outsourcing based on the extent outsourced as a percentage of 
IS budget. Based on the proportion of outsourcing to IT budget, Lacity and Hirschheim 
(1995a) classified outsourcing into three main types: total outsourcing, selective 
outsourcing and total insourcing. Total outsourcing is defined as the decision to avail IT 
services from an outside party, exceeding 80% of the IT operating budget. Selective 
outsourcing is when the value of outsourcing is between 20% and 80% of total IT 
operating budget. Total insourcing is when the value of outsourcing does not exceed 20% 
of the IT operating budget (Lacity et al. 1998). The types of outsourcing are summarized 
in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 - Types of Outsourcing 
 
 
Type Definition Reference 
Total 
outsourcing 
Decision to transfer 80% or more of the IT budget 
for IT assets, leases staff and management to a 
third party. 
(Grover et al. 
1994b; Lacity et 
al. 1998) 
Selective 
outsourcing 
Decision to transfer more than 20% but less than 
80% of the IT budget for IT assets, leases, staff and 
management to a third party. 
(Lacity et al. 1998) 
Total 
insourcing 
Decision to retain 80% or more of the IT budget 
internally after evaluating the market, (Lacity et al. 1998) 
 
Further, separate from these main types of outsourcing there are different other 
classifications based on different arrangements such as term of the outsourcing contract, 
purpose of outsourcing, or nature of the contract etc. The classifications and their 
definitions are listed in Table 2.2.  
Table 2.2 - Other types of IT outsourcing 
 
 
Type Definition Reference 
Time-
Sharing 
Time-sharing is a method of allowing multiple 
users to simultaneously access to a central 
mainframe through remote dumb-terminals to 
minimize higher capacity computer’s idle time, to 
achieve time and cost efficiency. This type of 
outsourcing was common during 1950’s thru 60’s). 
(Grover et al. 
1994b; Lee et al. 
2003) 
Body Shop 
Short term solution to meet specific project 
demands, usually by hiring contract employees, 
and managed by company employees. 
(Lacity et al. 
1993b) 
Project 
Management 
Outsourcing for a specific project, and also a short 
term solution. The project outsourced is managed 
by the vendor. 
(Lacity et al. 
1993b) 
Transitional 
Outsourcing Temporary handing over of a select IT function to a 
supplier, usually a legacy system, to build a new 
(Kern et al. 2001; 
Lacity et al. 2001) 
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advanced system. 
Smart 
contracting 
Introducing a customer-written contract, or 
introducing open-book accounting with third party 
pricing benchmarks, etc. in order to bring about 
flexibility and transparency in outsourcing deals. 
(Kern et al. 2001) 
Offshore 
outsourcing 
or global 
outsourcing 
Sourcing from a different country or a continent to 
take advantage of costs, advanced technology or 
expertise, or the foreign exchange rate differentials. 
(Lacity et al. 2001; 
Sobol et al. 1995) 
Value-added 
outsourcing 
Such outsourcing deals aim to combine the 
strengths of the client and vendor to market their IT 
products and services. 
(Kern et al. 2001) 
Application 
Service 
Providers 
Outsourcing of specific IS functions in which the 
vendor develops and hosts applications and related 
services on a remote server, and provides access to 
client over the Internet. 
(Kern et al. 2001) 
Co-sourcing Contracts based on performance, in which payments are tied to business performance. (Lacity et al. 2001) 
Spin-offs Giving complete autonomy in operation, pricing to IT staff of a company, as if they were the supplier. (Lacity et al. 2001) 
Facilities 
Management 
Outsourcing 
The facilities that require specialized and 
competent staff to operate are managed by a third 
party service provider. 
(Grover et al. 
1994b) 
Systems 
Integration 
Outsourcing 
A third party service provider linking various IT 
functions within and across the organizations. 
(Grover et al. 
1994b) 
Domestic 
Outsourcing 
An outsourcing decision (either total or selective) 
to avail the services of domestic vendor(s). (Sobol et al. 1995) 
 
In addition to the above, outsourcing could involve only a single vendor termed as 
simple dyadic or could involve multiple vendors termed as multi-vendor outsourcing 
(Dibbern et al. 2004). There is a broad consensus about measuring extent of outsourcing 
as a proportion to IT budget as shown in table 2.1. However on the other classifications 
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of various other types of outsourcing listed in Table 2.2, there is no consensus about the 
definition of these terms. The classifications in table 2.2 are neither complete, nor without 
overlap (De Looff 1995). The classifications have evolved over time depending upon the 
specific needs and situations of the firms, terms of the contracts, nature of the IT systems 
in place in each firm etc. The list of such classifications is only likely to expand over 
time, as the outsourcing processes undergo changes. 
The reason for emergence of different types of outsourcing lies in the specific 
needs of each outsourcing contract and the determinant factors behind such outsourcing 
decisions. To understand the determinants of outsourcing decision, multiple theoretical 
perspectives were adopted in outsourcing research. An overview of the theoretical 
perspectives and findings of the research on determinants of outsourcing is presented 
below. 
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DETERMINANTS OF IT OUTSOURCING AND DECISION MAKING FRAMEWORK 
Theoretical perspectives used and research approaches 
The main theories used in the pre-contract studies are the resource based theory 
(RBT) (Barney 1991), resource dependence theory (RDT) (Pfeffer et al. 1978), 
transaction cost economics theory (TCE)(Williamson 1985), and Agency theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989). 
In their conceptual piece, Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) present a 
comprehensive IS outsourcing model by bringing together four distinct but 
complementary theoretical perspectives of why firms make outsourcing decisions: 
Resource-based theory (RBT), Resource dependence theory (RDT), Transaction cost 
economics theory (TCE), and Agency costs theory (ACT).  
RBT (Barney 1991) explains the impact of firm resources on firm performance, 
and the effect of competitive advantage on firm performance. A resource is defined as 
anything which adds to the strength of a given firm which includes tangible and 
intangible assets of a firm (Wernerfelt 1984). These resources have the attributes of 
value, rareness, imperfect imitability and non-substituitability. A resource is considered 
valuable if the resource adds positive value to the firm. Rare implies that the resource is 
unique or scarce among current and potential competitors. Imperfect imitability is means 
the resource cannot be replicated or ‘imitated’ by the competitors. Non substitutability 
means other similar resources cannot be used in place of the resource, by competing 
firms to achieve the same or identical results. An individual resource by itself or in 
combination with other resources can result in advantages for the firm. From a resource 
based view, a firm formulates its internal strategy to gain market advantages, and 
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capitalizes on its internally available resources. In order to maintain or fully exploit a 
firm’s existing resources and maintain competitive advantage, a firm may require to 
accumulate certain external complementary resources (Grant 1991). Such filling the gaps 
in resources required, in the context of IT is outsourcing. Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) 
propose that from a resource-based theoretic perspective, outsourcing is a strategic 
response to fill the gaps between the expected level of performance and the actual level 
of performance of a firm’s IT resources. The IT resources are: IS information quality, IT 
support quality, IT staff quality, and IS cost effectiveness (Teng et al. 1995). 
According to the resource dependence theory, organizations depend on the 
environment to acquire and maintain the resources they need (Pfeffer et al. 1978). Task 
environments have three dimensions: concentration (the extent to which the power and 
authority in the environment is widely distributed), munificence (whether a critical 
resource is available or scarce) and interconnectedness (pattern of linkages among 
organizations). Resource dimensions are: importance of the resource, discretion (whether 
and which supplier to get the resource from), and alternatives (substitutability of the 
resource). Organizations adopt strategies to access those critical resources, establish those 
resource-dependent relationships with the external environment in order to ensure 
organizational survival. Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) propose that the dimensions of 
the environment (concentration, munificence and interconnectedness) and the resources 
(importance of the resource, alternatives available and discretion of the organization) 
influence an organization’ outsourcing decisions and outsourcing strategies (total or 
selective outsourcing or insourcing), causing dependence on various other organizations 
to obtain the critical IT resources.  
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Transaction cost economics theory (TCE) mainly concerns make or buy 
decisions. TCE (Williamson 1985) posits that economic efficiency can be achieved by a 
comparative analysis of production costs and transaction costs in exchanges conducted 
between two entities. Transaction costs are primarily influenced by three factors: Degree 
of uncertainty, frequency and asset specificity. Degree of uncertainty arises from fast 
paced technological changes, unpredictability in market conditions, complexity of the 
contracts and quality of the outputs. High degree of uncertainty leads to opportunism. 
Asset specificity is the degree to which assets are specifically designed for a particular 
purpose without many alternative uses. Transactions that have a high level of asset 
specificity should be produced in-house. Frequency of contracting is the recurring 
occurrences of transactions between the two parties.  
Cheon, Grover and Teng (1995) propose that the three factors of TCT increase the 
transaction costs and cost of outsourcing. TCT perspective considers the transaction costs 
of outsourcing an IT function. An IT function will be outsourced if it is low on asset 
specificity, low on uncertainty and high on frequency. Outsourcing is widely considered 
as a decision to economize costs, improve economic performance or for financial 
advantages (De Looff 1995; Loh et al. 1992a). Many of the studies predominantly used 
TCT perspective in studying the economic and financial aspects of outsourcing 
determinants (Ang et al. 1997; Aubert et al. 1996; Aubert et al. 2004; De Looff 1995; 
Loh et al. 1992a; Teng et al. 1995).  
Agency theory explains the relationship and the cost of a contract, where a 
principal delegates a job to an agent (Eisenhardt 1989; Jensen et al. 1976). Agency costs 
are the costs incurred by the principal to ensure the agent will act in the principals' 
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interest. The three components of agency costs are: monitoring costs, bonding costs and 
residual losses. Monitoring costs are the costs of selecting an agent, obtaining 
information and overseeing the agent’s performance. Bonding payments are the costs 
incurred by the agent to assure the principal of the agent’s commitment. Residual losses 
are the losses suffered by the principal on account of having an agent.  
Determinants of agency costs are: outcome uncertainty, programmability, 
measurability of performance, and risk aversion. Outcome uncertainty is caused by 
technological and economic changes, changes in government policies, or any other 
factors that reduce the ability to plan in advance, or factors that introduce an element of 
risk. Programmability is the extent of predictability of the agent’s appropriate behavior. 
Outcome measurability is the extent to which the performance of the agent can be easily 
measured. Risk aversion is the attitude of either the agent or principal or both, towards 
risk (Eisenhardt 1989).  
Assumptions of the agency cost theory are: parties in the relationship have self 
interest, bounded rationality and are risk averse. Agency theory also assumes that agent 
has an informational advantage over the principal and the agent’s interests may be 
different from that of the principal.  
In the context of outsourcing, the vendor acts as an agent and client acts as a 
principal. In a broad sense, agency costs are transaction costs incurred over the period of 
relationship between the vendor and client. High level of uncertainty, high risk aversion, 
low programmability, low outcome measurability increase the agency costs (Cheon et al. 
1995). Increased agency costs negatively impact the outcomes.  
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The four theoretical perspectives of outsourcing discussed above are 
complementary. Resource based perspective reviews the attributes of the individual IT 
functions. It evaluates whether there is a gap in the performance of the IT function vis-à-
vis the expectations, and if a gap exists, whether the resource should be outsourced. 
Resource dependence theory perspective looks at the IT as a function, and provides 
insights about the extent of the IT function that can be outsourced: i.e. RDT aids in 
deciding whether a firm has to opt for total outsourcing or selective outsourcing or total 
insourcing. TCE perspective explains the economics of the outsourcing decision. Agency 
cost perspective analyzes the cost of monitoring the outsourcing relationship over an 
extended period. Any one single theory cannot explain completely the organizational 
impacts of an outsourcing decision. RBT, RDT, TCE and ACT were all used in 
understanding the various factors that impact the outsourcing decision such as the 
determinants, the decision making processes and post-contract relationship management. 
The IT outsourcing research on outsourcing determinants are mainly concerned with the 
whether there is a gap in the expected and actual levels of performance of IT resources; if 
a gap exists, what extent of external resources should be outsourced to complement the 
internal resources; and what are the economic implications of such outsourcing decisions. 
These questions are addressed within the framework of the theoretical bases discussed 
earlier. The findings of the studies using the above theoretical approaches are discussed 
below.  
Determinants of IT outsourcing 
Loh and Venkatraman (1992a) hypothesized five determinants of outsourcing: 
high business cost structures, poor business performance, high debt (financial leverage), 
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high IT cost structure, and poor IT performance. The results confirmed that high business 
and IT cost structures, and poor IT performance were significant determinants of 
outsourcing decisions where as high debt and poor business performance of a firm were 
not significant determinant factors of outsourcing. 
In a similar study, using different data sources, Smith, Mitra and Narasimhan 
(1998) studied financial characteristics of firms entering into outsourcing contracts, 
immediately prior to outsourcing decisions. The study obtained similar results as the Loh 
and Venkatraman (1992a) study. The Smith, Mitra and Narasimhan (1998) study posited 
that the outsourcing firms had a pressing need to reduce costs, need for cash generation, 
need to focus on their core competencies, and had low profitability. Results supported the 
hypotheses about cost reduction and cash generation. The hypotheses about the firm’s 
need to focus on core competency, and the low profitability of the firm were not 
supported. 
Sobol and Apte (1995) surveyed companies identified as effective users of IS by 
ComputerWorld magazine. The study found that the important motivators for outsourcing 
were cost reduction, lesser staffing, focus on strategy, access to advanced technology, and 
reduction in capital investment. 
In a study involving more than 100 interviews with IT executives, the 
expectations of the executives from outsourcing contracts were documented in Lacity, 
Hirschheim and Willcocks (1994) study. Expectations are the motivations behind the 
outsourcing decisions or determinants. They classified the expectations in four 
categories: financial, business, technical and political expectations. Financial 
expectations include economies of scale of the vendor, control over IT costs, and 
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restructuring IT budgets. Strategic expectations include refocusing on the core 
competencies, eliminating IT incompatibilities at the time of mergers and acquisitions 
and sourcing IT from vendors in case of small startups. The technical expectations 
include better quality of service, access to expertise and new technologies. Political 
aspect involves phasing out a troublesome IT function, or imitation of the competitors.  
An interesting finding about the determinants of outsourcing was the need to 
bridge the gap in the expected and actual levels of IT performance (Teng et al. 1995). The 
difference between the expected levels of performance of IS resources and actual 
performance is termed the discrepancy in resource performance. Discrepancy in resource 
performance in an organization leads to the outsourcing of that IS resource. The IS 
resources considered for a possible discrepancy in performance were: Information 
quality, IS support quality, IS cost effectiveness and financial performance. Hypotheses 
regarding information quality and IS Support quality were supported. The surprising 
result in the study was that the financial performance or IS cost effectiveness did not find 
as strong a support as was found for service quality. The authors interpret the finding as: 
when there is a service quality discrepancy in the IT function, the requirement to bridge 
that discrepancy overrides the financial and cost considerations.  
Extending the research on determinants of outsourcing, many key findings were 
published in McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish (1995) study. McLellan et al. (1995) study 
found that even though companies had impressive business performance prior to the IT 
outsourcing decision, financial advantage gained by the firms from outsourcing is a 
strong motivator behind such outsourcing decisions. Outsourcing resulted in an average 
cost reduction of 19% and increase in profitability of more than 10% for the firms in the 
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study sample. All the executives in the sample recognized IT as yielding competitive 
advantage. 
The McLellan, Marcolin and Beamish (1995) study highlights the paradox of IT 
outsourcing: Research recognizes that core competencies are closely held by the firms. 
Though research recognized IT as a source of core competency (Burch 1990; Kearns et 
al. 2003; McLellan et al. 1995), it is still outsourced. The study answers the paradox as 
follows: The firms which outsourced IT still had firm managerial control over their IT 
functions. Only those functions which yielded substantial savings in cost were 
outsourced. Outsourcing IT enabled such firms to access superior technical skills or 
advanced technological resources that may be outside the firm.  
A critical review of results from determinants research 
Across multiple studies, there is a broad agreement on the main factors that 
contribute to the attractiveness of outsourcing – strategic, economic, technological 
(Grover et al. 1994b; Grover et al. 1993; Lacity et al. 1994; Willcocks et al. 1995) and 
political factors (Lacity et al. 1994). Strategic factors include focus on core competence, 
and gaining competitive advantage. Economic factors include cost advantages, financial 
leverage, economies of scale, and performance. Technical factors include increased 
access to skills and expertise, and avoidance of obsolescence. However support for these 
factors is not uniform across all the studies. Some studies did not find support for 
strategic factors as determinants for outsourcing decisions (Lacity et al. 1995b; Loh et al. 
1992a; Smith et al. 1998) despite a strong perception among the IT executives and 
decision makers that strategic considerations were a major consideration in outsourcing 
decisions (Lacity et al. 1994). There is also a view among researchers that the 
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outsourcing determinants are highly situation specific, and based on ideologies of the 
decision makers, and dependent on the nature of the IT functions which differ across 
firms in their purpose, size and complexity (De Looff 1995).  
Although cost savings is posited as a major factor influencing many outsourcing 
decisions (Lacity et al. 1994; Loh et al. 1992a; Sobol et al. 1995), there are studies in 
which cost was not found to be the most influential factor (Teng et al. 1995). The results 
of such studies were interpreted by the researchers taking into perspective the context of 
the study. In studies using qualitative data analysis techniques from interviews, most of 
the respondents suggested that cost reduction was a major motive behind IT outsourcing 
decisions and that IT is a source of core competence (Lacity et al. 1994; Levina et al. 
2003; Sobol et al. 1995; Willcocks et al. 1996). In studies where data from secondary 
sources were used, or in studies where survey techniques were used, the results seemed to 
vary based on the characteristics of the sample or the context of which the IT outsourcing 
decisions were taken and the nature of the IT function within an organization (Loh et al. 
1992a; McLellan et al. 1995; Smith et al. 1998). The variation in results despite broad 
agreement about the determinants is partly due to the highly context specific nature, 
distinctive characteristics of IT outsourcing, and partly due to the distinctive and 
organization specific nature of the IT function itself. 
IT Outsourcing decision making framework 
IT is a collection of multiple sub-functions. Common IT sub-functions identified 
in the past research that are outsourced include systems operations, applications 
development, applications maintenance, networks and telecommunications management, 
help desk and end user support, and systems planning and management (Dibbern et al. 
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2004; Grover et al. 1994a). Strategic role played by each of these sub-functions in the 
organization is an important consideration while making outsourcing decisions (Grover et 
al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1993; Lacity et al. 1998; Lacity et al. 1996; Teng et al. 1995). 
Research indicates that selective outsourcing of IT functions as opposed to total 
outsourcing is more popular among the decision makers (Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et 
al. 1993; Lacity et al. 1998; Lacity et al. 1996; Sobol et al. 1995). 
Grover and Teng (1993) study conceptualizes outsourcing as a strategic decision 
and classified the role of IT into three categories: traditional, evolving, and integral. The 
traditional role is non-strategy related, where the IT functions play a supporting role in 
operations, administration and decision making. Evolving role is one in which IT plays an 
actively supporting role in strategy formulation process, but not an integral part of the 
business strategy itself. In an integral role IT is used as a source of competitive 
advantage. IT forms an integral part of the corporate strategy. The IT sub functions that 
were tested in the study were applications development and maintenance, systems 
operation, networks and telecommunications management, end user computing support, 
systems planning and management. The strategic role of IT function moderated the 
relationship between an IT function and the decision to outsource the IT function. The 
non-strategic IT functions are outsourced while strategic IT functions are kept in-house.  
Grover et al (Grover et al. 1994a) classified organizations based on the 
organization strategy adopted by the firms. Organizational strategy is the process of 
decision making by which organizations adapt or respond to the changes in environment 
(Miles et al. 1978). An organization’s strategy is classified as either reactive or proactive 
based on the way an organization responds to the market changes (Miles et al. 1978). The 
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four types of organizational types based on their response to the market, proposed by 
Miles and Snow (1978) are as follows: Prospector – organization which responds rapidly 
to opportunities like marketing new products first in market. Analyzer – is the second-in 
response with better cost or service advantages. Defender is the risk-averse organization 
carefully responding only to market pressures. Reactor is a secure niche operator 
protecting its operational domain, and not in the forefront of industry developments 
(Miles et al. 1978). Organizational strategy of the firm was found to be a significant 
moderator indicating which of the IS functions are likely to be outsourced by the firm. 
Direct effects about the impact of organizational strategy of the firm were confirmed in 
two other studies by the same authors (Grover et al. 1994b; Grover et al. 1996b).  
Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny (1996) further classified IT on two dimensions based 
on contribution to operations and contribution to business positioning. On the 
contribution to operations dimension, IT is said to be a critical contributor to operations 
where IT is indispensable; IT is said to be a useful contributor if the function merely 
contributes to the bottom line of the business. On the contribution to the business 
positioning dimension, IT can be a differentiator or a commodity. An IT function is said 
to be a differentiator when it creates a characteristic distinction for a company from its 
competitors: for example – Semi-Automatic Business Research Environment (SABRE) 
online reservation system of the American Airlines. IT function is treated as a 
commodity, when it may not distinguish the company from its competitors, but the 
activity requires to be done competently. Examples are accounting systems, payroll and 
data processing centers. On a two way matrix, Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny (1996) 
classify IT in four categories: critical commodity or useful commodity and critical 
 28 
differentiator or useful differentiator. The critical differentiators are kept in-house, as 
these systems are instrumental achieving constant innovation and competitive advantage 
for the firm. Critical commodities are important to business operations but do not accrue 
any competitive advantage to the firm, and so are outsourced or kept in-house based on 
business considerations. Useful commodities are essential for the company but such 
functions are of a lower strategic priority. Therefore such functions are outsourced. 
Useful differentiators distinguish the firm from its competitors in a way which is not 
critical to success. Such IT functions are often phased out by the companies.  
Further evidence of advantage of selective outsourcing over total outsourcing was 
found in a study in which the senior business executives, CIOs, consultants and vendor 
account managers were interviewed (Lacity et al. 1996). Lacity et al. found that long-
term total-outsourcing contracts faced relational problems and escalated costs few years 
into the contract. Such problems arose because of the lack of awareness of the distinct 
characteristics of IT (Kern et al. 2002a; Lacity et al. 2001; Willcocks et al. 1996) among 
the executives, who treated IT outsourcing as any other make or buy decision.  
Results across the several studies discussed above have been consistent in 
highlighting the advantages of selective outsourcing over total outsourcing or total 
insourcing (Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1993; Lacity et al. 1998; Lacity et al. 1996; 
Sobol et al. 1995). The reasons for higher success rates of selective outsourcing are as 
follows:  
IT outsourcing is a strategic decision (Grover et al. 1993), where organizations 
carefully consider whether to outsource or not to outsource an IT function depending 
upon the strategic role played by the IT function within the organization (Grover et al. 
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1994a; Grover et al. 1994b). Organizations tend to outsource IT functions which have 
lesser strategic importance.  
The roles of IT functions are highly organization specific (Grover et al. 1994a). 
Therefore problems such as integration, and compatibility of IT functions of client and 
vendor, are likely to arise during the execution (Lacity et al. 1994; Lacity et al. 1993b; 
Lacity et al. 1995b).  
Where IT functions of an organization involves customization and compatibility 
issues, selective outsourcing affords the convenience of the problems of compatibility of 
client and vendor IT systems are minimized, and easily addressed when only a portion of 
the IT function within an organization is outsourced. 
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH IT OUTSOURCING  
Even though selective outsourcing may have an advantage over total outsourcing 
and total insourcing, all IT outsourcing projects entail a significant amount of risk 
(McFarlan et al. 1995; Quinn et al. 1994). The factors that contribute to emergence of 
risks in IT outsourcing contracts are: 1. the type of outsourcing: selective outsourcing, 
total outsourcing or total insourcing. 2. vendor selection criteria and selection process, 3. 
role of formal contract. 4. capabilities retained inhouse, and 5. post-contract management 
of the IT outsourcing project. (Willcocks et al. 1999b). Some of these risks in the post-
contract relationship phase can be explained from an agency theoretic perspective. Past 
research (Jurison 1995; Kern et al. 2002b; Willcocks et al. 1999b) explains risks 
associated with outsourcing from an agency theoretic perspective, which is summarized 
below. 
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Agency Theory and IT outsourcing risks 
Agency theory (Eisenhardt 1989) aims to explain the problems that can occur in 
principal-agent relationships. Two specific problems that concern agency theory are: 
conflict of goals of the agent and the principal, and situations where principal has no 
means to verify the agent’s actual behavior. Agency theory is concerned with 
determining the most efficient contract governing the principal agent relationship. The 
assumptions that agency theory makes about the parties in the relationship are: bounded 
rationality, risk aversion, self-interest, conflict of goals and information asymmetry. The 
parties in the relationship are the principal and the agent. Agent is the person who acts on 
behalf of the principal. Agency theory aims to situations in which the agent and principal 
are likely to have goal conflicts and limit the agent’s opportunistic behavior through 
governance mechanisms.  
Contracts between the agent and principal are of two types: outcome based and 
performance based. Outcome based contracts are those where the principal has the 
information to verify agent’s performance based on the results. Behavior based contracts 
are those where the principal does not have a means to verify the performance of the 
agent (Eisenhardt 1989). Where the principal does not have a means to assess the 
outcomes, or where the assessment of performance of the agent is problematic, agent has 
a favorable information asymmetry over the principal. Such information asymmetries 
favoring one party in a relationship results in opportunistic behaviors (Eisenhardt 1989). 
After an extensive review of agency theory, Eisenhardt (1989) made propositions 
of the types of contracts preferred by the agent or principal under different conditions of 
measurability of performance, goal conflict, prior knowledge of parties and risk aversion 
of the parties.  
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1. Propositions based on measurability and information asymmetry 
Based on measurability of the outcomes: Where the outcomes are easily 
measurable, outcome based contracts are preferred. If measuring outcomes are difficult, 
behavior based contracts are preferred. Agent is likely to act in principal’s interest when 
the contract is outcome based. Principal relies on information systems such as budgeting 
systems, reporting systems or management layers where the contracts are behavior based. 
Based on measurability of the agents behavior: Where the principal can easily 
assess an agent’s performance, behavior based contracts are preferred by the principal.  
2. Propositions based on goal conflicts:  
As goal conflicts increase, behavior based contracts will be more favored over 
outcome based contracts by the agent, because agent’s performance cannot be readily 
assessed by the principal. Principal in such situations will prefer outcome based contracts 
to behavior based contracts.  
3. Propositions based on prior knowledge of the parties  
Where there is an existing and a long relationship between the parties and the 
principal and agent are familiar with each others’ behavior, behavior based contracts are 
preferred to contract based contracts. 
4. Propositions based on controllability or no- controllability of risks and risk aversion 
When the risks are controllable, the cost of shifting risk to the agent is low. When 
the risks are non-controllable, cost of shifting risk to the agent is high. 
If the agent is risk averse, the cost of passing on risk to agent becomes expensive 
(negative relation to outcome based contracts); if the agent is less risk averse, the cost of 
shifting risk to the agent is low (positive relation to outcome based contracts). Principal’s 
risk aversion will be negatively related to behavior based contracts and positively 
inclined towards outcome based contracts.  
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Applicability of agency theoretic perspective to IT outsourcing 
Agency theory is best suited to explain the post contract risks in IT outsourcing 
for the following reasons: 1. the relationship between the vendor and the client is of a 
continuing nature comprising of several transactions within an IT outsourcing project. 2. 
By definition, IT outsourcing is allowing a vendor to provide or manage the IT systems 
of an organization such as systems operations, applications development, applications 
maintenance, networks and telecommunications management, help desk and end user 
support, and systems planning and management (Dibbern et al. 2004; Grover et al. 1994a; 
Willcocks et al. 1998b). The ownership of the IT facilities rests with the client. 3. Client 
also incurs the agency costs of monitoring the services provided by the vendor, bonding 
payments by the vendors, and also suffers the residual losses.  
Risks associated with outsourcing 
Using an outsourcing case study in the defense sector, Willcocks, Lacity and Kern 
(1999b) analyze the potential risks that could arise in IT outsourcing projects and suggest 
a framework for mitigation of those risks. Summary of the risk mitigation enumerated in 
the Willcocks, Lacity and Kern (1999b) study is given in Table 2.3.  
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Table 2.3 - Summary of Risk mitigation strategies proposed in Willcocks, Lacity and 
Kern (1999b) 
 
 
 
Risk factors Nature of risk Mitigation strategy proposed  
 Treating IT as an 
undifferentiated commodity to 
be outsourced  
 Lack of experience to 
manage total outsourcing  
 Failure to build and retain 
inhouse capability 
Pre-contract Integrated IT functions should be 
kept in-house. Only those IT 
functions that are discrete should be 
outsourced 
 Poor Vendor Selection 
 Contracts not being 
comprehensive 
Pre-contract 
Pre-contract 
Following proper assessment and 
selection procedures beyond cost 
considerations alone.  
 Lack of active relationship  
 Power asymmetries favoring 
vendor 
Post contract Tight contracts, overseeing vendor 
performance, reporting and building 
trust can improve relationship 
management. 
 Difficulties on account of 
fast pace of IT change  
Pre and post 
contract 
This risk is partly unavoidable, but 
tight contracts can tide over this 
aspect, coupled with efficient 
relationship management and 
flexibility in the contract. 
 Short term outsourcing for 
financial leverage 
Pre contract  
 Unrealistic expectations for 
outsourcing 
Pre contract A comprehensive Pre-contract 
assessment of the IT issues prior to 
outsourcing like evaluating inhouse 
options on par with outside bids will 
address this problem. 
 
Jurison (1995) evaluated factors of risk in IT outsourcing and the benefits of IT 
outsourcing from the perspective of transaction cost economics and risk and return model 
from financial theory. Integrating the two theories, Jurison proposes that the financial 
value of IT outsourcing risk falls in a gray area between the transaction and coordination 
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costs of outsourcing and the transaction and coordination costs of the same IT function 
insourced. The study proposed that the outsourcing decisions are a trade off between 
benefits accruing out of the transaction cost economics and risks involved with the 
outsourcing decision. Jurison (1995) identified the following risks associated with IT 
outsourcing: irreversibility of outsourcing decision, loss of autonomy and control over IT 
decisions, loss of control over data, loss of control over critical skills, breach of contract 
by the vendor, vendor’s inability to deliver, biased portrayal by vendors, vendor lock-in, 
lack of trust, hidden costs.  
Some of the risks identified above are controllable by formal contracts such as: 
fixed fee contracts, penalty clauses, special arrangements for handling changes, and early 
termination clauses, within the formal contract mechanisms. Other options for risk 
reduction are overseeing vendor performance, reporting, and client representation on site. 
Other strategies proposed by the framework are risk sharing and risk transfer to the 
vendor. However the transactions that reduce risk, whether by formal contract means, or 
by negotiation, increase the cost of transaction, thereby increasing the overall costs and 
reducing the economies. Managers while making outsourcing decisions must identify all 
the risks underlying the decisions based on their controllability.  
Factors of risk tested in the current study 
In the context of IT outsourcing, the propositions made in the Eisenhardt (1989) 
study about information asymmetry and goal conflict are relevant in the post-contract 
phase of the relationship. Information asymmetries between the parties could result in 
opportunistic behavior of one the parties. Opportunistic behavior, and conflict of goals 
have been recognized in IT outsourcing research as the risks arising in IT outsourcing 
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relationships (Jurison 1995; Willcocks et al. 1999b). Eisenhardt’s (1989) other two 
categories of propositions about the prior knowledge of parties in a relationship and 
controllability of risks and risk aversion are not relevant in the post-contract phase of IT 
outsourcing for the following reasons: Prior knowledge about the parties is tested in this 
study as a basis for creation of trust. Prior knowledge of the parties from a risk 
perspective is more relevant and will be considered by the IT outsourcing clients at the 
time of vendor selection in the pre-contract phase. The controllability of risks and the 
possibility of passing on the risk to either the client or the vendor are considered at the 
time of finalization of contract and such aspects are built into the terms of the contract.  
The present study proposes to test three kinds of post contract risks: vendor 
opportunism, conflict of interests, and risk of non-involvement of the stakeholders. These 
risk factors and their definitions are presented in chapter 4. 
SUMMARY OF PRE-CONTRACT STUDIES  
The pre-contract studies in outsourcing primarily focus on the motivations behind 
the outsourcing decisions. From the research discussed above, results indicate that the 
most important considerations in almost all the outsourcing decisions were costs and 
financial savings (Grover et al. 1994b; Lacity et al. 1994; Loh et al. 1992a; McLellan et 
al. 1995) followed by strategic considerations (Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1994b; 
Grover et al. 1996b; Lacity et al. 1993a; Lacity et al. 1993b; Willcocks et al. 1998a) and 
access to expertise and advanced technology.  
The IT function is generally considered as contributing to an organization’s core 
competence (Burch 1990; Kearns et al. 2003; McLellan et al. 1995). However, there are 
multiple sub-functions within IT functions. Only some of the IT sub-functions contribute 
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to the core competence of an organization, while other sub-functions may not. The 
paradoxical question of why IT function being a core competence is being outsourced 
(McLellan et al. 1995) was explained from the understanding that IT is comprised of 
multiple functions, all of which may not contribute to the core competence. The research 
found that the IT sub functions which are core competencies for a firm resulting in 
competitive advantage (critical differentiators), were not outsourced, but only those IT 
functions which were of routine nature (non-critical commodities) were outsourced 
(Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1996b; Lacity et al. 1996; Teng et al. 1995).  
The above relationships about the core competency of IT and outsourcing 
decisions also indicate that selective outsourcing more preferred to total outsourcing. 
Total outsourcing often did not result in the desired benefits, and often faced problems 
after a few years into the contract (Lacity et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 1993b; Lacity et al. 
1996). Selective outsourcing deals were found to be more successful than the total 
outsourcing deals (Lacity et al. 1996; Lee et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2003). Size of the IT 
function of the client and industry characteristics of the client (Lee et al. 1997), vendor 
attributes (Levina et al. 2003) and term of the outsourcing contract had significant impact 
on success of the outsourcing contract. 
POST-CONTRACT STUDIES 
Even though many benefits – financial, strategic, political and technological, are 
associated with outsourcing, there is a criticism that the benefits from IT outsourcing 
were projected to be too optimistic (Lacity et al. 1993b). The desired objectives of 
outsourcing are often not fully realized (Grover et al. 1994b; Lacity et al. 1993b). The 
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market surveys on outsourcing reported that only in 30 to 35 percent of the firms, the 
objectives were actually realized (Deloitte 2005; DiamondCluster 2002).  
Past research on post contract studies analyzed and identified the following 
reasons for outsourcing successes or failures: vendor selection, contract related issues and 
loss of flexibility, hidden costs, measurement of performance issues and issues of 
relationship management involving risk and trust (Barthelemy 2001; Grover et al. 1994b; 
Lacity et al. 1994; Lacity et al. 1993b; Lacity et al. 1995b; Sabherwal 1999).  
The issues identified above can be classified broadly into two categories: First 
stream (termed in this study as ‘Lessons learned from outsourcing contract’) deals with 
the vendor selection and contract issues based on case studies and interviews with the 
executives involved in outsourcing contracts. This stream of research covered a broad 
range of issues spanning multiple case studies in a variety of industries, and identified a 
plethora of issues involved in the post contract phase, which have a direct impact on 
success or failure of the contract and provided a list of prescriptions for practice at the 
time of entering into a contract, assessment of vendor bids, vendor selection, and post-
contract performance.  
The second stream of research (termed in this study as “Research on outsourcing 
success”) examined outsourcing success as the dependent variable, and tested the impact 
of various relationship and partnership variables on outsourcing success based on surveys 
of executives involved in outsourcing. The main theoretical bases used in this research 
are social exchange theory (Blau 1964b), partnership theory (Henderson 1990), theory of 
reasoned action (Ajzen et al. 1980), and behavioral-attitudinal theories (Kappelman et al. 
1992).  
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Findings of both the streams of research are presented below: 
Lessons learnt from IT outsourcing contracts 
After a detailed in-depth multiple case analysis of fourteen Fortune 500 
companies, Lacity and Hirchhiem (1993a) identified the common notions of the clients 
about outsourcing deals as follows:  
Clients often believed that the vendors are more efficient in delivering the 
outsourced operations because of economies of scale. In reality, vendors did not enjoy 
any economies of scale more than the client’s own IT departments. Vendors also had to 
factor their profit margins over the cost into the bids for IT outsourcing contracts. 
Cinent’s IT departments must be able to achieve that level of efficiency as there was no 
profit margin in case of in-house operations. 
Clients expected IT outsourcing to allow access better technical expertise. This 
expectation was often not met because in most cases, the vendors recruited the client’s 
support staff that was displaced because of IT outsourcing. The clients are assigned the 
same support staff by the vendors. Additional expertise from the vendor is either not 
forthcoming or is expensive.  
Clients believed that a savings of 10% to 50% could be achieved by outsourcing 
IT. Lower bids by the vendors may not indicate greater efficiency because of the reasons 
mentioned above. Executives’ common belief that 10 to 50 percent savings can be 
achieved by outsourcing has not been realized often because of hidden costs. 
 Lacity and Hirchhiem (1993a) highlighted important aspects to be considered at 
the time of contract negotiations: careful selection of the vendor; ensuring that contracts 
are custom drafted and complete; inclusion of penalty terms in contract for non-
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performance; inclusion of termination clause; having experts to negotiate the contract; 
evolving proper performance evaluation measures; including conflict resolution and 
escalation procedures in contract; including pre-determined service/resource growth rates 
in the contract.  
With a sample of 145 interviews of IT executives in 40 organizations Willcocks, 
Lacity and Fitzgerald (1995) analyzed assessment and measurement of performance 
issues in 61 outsourcing decisions. Outsourcing decisions included data centre operations, 
system development, systems support, telecommunications and PC maintenance. In 
addition to confirming the findings in Lacity and Hirchhiem (1993a) discussed above, the 
study highlighted the importance of relationship management, monitoring and the risk of 
opportunistic behavior by the vendor.  
Kern, Willcocks and van Heck (2002b) explored the scenario of winner’s curse in 
vendor selection. Winner’s curse is common in auctions where the winner of the bid pays 
the highest price. In outsourcing, the supplier who wins the outsourcing is likely to be the 
lowest bidder. The study examined 85 outsourcing cases in various industries and found 
that the supplier under bid on contracts as the real costs and values of the outsourcing 
services were not taken into account. The supplier stands to lose in such situations, which 
could also affect the client negatively because of reduced services, lack of quality, 
inexperienced staff and understaffing, if not controlled tightly. Such situations invariably 
resulted in cost escalation, relational friction, renegotiation or termination of the 
contracts. The solution to such problems was to renegotiate the contract early in order to 
ensure maintenance of desired service levels and operational efficiency. The post contract 
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phase problems can be avoided at the bid level by proper bid assessment by the client. 
Similar results were found in Willcocks, Lacity and Fitzgerald (1995) study.  
Research on outsourcing relationships 
Though the research acknowledged the importance of relationship management in 
outsourcing contracts, the research on outsourcing relationships is relatively scarce. The 
post-contract research on relationships examined success or failure of the outsourcing 
contract and the relationship management issues from the perspectives of social exchange 
theory (Blau 1964b; Homans 1961; Thibaut et al. 1959) and relational contract 
theory(Macaulay 1963; Macneil 1978) and strategic partnership theory (Dwyer et al. 
1987; Henderson 1990). The three main theories used in the research on IT outsourcing 
relationship are briefly reviewed in the following paragraphs, and a review of the 
empirical research in the context of IT outsourcing relationships is presented thereafter. 
Social exchange theory: Social Exchange theory (Blau 1964b; Homans 1961; 
Thibaut et al. 1959) explains the factors that influence the formation, maintenance, and 
dissolution of exchange relationships. Within a relationship where series of transactional 
exchanges occur, the parties in the relationship strive to minimize costs and maximize 
rewards. Parties in the relationship establish and continue the relationship based on the 
expectation that the outcomes from the relational exchanges will be mutually beneficial. 
The assumptions about the nature of exchange relationships are as follows: The parties in 
the relationship are dependent on each other i.e. obtain rewards from and provide rewards 
to each other. The parties are, fair and just to each other. There is mutual trust between 
the parties ensuring stability of relationship over time (Blau 1964b; Homans 1961; 
Thibaut et al. 1959). 
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Relational contract theory: Often, legal contracts are not comprehensive and in 
sometimes where the parties have a long interaction with each other, there may not be a 
necessity for formal contracts. Relational contract theory (Baker, Gibbons and Murphy 
2002; Macaulay 1963; Macneil 1978) aims to explain the mechanisms that ensure that 
each party fulfills obligations, when the parties in a relationship either do not have a 
comprehensive formal contract, or choose not to have a formal contract. Relational 
contracts are based on cooperation between the parties and therefore are self-enforcing. 
The theory assumes that there is frequent interaction between the parties, and there are a 
set norms governing the behavior of the parties, the relationship is mutually beneficial, 
and the parties in the relationship do not engage in opportunistic behavior. In such 
relationships, the formal contract is just a part of the relationship that governs the 
transactions between the parties (Macneil 1978). Formal and relational contracts in a 
business relationship can be either complements or substitutes depending upon the 
context of the relationship or interaction between the parties. Informal agreements can be 
complements or substitutes depending on the context. 
Strategic Partnerships: The American Heritage Dictionary (2000), defines a 
partnership as “A relationship between individuals or groups that is characterized by 
mutual cooperation and responsibility, as for the achievement of a specified goal.” In the 
organizational research, the concept of strategic partnership has been used to study 
organizations or individuals in organizations working together in a mutually rewarding 
relationship to achieve common goals, and to accomplish a shared purposes like 
achievement of competitive advantage, mutual access to superior resources (Anderson et 
al. 1990; Anderson et al. 1991; Dwyer et al. 1987; Gray et al. 1991; Henderson 1990).  
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Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) proposed a conceptual model of partnership 
development comprising of four main processes: awareness, exploration, expansion, and 
commitment. Awareness in the partnership model refers to the mutual knowledge of the 
parties about each other’s potential to form a relationship. Relationship does not yet 
develop at this stage. The exploration phase of the relationship is when the exchanges 
between the parties begin and the relationship between the parties begins to develop. 
Expansion stage is a further phase in the relationship where the parties become 
interdependent and the relationship established in the exploration stage deepens based on 
the previous interactions and positive experiences between the parties. Commitment 
phase is when the partners agree explicitly and implicitly to continue the relationship 
over a long term. The relationship at this stage reaches a mutually fulfilling level where 
both parties benefit out of the relationship. The partnership model aims to explain how 
the partnerships develop into stable and mutually beneficial relationships over time. The 
concept of strategic partnership has been used in studying IT outsourcing relationships as 
described in the following paragraphs. 
Based on interviews of 14 managers in 12 organizations Kern and Willcocks 
(2000) highlighted the importance of contractual, behavioral and social factors in addition 
to economic factors, in the area of outsourcing relationship management from a social 
exchange theory and relational contract theory perspective. The study results indicate that 
the context and the contract structure which include the objectives and expectations 
(financial, technical and political), influence the relationship interactions. The study 
identified eight dimensions of behavioral interactions which govern the relationship: 
commitment, conflict, cooperation, dependency, expectations, power, satisfaction, and 
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trust. Similar relationship factors were found in another study involving a single case 
study of UK inland revenue (Willcocks et al. 1998b). Both studies conclude that based on 
the eight dimensions identified above, the relationship management essentially centers on 
accomplishment of client expectations.  
From a social exchange theory perspective, trust was found to be an important 
factor in managing the outsourced IS development projects (Sabherwal 1999). Based on 
interviews of executives from 21 client firms and 26 vendor firms involved in 18 
outsourcing projects, Sabherwal (1999) found that developing mutual trust between the 
parties could potentially avoid problems in outsourcing relationships.  
Transitioning to the vendor at the time of outsourcing, post contract re-transition 
costs, monitoring the vendors’ performance and managing the relationship were 
identified as the hidden costs in outsourcing projects (Barthelemy 2001). Vendor-search 
costs, though classified as pre-contract costs were considered as a hidden cost of 
outsourcing itself. The Barthelemy (2001) study recognizes that the selection of a right 
vendor can decide the success or failure of client’s outsourcing venture. From an analysis 
of 50 outsourcing cases, the study makes the following recommendations for reducing 
hidden costs in outsourcing: outsourcing those IT functions that are not very critical to 
the business, or do not have too much uncertainty; following the best practices for vendor 
selection, adopting of accurate assessment measures of performance, effective 
negotiations, and drafting of tight and comprehensive formal contracts. The important 
conclusion the study makes about the relationships is about the importance of managing 
the relationships. The Barthelemy (2001) study proposes that relationships built on 
mutual trust reduce the hidden costs of outsourcing and increase the flexibility in the 
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contracts. Maintaining healthy client-vendor relationship makes the process of conflict 
resolution easy, and reduces the costs from escalating. 
From the perspective of strategic partnerships in IT outsourcing context, Klepper 
(1995a) study expanded the strategic partnership model (Dwyer et al. 1987) by adding 
five sub-processes to the partnership model: attraction, communication and bargaining, 
power and justice, norms, and expectations. Attraction refers to the direct benefits 
received by the client like quality and performance of the vendor, and vendor’s technical 
expertise, service capability, financial viability, managerial abilities, status and 
reputation. If the vendor characteristics mentioned above are complementary to that of 
the client, the parties are more likely to become partners. Communications and 
bargaining are the mechanisms by which the requirements and needs of the parties are 
expressed and exchanged. Bargaining is the conflict resolution process which lends 
flexibility to the project and the relationship. Power and justice: if one party has valuable 
resources, that party enjoys a position of power in the relationship. The power is 
enhanced if there are limited alternative choices for the other party. When power is used 
for providing joint benefits for the parties in the relationship, it adds strength to the 
relationship. Where power is used unilaterally to the detriment of the other party, the 
relationship ends. Norm development is the behavior of the parties, where the mutual best 
interests are protected by not indulging in opportunistic behavior even if there might be 
an occasion to do. Expectations development is the estimation of behavior of the other 
party. Met expectations translate into trust between the parties and give rise to further 
expectations, strengthening the relationship.  
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Each of the five sub-processes mentioned above become more and more relevant 
when the relationship progresses into the commitment phase of the strategic partnership 
(Dwyer et al. 1987). In the commitment stage, each party is vulnerable for opportunistic 
behavior of the other party, and the importance of the five sub-processes that strengthen 
the relationship become more evident.  
Adopting a strategic partnership perspective, Lee and Kim (1999) study tested the 
impact of partnership quality on outsourcing success. Using a sample of 36 service 
providers and 54 receivers, the study tested the determinants of partnership quality, 
components of partnership quality and the impact of partnership quality on outsourcing 
success. Lee and Kim (1999) classified the strategic partnership constructs into three 
categories: dynamic factors (participation, joint action, communication quality, 
coordination, information sharing), static factors (age of relationship, and mutual 
dependency), and contextual factors (culture similarity and top management support). 
The definitions of these constructs are given in table 4. Five dimensions of partnership 
quality tested in the study were: trust, business understanding, benefit and risk share, 
conflict and commitment. The antecedent factors of partnership quality proposed are: 
joint action, communication quality, coordination, information sharing, age of the 
relationship, mutual dependency, cultural similarity, and top management support.  
Lee and Kim (1999) study is important in IT outsourcing relationship research for 
many reasons. First: It is one of the first studies which empirically tested the strategic 
partnership theory variables in an IT outsourcing context. Second: The Lee and Kim 
study had some interesting findings discussed later in the critique of relationship 
research. The results in the Lee and Kim (1999) study are summarized in table 2.4 below.   
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Table 2.4 - Summary of constructs, definitions, and results in the Lee and Kim (1999) 
study 
 
 
 
Construct Definition provided in the Lee and 
Kim (1999) study  
Significance of the relationship 
Trust Degree of confidence and 
willingness between partners 
Significantly related to 
outsourcing success. 
Business 
understanding 
Degree of understanding of 
behaviors, goals, and policies 
between partners 
Significantly related to 
outsourcing success. 
Benefit and risk 
share 
Degree of articulation and 
agreement on benefit and risk 
between partners 
Significantly related to 
outsourcing success. 
Conflict Degree of incompatibility of 
activities, resource share and goals 
between partners 
Significantly related to 
outsourcing success. 
Commitment Degree of the pledge of 
relationship continuity between 
partners 
Significantly related to 
outsourcing success. 
Participation Active participation of the 
members in the relationship in 
resolving “conflict, frustration and 
vacillation in the group”. 
Significantly related to 
partnership quality (PQ) 
Joint action The degree of interpenetration of 
organizational boundaries – which 
is a mechanism for negotiating and 
agreeing upon mutual benefits and 
for creating a common goal for 
participants. 
Not significantly related to PQ. 
Positively related to benefit and 
risk. Negatively associated with 
conflict. Not significantly related 
to trust, business understanding 
and commitment. 
Communication 
quality 
Effective communication between 
the parties – which is an 
antecedent for trust between the 
parties. 
Significantly related to 
partnership quality (PQ) 
Coordination Coordinated action directed at 
mutual objectives to maintain 
stability between parties in a 
dynamic environment 
Not significant 
Information 
sharing 
Extent to which critical 
information or proprietary 
information is communicated to 
one’s partner. 
Significantly related to 
partnership quality (PQ) 
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Age of the 
relationship 
Long term versus short term 
interaction with the partner 
Not significant as posited. 
Significant negative effect. 
Mutual 
Dependency 
Perception of a firm’s dependency 
on its partner firm, relative to the 
partner firms’ dependency on it. 
Not significant as posited. 
Significant negative effect—
more the dependency – lesser 
the partnership quality. 
Top 
management 
support 
Top executives understanding of 
shared benefits of collaboration 
Significantly related to 
partnership quality (PQ) 
 
Trust, business understanding, benefit and risk share, and commitment were 
significantly related to outsourcing success. Determinants of partnership quality had 
interesting results and are shown in the table above. Participation, information sharing 
and top management support, were positively related to partnership quality. Age of the 
partnership, and mutual dependency were related negatively to partnership quality, 
contrary to what was posited. Joint action had mixed results: it was positively related to 
benefit and risk, negatively associated with conflict and not significantly related to trust, 
business understanding and commitment. Coordination was not significant. Outsourcing 
success was measured in terms of success from business perspective – defined as 
achieving strategic, economic and technological objectives (Grover et al. 1996b) and user 
perspective defined as the level of quality of the services offered – measured by user 
satisfaction.  
Criticism of strategic partnerships 
The concept of strategic partnership has been extensively used in marketing and 
organizational research (Anderson et al. 1990; Anderson et al. 1991; Henderson 1990; 
Narus et al. 1986; Narus et al. 1987). The same has been replicated in IT outsourcing 
research also (Grover et al. 1996b; Lee et al. 1999). Both parties involved in such 
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interactive relationships stand to benefit mutually. IT outsourcing research across the 
board, has emphasized the importance of relationships in IT outsourcing 
(examples:Barthelemy 2001; Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; 
Sabherwal 1999).  
However, some authors believe that while relationships are important for 
outsourcing success, the strategic partnership view about the vendor is misleading (Lacity 
et al. 1993a). The argument put forth in support of this point of view is that the profit 
motive is not shared. The term ‘partnership’ as defined in Grover et. al (1996b) and Lee 
and Kim (1999) studies only denotes the relationship aspect, and there is no profit sharing 
motive involved.  
The applicability of such strategic partnerships in IT outsourcing context has been 
criticized (Lacity et al. 1993a) because of the special characteristics of IT discussed in 
chapter 1. Lacity and Hirschhiem (1993a) and (Kern, Willcocks and van Heck (2002b) 
analyze from IT outsourcing case studies that it is a “myth” to call IT outsourcing 
vendors as strategic partners for the following reasons: 1. profit motive is not shared. 2. 
risk of vendor’s opportunistic behavior exists. 3. the nature of relationship that exists is 
that of a contractual nature. 4. The strategic priorities of the client, for which the 
outsourcing contract is entered into, need not necessarily be the strategic priorities of the 
vendor. 5. in case of failures, the loss is not borne or welcomed by either party or the 
losing party compensated. (Lacity et al. 1993a) 6. Situations in outsourcing arise, where 
there may be one-sided contracts either favoring the client or the vendor (Kern et al. 
2002b) resulting in power imbalances. In most such cases, the balance is in favor of the 
vendor. 
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The finding from Lee and Kim (1999) study about mutual dependency – that 
more dependency will negatively impact partnership quality – gives strength to the above 
argument. The finding suggests that more dependency could lead to power imbalances or 
give rise to opportunistic behaviors by the vendor. This phase of relationship corresponds 
to the expansion phase described in the strategic partnership model (Dwyer et al. 1987) 
discussed earlier. The strategic partnership model proposes that development of 
imbalances of power in itself it not a negative factor, but the manner in which the power 
is used by the parties could negatively impact the relationship. The next phase of the 
relationship proposed in the strategic partnership theory is commitment, which indicates 
that the relationship is sustained beyond the parties’ dependencies or power imbalances. 
However, Lee and Kim (1999) study posited a positive relationship between mutual 
dependency and partnership quality but results indicate a significant negative impact of 
mutual dependence on partnership quality.  
IT outsourcing, is similar to purchasing the finished product of the vendor 
(outsourcing services), as a raw material for the clients operations similar to make-or-buy 
decisions (Bensaou et al. 1995). The client’s operations may or not be related to the 
vendor’s line of business at all. Similarly, past research indicates that strategic IT 
resources are seldom outsourced, but only the non-strategy related functions such as 
applications development, telecommunications maintenance and management and end 
user computing support functions (Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1994b; Grover et al. 
1993; Sobol et al. 1995). 
This current study proposes to test partnership variables coupled with social 
exchange perspective can give a deeper understanding of the IT outsourcing 
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relationships. From a social exchange perspective, this study tests the impact of trust 
constructs on the relationship quality. Social exchange perspective is better suited for 
studying the IT outsourcing relationships because, the bases of relationships in social 
exchange theory framework (Molm et al. 2000). The relationships from a social exchange 
theory perspective are based on mutual dependence where the parties in a relationship are 
dependent on each other. The social exchange relationship can be a negotiated exchange 
based on formal contracts and bargaining or a reciprocal exchange where the mutually 
beneficial actions performed by the parties are separate and non-negotiated. The most 
important distinction of social exchange theory from relational contract theory or 
strategic theory is that the social exchange perspective recognizes that risk of one party 
not performing his or her part of the expectations in a relationship, or risk of imbalance of 
power in favor of one party and opportunistic behavior by a party in the relationship. 
Social exchange theory proposes that the recognition of possibility of risk is critical to the 
development of trust between the parties (Molm et al. 2000) to reduce social uncertainty 
(Luhmann 1979). A detailed review of trust constructs is presented in the next chapter. 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE IN RELATIONSHIP RESEARCH: OUTSOURCING SUCCESS 
Empirical research on IT outsourcing relationships examined outsourcing success 
as the dependent variable. Outsourcing success is measured in terms of accomplishment 
of the outsourcing objectives and operationalized as a multidimensional latent variable 
consisting achievement of strategic, economic and technological objectives (Grover et al. 
1996b; Lee et al. 1999), and the level of user satisfaction (Lee et al. 1999). 
Outsourcing success is defined as satisfaction with the benefits derived by the 
organization from employing a particular outsourcing strategy (Grover et al. 1996b). 
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From a survey of 188 top IS executives in randomly selected industries, Grover, Cheon 
and Teng (1996b) examined the determinants of outsourcing success of various IS 
functions. Important findings from the study were: from the transaction cost theoretic 
perspective, asset specificity was found to be key factor to be considered in all 
outsourcing decisions. Service quality and partnership interactions such as cooperation, 
trust and communication were found to be important factors impacting outsourcing 
success. 
Using behavioral and psychological variables, Lee and Kim (2005) examined the 
impact of strategic partnership constructs on outsourcing success, surveying a sample of 
225 firms in Korea. Six partnership variables were identified in the study. Three of the 
variables (shared knowledge, mutual dependency and organizational linkage) were based 
on behavioral-attitudinal theory (Kappelman et al. 1992) and three psychological 
variables (perception of mutual benefits, perception of commitment and perception of 
predisposition) were based on Theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen et al. 1980). 
Behavioral-attitudinal theory measures the psychological factors (like involvement) 
underlying an observed behavior. TRA measures the observed behavior as influenced by 
beliefs, attitudes, subjective norms and intentions.  
The study tested these variables in three stages: Direct effect of behavioral and 
psychological variables on outsourcing success; effect of behavioral variables mediated 
by psychological variables on outsourcing success, based on behavioral-attitudinal 
theory; effect of psychological variables on outsourcing success, mediated by behavioral 
variables based on theory of reasoned action. Results indicated that the model based on 
behavioral-attitudinal theory predicted the success the best. This confirmed the 
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hypothesis that the involvement of the parties in the relationship (measured by the 
psychological variables) is a good predictor of outsourcing success.  
From a psychological contract perspective Koh, Ang and Straub (2004) 
investigated the mutual obligations between the vendor and client and the impact of 
fulfillment of obligations on outsourcing success. Psychological contract refers to the 
beliefs of an individual about his or her mutual obligations in a contractual relationship. 
Six major obligations of a supplier from the client’s point of view identified in the study 
were: Accurate project scoping, clear authority structures, taking charge, effective human 
capital management, effective knowledge transfer, and building inter-organizational 
teams. From the vendor point of view, set of six obligations identified were: clear 
specifications, prompt payment, close project monitoring, dedicated project staffing, 
knowledge sharing and project ownership. Outsourcing success was defined and 
operationalized as satisfaction with the outsourcing contract, and desire to retain the 
outsourcing partner. Controlling for the effects of type of outsourcing, duration and size, 
the fulfillment of obligations of the parties predicted success of the outsourcing venture. 
Koh, Ang and Straub (2004) found that that knowledge sharing and dedicated project 
staffing were not significant predictors of outsourcing success. Owing to the fact that the 
parties have sufficient knowledge and expertise of the task, knowledge sharing was 
viewed as less critical for outsourcing success.  
Integrating the findings in pre and post contract studies a comprehensive model of 
outsourcing constructs and relationships is presented below. 
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COMPREHENSIVE MODEL OF OUTSOURCING CONSTRUCTS BASED ON RESULTS FROM 
THE PAST RESEARCH 
The constructs tested in the past research and the relationships are presented in 
two distinct models – the pre-contract phase model and the post-contract phase model 
(figure 2.1). 
Pre-contract phase: Decision to outsource IT function is determined by multiple 
factors: economies of cost, economies of scale, financial leverage for the client, 
improving business performance, need to focus on core business, gaining competitive 
advantage, access to technology and skills, need for imitation within an industry for 
strategic reasons (Grover et al. 1994b; Hirschheim et al. 2000; Lacity et al. 1994; Lacity 
et al. 1993b; Lacity et al. 2001; Levina et al. 2003; Loh et al. 1992a; Loh et al. 1992b; 
Smith et al. 1998), gap in IT function, type of organization strategy (Defender, 
Prospector, Analyzer, Reactor), and the strategic Role of IT (Traditional, Evolving, 
Integral)(Grover et al. 1994a; Grover et al. 1994b; Grover et al. 1993; Lee et al. 1997). 
Client size and the vendor characteristics have an impact on the determinants as well as 
the outsourcing decision. Characteristics of the firms IT function, and characteristics of 
the firm, firm’s need to focus on core business, the gap in the firms IT function determine 
the type of outsourcing option of that firm (Cheon et al. 1995; Grover et al. 1994b). 
Careful vendor selection combined with proper choice of the type of outsourcing impacts 
the success of IT outsourcing (Kern et al. 2001; Levina et al. 2003; Willcocks et al. 
1999b). IT outsourcing is considered a success if the financial and strategic objectives of 
the decision are realized and the stakeholders in the outsourcing relationship are satisfied 
(Grover et al. 1994b; Lacity et al. 1994; Lee et al. 1999; Lee et al. 2004).  
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Post-contract phase: Post-contract phase of the IT outsourcing is considered to 
be the longest period in the life of the outsourcing contract and is considered crucial for 
outsourcing success (Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; Kern et al. 2002b; Klepper 
1995a). The post-contract studies used social exchange theory, social contract theory, and 
partnership theories to analyze the relational interactions. Post contract studies considered 
outsourcing relationship as a strategic partnership (Grover et al. 1996b; Lee et al. 1999). 
However, some authors disagree with the notion of strategic partnership because the 
strategic partnerships do not involve either a legal status of a partnership or profit sharing 
(Lacity et al. 1993a). The framework of strategic partnerships (Anderson et al. 1991; 
Henderson 1990) was used to explain the relationship management of IT outsourcing 
projects. There is a strong agreement on the need for managing the relationships 
effectively in the post-contract research (Grover et al. 1996b; Lacity et al. 2003; Lacity et 
al. 1995b; Lee et al. 2005; Lee et al. 2004; Willcocks et al. 1998b). The post-contract 
research operationalized the outsourcing success as a multi-dimensional construct, 
comprising of strategic success, financial success and relationship satisfaction. 
Partnership quality was found to have a strong impact on the outsourcing success (Grover 
et al. 1996b; Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; Lee et al. 1999). The 
post-contract factors that influence the quality of the relationship (termed as strategic 
partnerships) between the parties, are: Service quality, Performance of the vendor, mutual 
trust between the stakeholders, communication between the parties, participation, joint 
action, coordination and knowledge sharing, top management support and fulfillment of 
mutual obligations by both parties (Barthelemy 2001; Grover et al. 1996b; Kern et al. 
2001; Kern et al. 2002a; Kern et al. 2002b; Klepper 1995a; Lacity et al. 1995b; Lee et al. 
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1999; Lee et al. 2005; Levina et al. 2003; Sabherwal 1999). A comprehensive model of 
pre and post contract relationships tested in IT outsourcing research is presented in Figure 
2.1. 
The outcomes from the IT outsourcing decisions form a feedback for future 
decisions about IT outsourcing within an organization. The feedback about the outcomes 
also revise the expectations from IT outsourced functions which in other words are the 
determinants of IT outsourcing, or the type of outsourcing choice for the future decisions. 
The feedback from the outsourcing contract also revises the perceptions of the parties 
regarding the post-contract factors like service quality, trust, top management support etc. 
Such revised post-contract factors in turn impact the partnership quality. The feedback 
mechanism is especially useful while making contract renewals or during renegotiations 
of the existing outsourcing contracts. 
The next chapter presents a review of the trust constructs tested in this study. 
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Figure 2.1 - Comprehensive model of constructs tested in IT Outsourcing from past 
research  
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CHAPTER 3:  REVIEW OF TRUST LITERATURE 
 “There is an element of trust in every transaction; 
typically, one object of value changes hands before the 
other one does, and there is confidence that the 
countervalue will in fact be given up. It is not adequate 
to argue that there are enforcement mechanisms, such as 
police and the courts; these are themselves services 
bought and sold, and it has to be asked why they will in 
fact do what they have contracted to do”. 
 
-- Arrow, K. J. 1973.  
 Information and economic behavior  
Stockholm: Federation of Swedish Industries 
INTRODUCTION 
Social exchange theory recognizes the risks of opportunism, imbalances of power, 
and possibility of non-performance by one of the parties in social exchange relationships. 
A review of social exchange theory has been presented in Chapter 2. Past research 
(Jurison 1995; Willcocks et al. 1999b) recognizes that IT outsourcing contracts are prone 
to risks of opportunism and imbalances of power. Therefore, social exchange perspective 
is considered appropriate to study the IT outsourcing relationships. Trust is an important 
process in social exchange that emerges as a response to uncertainty and risk (Molm et al. 
2000).  
This chapter presents the past research on trust. First the definition of trust is 
presented, followed by the dimensions of trustworthiness and modes of trust. Then the 
past research on trust, trustworthiness and trust modes is presented followed by findings 
on relationships between the various trust constructs. Definitions of the trust constructs 
tested in this study are also furnished. Appropriateness of trust and trust constructs to 
study IT outsourcing relationships is discussed at the end of the chapter. 
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DEFINITION OF TRUST 
Trust has been recognized as an important factor in different contexts across 
several disciplines like psychology, economics, and sociology. Within information 
systems discipline trust has been studied in multiple contexts such as ecommerce (Gefen 
2000; Gefen 2002a; Gefen et al. 2003b; Gefen et al. 2004; Grabner-Krauter et al. 2003; 
Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 
2002b), virtual groups (Jarvenpaa et al. 1997; Jarvenpaa et al. 2004; Ridings et al. 2002) 
and IT outsourcing (Lee et al. 1999; Sabherwal 1999).  
Trust has been defined from divergent perspectives across disciplines and studies. 
The principal approaches to trust have been from the psychological (Rotter 1980), 
behavioral (Deutsch 1958b) and sociological (Barber 1983; Luhmann 1979) perspectives.  
From a psychological perspective trust was viewed as being similar to an emotion 
or a personality trait. Rotter (1980) considered trust an individual personality trait and 
defined trust as a generalized expectancy that the promises of another individual or group 
can be relied upon. Behavioral scientists using experimental techniques and the famous 
prisoner’s dilemma game, conceptualized trust as cooperation with others (Deutsch 
1958b). 
The criticism against the psychological approach to trust is that when trust is 
treated as a psychological state, it is easily confused with other psychological states such 
as hope, faith or behavioral prediction etc. (Lewis et al. 1985). The behavioral 
conceptualization of trust is also criticized on the ground that experimental research only 
measured the processes by which predictions about the behaviors of others is made, but 
not actual trust (Lewis et al. 1985). Lewis and Weigert (1985) conceptualize trust as 
essentially a sociological rather than psychological concept. Lewis and Weigert (1985) 
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argue that the need for trust arises where the possibility of prediction ends, in order to 
ensure social order.  
Combining the cognitive and emotional dimensions of trust, Luhmann (1979) 
termed trust as a mechanism to reduce perceptions of social complexity. Luhmann (1979 
pp 24) defined trust as an expectation about the behavior of the other party. Trust “makes 
a difference to a critical decision”, taking into consideration the consequences resulting 
from a violation of the expectations. Luhmann’s work provided a theoretically sound and 
empirically testable conceptualization of trust and is therefore considered an important 
basis for all the subsequent sociological research on trust.  
Similar to the Luhmann’s sociological view of trust, Barber (1983) also viewed 
trust as a phenomenon of social and cultural variables and not as a function of personality 
traits. Trust according to Barber (1983) implies some form of expectation about the future 
based on relationships and social interactions. The expectation in a trusting relationship is 
about: 1. persistence and fulfillment of the moral social orders, which reduces 
complexity; 2. the trusted party delivering a technically competent role performance; 3. 
the parties in the relationship fulfilling their obligations; and 4. the trusted party placing 
the other party’s interests in priority over his or her self interest. Barber further states the 
specific nature of trust in a person: trust cannot be generalized. Trust is in a specific 
person for a specific competence.  
Based on Luhmann’s and Barber’s (1983) sociological conceptualization, trust is 
defined as the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another (Mayer et 
al. 1995; Zand 1972). This willingness is based on the expectation that that the other 
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party will not indulge in opportunistic behavior by taking advantage of the situation 
(Gefen 2002c).  
This study adopts the sociological conceptualization of trust because of its 
relevance to outsourcing relationships from a social exchange point of view. In this study, 
terms trustor and trustee are used to denote parties in a trust relationship: trustor is the 
person who relies on another person. Trustee is the person who is relied upon. In the 
context of outsourcing trust in vendor is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the 
actions of the IT outsourcing vendor, with an expectation that the vendor will not engage 
in opportunistic behavior. The trust in vendor is the overall trust refers to the general 
level of trust in a specific IT outsourcing vendor, without reference to any particular 
behavior or characteristic of the trusted party (Chen et al. 2003).  
TRUST AS A MECHANISM OF REDUCING SOCIAL UNCERTAINTY 
The sociological conceptualization of trust includes two aspects. First: the 
expectation that one party in a relationship will not act in a manner detrimental to the 
interests of the other; Second: the parties have knowledge of consequences of violation of 
such expectation. Such simplifying assumptions about the possible behavior of the other 
party are essential in order to reduce the perceptions of social complexity. The rationale 
behind this argument is that in social relationships, it is not always possible to predict the 
behavior of the other party. The parties in a relationship are individuals who have self 
interest. There is no guarantee that the parties act rationally (Lewis et al. 1981). The 
behavior of one party cannot be controlled by the other (Zand 1972). Expectations about 
the behavior of the other party are fraught with risk but reduce the perceived complexity 
(Gefen 2000; Luhmann 1979).  
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Luhmann (1979) conceptualizes trust as a mechanism of reducing perceptions of 
risk and social complexity. Luhmann’s approach to trust is sociological and proposes 
trust as a theory of social exchange as opposed to a simple personality trait variable or a 
psychological phenomenon. Luhmann argues that as a mechanism of reducing social 
complexity, trust can be a higher level concept without being limited to the personality 
processes of individuals alone. According to Luhmann, the world is complex and trust is 
a social reality and a “basic fact of human life”. Luhmann’s main proposition was that 
trust is a means for reducing social complexity. People make simplifying assumptions in 
order to reduce the real world complexity to a manageable level. Similar to other 
researchers (example: Bigley et al. 1998; Deutsch 1958b; Johnson-George et al. 1982; 
Kee et al. 1970), Luhmann argues that trust presupposes a situation of risk and the need 
for trust arises in situations of risk. Trust is relegated to marginality where outcomes are 
certainties (Bhattacharya et al. 1998 pp. 451). 
Luhmann’s argument that trust is a reducer of uncertainty and risk has been built 
into the definition of trust itself by many authors. Trust is defined as hope in situations of 
risk (Taylor 1989), or something risked in anticipation of a gain (Golembiewski et al. 
1976). Empirically, Luhmann’s proposition that trust as a mechanism of reducing the 
perceptions of uncertainty and risk has been tested extensively in the context of 
ecommerce transactions.  
E-commerce consists of the buying or selling, products or services over the 
Internet (Chen et al. 2003; Jarvenpaa et al. 2000) which may also include electronic 
transfer of information between the transacting parties. The nature of the medium of 
ecommerce transaction (Internet) factors in additional and unique risks (Lee 1998). 
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Buyers or sellers in the electronic markets may not usually have a prior acquaintance. 
The parties are separated in time and space. There are no visual cues or verbal interaction 
between the parties to make judgments about trusting a seller (Gefen 2000; Gefen et al. 
2003b; Gefen et al. 2004; Kim et al. 2004; Reichheld et al. 2000). Ascertainment of real 
identity of either party is not as easy as in a face to face interaction (Ba et al. 2002; Gefen 
et al. 2003b). The impersonal nature of the ecommerce exchange does not allow the 
parties to judge each other, or judge the quality of the goods as in a face to face exchange, 
leading to information asymmetry (Ba 2001; Gefen et al. 2004).  
Trust acts as a facilitating mechanism in such situations. Trust reduces the 
perceptions of risk in ecommerce transactions (Ba et al. 2002; Gefen 2000; Gefen 2003; 
Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; McKnight et al. 2002a; Pavlou et al. 2004) and helps the customers 
to make purchase decisions (Ba et al. 2002). By trusting, online consumers make a 
simplifying assumption that the vendor will in fact behave in an appropriate manner, and 
will not use the sensitive information they provide to the detriment of the consumer 
(Gefen 2000). In an ecommerce context Ba and Pavlou (2002) found that not only did 
trust reduce the perceptions of uncertainty and risk among online buyers, but also 
rewarded the sellers with credibility with price premiums and penalized the sellers with 
questionable reputation.  
The various trust constructs discussed in the literature, their relevance in 
relationships and the findings from the past results are presented in the following 
sections. 
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OPERATIONALIZATION OF TRUST AND VARIOUS TRUST CONSTRUCTS USED IN 
LITERATURE 
Trust is operationalized in research as an actionable knowledge about the trustee 
and the possible outcomes of a relationship. Trust is an intention to engage in a certain 
behavior such as making a purchase in the context of ecommerce (Gefen 2000; Gefen 
2002c; Gefen 2003; Gefen et al. 2003b; McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 2002a; 
McKnight et al. 1998), or sharing information (McKnight et al. 2002a). In other words 
trust operationalized as an intention signifies the “secure willingness” of the trustor to be 
vulnerable to the actions of the trustee (McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998). 
The trusting intentions are based on, and influenced by the trustor’s beliefs about (a) 
trustworthiness of the trustee and (b) on sets of beliefs known as the trust modes. 
Trustworthiness beliefs are the attributes about the trustee as perceived by the trustor. 
Trust modes are beliefs which are external to the trustor or the trustee but form an 
extremely relevant basis for the relationship. A detailed review of the trustworthiness 
constructs and trust modes are discussed in the following sections. 
TRUSTWORTHINESS AND TRUST MODES  
Trustworthiness: Dimensions of trust 
Trustworthiness is about the characteristics of the trustee. The extent of trust 
placed in a trustee can be explained by the trustworthiness of the trustee (Mayer et al. 
1995). When the parties in the relationship have sufficient interaction in the past, the 
perceptions of trustworthiness attributes of the trustee are based on the past experiences. 
But in the absence of prior experience between the parties, the attributes of 
trustworthiness of the trustee are only the perceptions of the trustor but not backed by any 
prior knowledge. One other source for forming perceptions about the trustworthiness are 
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the bases of trust or ‘trust modes’ (discussed later in this chapter). Various modes provide 
basis for the perceptions of trustworthiness (McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 
1998) in initial trust formation where there is no prior experience.  
Many dimensions of trustworthiness (characteristics of the trustee or the 
attributes) have been proposed in research. Some authors have proposed only one 
characteristic of the trustee (e.g. Strickland 1958), while some others proposed as many 
as ten dimensions of trustworthiness (e.g. Butler 1991). Though many factors of 
trustworthiness are proposed in research, most of the concepts have considerable overlap 
in meaning. There is also considerable disagreement among the researchers on the 
conceptualizations and the number of dimensions (Shapiro et al. 1992). A complete 
review of the research on all factors of trustworthiness proposed in research is available 
in the following works: Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995), McKnight and associates 
(McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998), Gefen and associates (Gefen 2002c; 
Gefen et al. 2003b; Gefen et al. 2004), and Grabner-Krauter and Kaluscha (2003).  
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995) proposed three dimensions of 
trustworthiness: Ability, benevolence and integrity. These three dimensions are the most 
commonly used and have gained broad consensus in research as the dimensions of trust 
(Chen et al. 2003). The above three factors are recognized as explaining a major portion 
of variance (Gefen 2002c; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 
1998). The three dimensions of trust are defined and discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  
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Ability 
Ability is the set of skills or competencies that enable the trustee to enjoy a 
position of influence with in a specific domain (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998). 
Ability or an equivalent term — competence has been used extensively in the past 
research to identify one of the most important aspects of trust (Butler et al. 1994).  
Ability is arguably the most important expectation in a trusting relationship, and 
an important belief about the competence of the trustee to fulfill the obligations based on 
which the relationship rests. The bases for forming beliefs about the ability of the trusee 
are drawn from past experiences and/or the trust modes. Met expectations about the 
performance in the relationship strengthen the trustor’s beliefs about the ability of the 
trustee (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998). If the beliefs about the ability of the 
trustee are belied, and the expectations of performance in the relationship are not met by 
the trustee, the trusting relationship ends.  
Ability is defined in this study as the clients’ belief that the IT outsourcing vendor 
is competent to deliver the clients requirements as outlined in the contract.  
Benevolence 
Benevolence is the belief that the trusted party will act beyond self-interested 
profit motives, to protect the interests of the trusted party (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight 
et al. 1998). Though with different nomenclatures, authors have used similar concepts: 
Trustworthiness has been measured using motivation to lie (Hovland 1964). 
In this study benevolence is defined as the IT outsourcing client’s belief that the 
vendor will act in a legitimate manner, so that the client’s interests are protected.  
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Integrity 
Integrity is the belief in the trusted party about his or her adherence to an expected 
ethical or moral code (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998). Importance of integrity 
is explained by McFall (1987): integrity involves a person’s higher order virtues like 
telling the truth, honesty and fairness. Though these may be personal qualities of a 
trustee, absence of these qualities will be deemed unacceptable even in business 
relationships. Constructs close in meaning to integrity were proposed as essential 
requirements in trusting relation ships: for example: value congruence (Sitkin et al. 
1993). 
In the context of IT outsourcing Integrity is defined in this study as the client’s 
perception that the vendors are honest in their dealings, and will honor their 
commitments. 
TRUST MODES 
A distinction between the trustworthiness beliefs and trust modes is: 
trustworthiness beliefs are the trustor’s perceptions of trustee characteristics (Mayer et al. 
1995); trust modes are the various bases of belief that the trustor relies on primarily at the 
time of initial trust formation, and also later in the relationship. Trust modes influence the 
trustor’s perceptions of trustworthiness of the trustee as well as interpersonal trust (Gefen 
2002c; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998) at the time of initial trust formation 
as well as in an ongoing trust relationship (Gefen 2000). The various trust modes 
proposed and tested in the past research are presented below:  
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Personality-based trust 
Personality-based trust also known as disposition to trust is a stable personality 
characteristic and a generalized expectancy for trusting others (McKnight et al. 1998). 
The expectancies are determined by specific experiences in that particular situation and 
also on cross-situational generalities that an individual perceives as similar (McKnight et 
al. 2002a). Personality-based trust refers to the general inclination of the person to be 
willing to depend on others based upon an individual’s life experiences (McKnight et al. 
1998; Meyerson et al. 1995). Personality-based trust varies from individual to individual. 
It does not imply that a person believes others to be trustworthy. This mode of trust is 
significant at the time of initial trust formation, when there is little or no prior interaction 
between the parties (McKnight et al. 2002a; Zucker 1986).  
Disposition to trust includes two sub-constructs faith in humanity and trusting 
stance (Zucker 1986). Faith in humanity is the general belief that others are upright and 
honest. Trusting stance is the beliefs about the outcomes. Irrespective of what the beliefs 
about the general other person are, trusting stance is the belief that people can be trusted 
“until proved to be wrong”, and adopting a strategy that no harm will befall from trusting 
people.  
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Cognition-based trust  
Cognition-based1 trust is based on “first impressions” rather than interaction 
between the parties or any prior experience (Gefen 2004; Lewis et al. 1985; Zucker 
1986). The extent of trust placed by a person in another depends on the mental 
categorization the trustor makes about the trustee. Trust is usually stronger between 
persons perceived as similar others (Zucker 1986). Prior experiences are not essential for 
creation of this mode of trust. Cognition-based trust is significant in the initial trust 
formation process.  
Characteristic-based trust 
Characteristic-based trust deals with the issues of similarities between the trustor 
and the trustee, such as gender, race and culture (Paul et al. 2004; Zucker 1986). 
Similarities of characteristics of the parties in relationship lead to similarities in 
expectations. Characteristic-based trust is significant during initial trust formation (Gefen 
2004) but is limited to smaller and specific core groups (Zucker 1986).  
Calculative-based trust 
This mode of trust is also called as deterrence-based trust (Rousseau et al. 1998) 
or calculus-based trust (Lewicki et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998) or calculative trust. 
Calculative-based trust is based on rational choice. Trust develops when the trustor 
perceives that the relationship will be beneficial (Paul et al. 2004; Shapiro et al. 1992). 
                                                 
1
 Lewis and Weigert Lewis, J.D., and Weigert, A. "Trust as a Social Reality," Social Forces (63:4), Jun. 
1985, pp 967-985. explain cognitive basis of trust as follows:  “We choose whom we will trust in which 
respects and under what circumstances, and we base the choice on what we take to be ‘good reasons,’ 
constituting evidence of trustworthiness”.  McAllister McAllister, D.J. "Affect-Based and Cognition-Based 
Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations," Academy of Management Journal 
(38:1), Feb 1995, pp 24-59. explains cognitive trust as follows: the knowledge necessary for trust falls in 
between total knowledge and total ignorance.  “Given total knowledge, there is no need to trust, and given 
total ignorance, there is no rational basis upon which to rationally trust”.  People trust based on available 
knowledge and based on their reasons perceived as “good reasons”, which could even be “leaps of faith”.    
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Trust between the parties develops based on a simple calculation that the parties will 
honor their commitments because violation of trust may result in a disadvantage to both 
the parties in a relationship (Dasgupta 1988). Each party compares the utility of outcomes 
and the probability of the other party fulfilling the expectations versus violating trust, 
their own vulnerability, and available recourses (Doney et al. 1997). The possibility of 
incurring a disadvantage or a loss upon violation of the relationship acts as a deterrent for 
the parties against breach of trust (Rousseau et al. 1998). The opportunities resulting from 
the relationship are constantly pursued and the risks are constantly monitored (1992). For 
calculative-based trust to exist between the parties, Shapiro, Sheppard and Cheraskin 
(1992) propose that the following three conditions of interactions between the parties 
must exist: 1. Potential loss of future business must outweigh the gains from harming 
behavior of one party. 2. The other party has to be disclosed that harm has been done. 3. 
The harmed party must be willing to withdraw benefits or cause detriment to the party 
acting distrustfully. Other deterrence could be loss of reputation, possibility of multiple 
interactions with small benefit accruing with each interaction, or possibility of multiple 
concurrent transactions at one point of time, accruing benefits. Some scholars (Saparito et 
al. 2004) point out the differences between deterrence based trust, which accounts for the 
costs of violation of trust and calculative-based trust which is broader in scope 
accounting for both costs and benefits of violations. Empirically, calculative trust was 
found to be significantly related to trust in an ecommerce vendor positively impacting the 
purchase intentions (Gefen et al. 2003b). 
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Information-based trust 
This is also known as: knowledge-based trust (Rousseau et al. 1998), process-
based trust (Ba 2001; Lewicki et al. 1995; Shapiro et al. 1992; Stewart 2003; Zucker 
1986). Some researchers consider affect-based2 trust (McAllister 1995; Rempel et al. 
1985) as similar to information based trust. Because of the likely emotional attachment 
between the parties in interpersonal relationships that develop because of long term 
interaction between the parties this type of trust is called as affect-based trust (McAllister 
1995). As the relationship between the parties develops, information based on regular 
communication between the parties (Rousseau et al. 1998) and their past experiences 
allows them to predict the likely actions of each other (Deutsch 1958b). Positive 
experiences in the past interactions give rise to positive expectations about the trustee’s 
intentions (Ba 2001; Lewicki et al. 1995). Frequent interactions between the parties and 
satisfying fulfillment of mutual expectations leads to strengthening of trust between the 
parties. This mode of trust entails higher levels of interdependence, and increasing 
exchange of resources between the parties over time (Lewicki et al. 1998; Sitkin et al. 
1993).  
                                                 
2
 Affect-based trust is considered as the highest order of interpersonal trust, which develops out of a long 
association between the parties based on positive interactions and the trustee is emotionally attached to the 
trustor McAllister, D.J. "Affect-Based and Cognition-Based Trust as Foundations for Interpersonal 
Cooperation in Organizations," Academy of Management Journal (38:1), Feb 1995, pp 24-59, Rempel, 
J.K., Holmes, J.G., and Zanna, M.P. "Trust in Close Relationships," Journal of Personality & Social 
Psychology (49:1) 1985, pp 95-112.. McAllister McAllister, D.J. "Affect-Based and Cognition-Based Trust 
as Foundations for Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations," Academy of Management Journal (38:1), 
Feb 1995, pp 24-59.  explains as follows:  “People make emotional investments in trust relationships, 
express genuine care and concern the welfare of the partners, believe in the intrinsic virtue of such 
relationships, believe these sentiments are reciprocated Pennings, J.M., and Woiceshyn, J. "A Typology Of 
Organizational Control And Its Metaphors," in: Research in the sociology of organizations, S.B. Bacharach 
and S.M. Mitchell (eds.), JAI Press, Greenwich, CT, 1987, pp. 75-104.” . 
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Transference-based trust 
Transference-based trust is the trustor’s willingness to trust an unknown person, 
based on a reference of trustworthiness from a known third party in whom the trustor has 
developed strong trust based on past experience (Milliman et al. 1988). Transference-
based trust is recognized as a higher level of trust than information based trust, and 
Calculative-based trust (Doney et al. 1997; Doney et al. 1998; 1988; Strub et al. 1976). 
Milliman and Fugate (1988) define trust transference as shifting trust expectancies from a 
trusted “proof source” to an unknown suitable substitute. Proof source is a verifiable 
evidence of reliability of the claims by a prospective trustee. Strub and Priest (1976) 
found that a marijuana user would trust an unknown person, if referred by a person 
trusted by the marijuana user. The characteristic feature of transference-based trust is that 
often, it involves trusting an unknown party with whom there is little or no prior 
experience. Transference-based trust is salient in initial trust formation (Milliman et al. 
1988). 
Sources from which trust can be transferred can be: individuals with whom the 
trustor has prior experience (Uzzi 1996); a place which is a source of trust for the trustor 
(Henslin 1968); an institution or an industry association (McKnight et al. 1998; Milliman 
et al. 1988; Pavlou et al. 2004; Zucker 1986). 
Institution-based trust 
Institution in a social sense has a common meaning and a shared connotation 
which is understood in common with others as a “taken-for-granted part of the social 
reality”(Zucker 1977). Institutional-based trust generalizes the exchange beyond the 
trusting parties by introducing an external institution that has a common connotation for 
the parties in a trusting relationship (Zucker 1986). Institution-based trust is the belief 
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that the probability of expected outcomes of the trusting relationship will be protected by 
the situational normality, safeguards, guarantees or other structural assurances that are 
built into environment of the relationship (McKnight et al. 1998; Pavlou et al. 2004; 
Zucker 1986). Structural assurances are the presence of widely accepted intermediaries 
like institutions, and protective structures like formal contracts, guarantees, and legal 
recourse are available to the trusting party to ensure success of a transactional exchange 
(McKnight et al. 1998; Pavlou et al. 2004; Zucker 1986). Situational normality is the 
perception of the trusting party that conducive situation for success of the transactional 
exchange exists (McKnight et al. 1998; Pavlou et al. 2004; Zucker 1986).Examples of 
institution-based trust mechanisms are escrow services, payment intermediaries like 
PayPal, online purchases using credit cards, and buyer-feedback mechanisms on online 
ecommerce portals. Institution-based trust is one form of trust transference (Doney et al. 
1998) because situational normality and structural guarantees act as a proof source for 
transference of trust.  
Other modes of trust 
Other modes of trust considered in research are integrated trust, competence trust, 
and relational trust (Paul et al. 2004). Paul and McDaniel operationalize these modes of 
trust as dimensions of interpersonal trust beliefs. Integrated trust is defined as the 
integrated perspective of interpersonal trust, combining the different types of trust. This is 
similar to the conceptualization of overall trust (Mayer et al. 1995) which is the general 
assessment of interpersonal trust (Ganesan 1994a; Gefen et al. 2003b; McKnight et al. 
2002a). Competence trust as conceptualized in Paul and McDaniel study is similar to the 
conceptualization of ‘ability’ dimension of trustworthiness discussed in the previous 
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section. Relational trust (Paul et al. 2004; Saparito et al. 2004) corresponds to the 
benevolence of the trustee. Competence trust and relational trust strictly are the 
characteristics of the trustee or the trustworthiness beliefs (Mayer et al. 1995).  
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE TRUST CONSTRUCTS 
A detailed review of the relationships between the various modes of trust, 
trustworthiness beliefs and interpersonal trust are presented in the following paragraphs, 
starting with initial trust formation.  
Trustworthiness beliefs explain overall trust, and overall trust influences the trust 
outcomes (McKnight et al. 1998). Trust modes influence the trustworthiness beliefs as 
well as the overall trust. Overall trust refers to the general level of trust in a specific 
other, without reference to any particular behavior of the trusted party (Chen et al. 2003). 
Personality-based trust (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998; 
Rotter 1980) and cognitive-based trust (Lewis et al. 1985; Meyerson et al. 1995) are not 
based on prior experience or information about the relationship. These are important 
determinants at the time of initial trust formation. Because these two modes of trust are 
internal traits specific to the trustor, both these two modes are present in all trust 
relationships (McKnight et al. 1998). Transference-based trust (Milliman et al. 1988; 
Stewart 2003; Strub et al. 1976) is not based on direct past experiences with the trustee. 
Instead, it depends upon the past experiences with a “proof source” for initial trust 
formation. Calculative-based trust (Doney et al. 1997; Lewicki et al. 1995; Shapiro et al. 
1992) and institutional-based trust (Gefen 2003; McKnight et al. 2002a; Pavlou et al. 
2004) are significant in the formation of initial trust as well as in ongoing relationships 
(Blau 1964a; Lewis et al. 1985; Zand 1972).  
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REVIEW OF PAST RESEARCH 
Initial trust 
Initial trust is the trust between parties who have no prior interaction (Kim et al. 
2004; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998). Unanimous findings about trust has been 
that trust develops gradually over time (Blau 1964a; Lewis et al. 1985; Zand 1972). It is 
also agreed that various situational factors play varying roles in initial trust formation. 
Bigley and Pearce (1998) identify three theoretical bases on which the initial trust forms: 
dispositional based theories of trust; behavioral decision theory based theories of trust; 
and institutional frameworks based theories of trust. Dispositional theories address the 
personal dispositions of the parties in an exchange. Personality-based and cognitive-
based trust modes fall under this category. Behavioral decision theories take into account 
the situational factors that are associated with the relational exchange. Characteristics-
based, transference based, calculative-based and information-based trust modes fall under 
this category. Institutional-based trust is concerned with the organizational and 
institutional structures causal to or associated with the relational exchange.  
In the initial stages of formation, trust is primarily influenced by institutional-
based trust (McKnight et al. 1998; Zucker 1986), personality based trust (Rotter 1980), 
cognitive-based trust (McAllister 1995), and calculative based trust (McKnight et al. 
1998 pp. 475). Personality based trust, cognitive based trust, are salient only during initial 
trust formation (McKnight et al. 1998). 
In some instances parties gain information only after the trustor has engaged in a 
trusting behavior: For example, in ecommerce transactions, trust is established only after 
making a purchase or disclosing personal information (Gefen 2002c; Gefen et al. 2003b; 
2002a). McKnight et al. (1998) argue that a person’s disposition to trust, cognitive-based 
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trust, and institution-based trust together explain the paradox of high initial trust. The 
common feature of all the three modes of trust is that past experience is not a pre-
condition for formation of trust.  
McKnight et al. (1998) propose that personality-based trust, cognitive based trust, 
and institutional based trust are most important in the trust formation process. However, 
they caution that all the three streams of trust need to be considered together rather than 
separately. Studying any one mode in the trust formation process in isolation could be 
confounded by the presence of other factors too. This is because, each of these three 
types of trust mentioned above explain the initial trust formation process only partially, 
and all the three trust streams might be present in a given context, simultaneously. 
Relationship between the constructs: ongoing relational exchanges 
McKnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998) proposed a conceptual model of 
relationships between trust related constructs and two cognitive processes. They defined 
trust as willingness to depend on another party. Further distinction is made between 
trusting beliefs and trusting intentions. Trusting beliefs are beliefs about benevolence, 
honesty, predictability and competence of a person – which are the characteristics of the 
trustee. Trusting intention is the willingness to depend upon another person. McKnight et 
al propose that the four trusting beliefs contribute to trusting intentions. Institution-based 
trust comprising two sub-constructs: situational normality and structural assurances, and 
disposition to trust comprising two sub-constructs: faith in humanity and trusting stance, 
influence the trusting beliefs. The model also proposes two cognitive processes: 
categorization process and illusion of control process influence the trusting beliefs. 
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Disposition to trust directly influences trusting intentions as well as institution-based 
trust.  
Two cognitive processes proposed by McKnight, Cummings and Chervany 
(1998) are categorization processes and control effects. Categorization processes consist 
of unit grouping – categorizing the trustee in the same category as self, stereotyping – 
categorizing the trustee in general broad categories of others, reputation categorization – 
assigning attributes to a person based on second-hand information. Token control 
processes are small actions on the part of a person in a relationship to assure self of 
control of situation. Such actions include ruminations over others actions, motives and 
attributes deriving assurance over a person’s own judgment or actions, or small actions 
like smiling to assure self that the person has control over the other party in a 
relationship. These cognitive processes directly influence the trusting beliefs. Illusion 
control processes also interact with categorization processes, disposition to trust, and 
structural assurance beliefs to influence trusting beliefs. McKnight et al. (1998) propose 
that perceived risk is an important condition where the initial trusting beliefs or trusting 
intentions could be fragile. 
McKnight, Choudhury and Kacmar (2002a) developed an instrument to test the 
constructs proposed by McKnight, Cummings and Chervany (1998). The instrument 
measured trust constructs in the context of ecommerce. The distinct feature of trust in the 
context of ecommerce is that initial trust forms only after the parties have engaged in a 
trust related behavior – making an online purchase. The trustworthiness of the vendor is 
assessed based on the outcomes of the behavior.  
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Consistent with the theory of reasoned action (TRA) (Ajzen et al. 1980) and 
theory of planned behavior (TPB) (Ajzen 1985; Ajzen 1987), McKnight, Choudhury and 
Kacmar (2002a) posit that trusting beliefs (beliefs about trustworthiness) lead to trusting 
intentions, which in turn leads to trusting behaviors (making an online purchase). The 
McKnight et al study does not measure the behavior but only develops an instrument and 
measures beliefs and trusting intentions. Trusting intention is defined as the intention to 
engage in a trust related behavior with a specific web vendor. The trusting beliefs 
proposed in the study are competence, benevolence and integrity. Competence is defined 
as the ability of the vendor to do what is expected; benevolence is the trustee (vendor) 
taking care of the interests of the trustor (customer); integrity is the honesty of the trustee 
and keeping promises. The study posits that disposition to trust, institution-based trust 
influences the trusting beliefs and trusting intentions. The other related ecommerce 
constructs proposed are personal innovativeness, general web experience and perceived 
web quality. Disposition to trust was related to personal innovativeness, general web 
experience influences institution-based trust and perceived site quality influences the 
trusting beliefs and trusting intentions.  
In a similar study Gefen (2002c) developed an instrument to measure the 
dimensions of trustworthiness beliefs and trusting intentions. The study added two 
intention variables: window shopping intention and purchase intention into the model to 
test the predictive validity of the model and differential weights of each dimension of the 
trustworthiness beliefs. The results indicated that ability of the vendor was a salient factor 
the in window shopping intentions of the customers where as integrity was a salient 
factor in case of purchase intentions and overall trust in the vendor. The findings suggest 
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the relative importance of integrity and benevolence over ability, when considering the 
actual online purchase intentions.  
Gefen, Karahanna and Straub (2003b) explain the online client-vendor exchange 
using trust and the technology acceptance model (TAM) (Davis 1989). The intuition 
underlying the study is summed up as follows: Web is a technology and users make 
purchases online using the web. Therefore, usage of web as a technology should be partly 
explained by TAM. Trust literature deals with online purchases as transactional 
exchanges between the customer and the online vendor. Therefore, trust should be able to 
explain the online exchanges with the vendor.  
Gefen, Karahanna and Straub (2003b) tested trust as a specific set of beliefs about 
ability, benevolence and integrity of the trustee as distinct from behavioral intentions. 
Trust is important in the context of ecommerce because of the special nature of the 
ecommerce transactions in addition to the existing social complexity. The customer and 
vendor are separated in time, and distance by the medium. There is no face to face 
interaction. There is a possibility that the vendor can engage in opportunistic behavior 
such as unfair pricing, furnishing inaccurate or incorrect information, improper use of the 
customer’s sensitive information etc. In such cases people rely on trust to reduce the 
complexity of online exchanges. The study found that trustworthiness beliefs influence 
the purchase intentions and also the behavior (the purchase itself). The study posited 
personality-based trust, knowledge-based trust, cognitive-based trust, and institution-
based trust as antecedents for trust in vendor. Knowledge based trust was indirectly 
related to trust, indicating that the familiarity with the vendor was because of perceived 
ease of use (PEOU): familiarity in an online environment is about knowing to use the 
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technology. Both trust and TAM were found to be significant in predicting online 
purchases.  
In the context of implementation of enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, 
Gefen (2002c) tested the impact of trust modes: institutional-based trust, characteristics-
based trust and process-based trust on trust in ERP vendor. Trust in vendor is 
operationalized as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of ability, benevolence and 
integrity of the vendor. The modes of trust and the trustworthiness beliefs were 
significantly related to trust in vendor. Trust in vendor coupled with and the other TAM 
constructs tested in the study – perceived ease of use and perceived usefulness, increased 
the perceptions of the client that the relationship is indeed worthwhile.  
SUMMARY OF TRUST LITERATURE 
Though there are multiple conceptualizations of trust, sociological 
conceptualization of trust as a mechanism of reducing uncertainty (Luhmann 1979) has 
been widely accepted in business relationships. Trust is defined as a willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998), 
based on the expectation that the other party will not indulge in opportunistic behavior . 
There are at least two parties in a trusting relationship – the trustor and the trustee. The 
party who places trust in another is known as the trustor and the person trusted is the 
trustee. The need for trust arises in the face of risk.  
Trust is widely accepted in research as a multidimensional construct. Dimensions 
of trust otherwise known as trustworthiness beliefs are the characteristics of the trustee: 
they are the trustor’s perceptions of the trustee’s ability, benevolence and integrity. 
Though varying number of trustworthiness factors have been proposed in research, the 
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three factors mentioned above have been commonly accepted in research as explaining a 
significant portion of the variance of trustworthiness. Various modes of trust contribute to 
trust. The modes of trust are the factors that facilitate trust. The various modes of trust 
proposed in literature are calculative-based trust, information-based trust, transference-
based trust, institution-based trust, personality-based trust, cognition-based trust, and 
characteristic-based trust. The trust modes are the various external factors that form basis 
for one party to trust another and facilitate trust between the parties. The various modes 
of trust contribute to the perceptions of trustworthiness, and also overall trust. Feedback 
from the outcomes of trust updates the beliefs of the trustor through experience.  
Applicability of trust in the context of outsourcing relationships 
Trust and trust constructs were found to have relevance and applicability not only 
in interpersonal contexts but also in business relationships such as ecommerce (Gefen 
2000; Gefen 2002a; Gefen et al. 2003b; Gefen et al. 2004; Grabner-Krauter et al. 2003; 
Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 
2002b) and enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Gefen 2002a; Gefen 2004). The present 
study proposes that the trust and the trust constructs (trustworthiness and trust modes) are 
relevant in the context of IT outsourcing also for the following reasons: The client-vendor 
relationships in IT outsourcing are similar to the buyer-seller relationships in ecommerce 
contexts and the client-vendor relationships in ERP contexts. Trust has been found to be a 
significant factor in contributing to the success of the relationship between the parties in 
IT outsourcing contexts (Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Kern et al. 2002a; Lacity et 
al. 1995b; Sabherwal 1999). During the vendor selection process (Kern et al. 2002b; 
Lacity et al. 1993a) factors that are considered apart from the pricing aspect are the 
 81 
suitability of the vendor (the vendor attributes) for the project execution and the factors 
that contribute to create clients trust in the vendor. The trustworthiness attributes of the 
vendor that are considered are: the vendors’ ability to undertake and complete the IT 
outsourcing project and the integrity of the vendor claims. The factors that are essential 
for creation of client’s trust in the vendor are the various modes of trust: institutional-
based trust such as penalty termination clauses in the IT outsourcing contract; vendor’s 
memberships in professional associations etc. calculative-based trust, an expectation that 
violation of the client trust will result in detriment to the vendors such of loss of future 
contracts or contract extensions; knowledge-based trust where the client has previous 
experience with the vendor.  
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CHAPTER 4:  RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES 
RESEARCH MODEL 
This study extends the research on the post contract relationships and tests the 
impact of trust, dimensions of trustworthiness and trust modes in IT outsourcing 
relationships. The research questions considered in this study outlined in chapter 1 were:  
What does relationship quality depend on to determine outsourcing success? What 
is the effect of trust and perceptions of risk on relationship quality? How does trust in 
vendor moderate the relationship between other determinants and relationship quality? 
In order to address the above questions this study develops hypotheses within the 
framework of a research model shown in figure 4.1. The dependent variable proposed in 
this study is outsourcing success. The impact of relationship quality on outsourcing 
success is tested. The hypothesized antecedent factors for relationship quality are 
interdependence, service quality, trust in vendor, perceptions of risk, and perceptions of 
strategic salience. These antecedent factors for relationship quality are derived form the 
past research on outsourcing and trust, discussed in the previous chapters.  
Antecedents of trust tested in this study are the trustworthiness perceptions – 
ability, benevolence and integrity; and trust modes – institution-based trust, calculative-
based trust, transference-based trust, and knowledge-based trust.  
The main theoretical contribution of this study is the interaction effects of trust on 
the relationships between the antecedents of relationship quality and relationship quality. 
The study advances theory by testing the moderating effects of high or low levels of trust 
in vendor on the relationships between the antecedents and relationship quality.  
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Since the main theoretical contribution of the study is the interaction effects of 
trust, this chapter first presents the direct effects between the relationship quality 
construct and its antecedents and then presents the interaction effects of trust in vendor on 
the direct effects. The study replicates the established theoretical relationships like the 
trustworthiness of vendor, modes of trust and antecedents of relationship quality in the 
context of IT outsourcing. The relationships between the trust constructs that are 
replicated in this study in an IT outsourcing context are presented thereafter.  
This study adopts the definition outsourcing articulated by Grover, Cheon and 
Teng (1996b) and Lee and Kim (1999). Outsourcing is defined as “ the practice of 
turning over part or all of an organization’s IS functions to external service provider(s)”. 
The functions outsourced could be any of the IS functions within a firm. These IS 
functions include any or all of the following: telecommunication management, systems 
integration, application development, and systems operation (Grover et al. 1993).  
The definitions of the constructs, the relationships between the constructs, the 
rationale for the posited relationships and their theoretical bases are explained in the 
following sections starting with the dependent variable in this study: outsourcing success.  
Outsourcing Success 
Dependent variable outsourcing success is adopted from Grover, Cheon and Teng 
(1996b) study and Lee and Kim (1999) study. Outsourcing success is operationalized as a 
four dimensional concept consisting of strategic success, financial success, technological 
success and relationship satisfaction. The first three dimensions are adopted from Grover 
et. al. (1996b). Strategic success is defined as the firm’s ability to focus on its core 
business; outsource routine IT activities so as to focus on strategic uses of IT; and 
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enhance its IT competence (Grover et al. 1996b; Loh et al. 1992a; Loh et al. 1992b). 
Financial success is defined as the firm’s ability to utilize the economies of scale of the 
vendors, and achieve economies in profitability, and reduce costs (Grover et al. 1996b; 
Loh et al. 1992a; Loh et al. 1992b). Technological success is defined as the ability of the 
firm to gain access to IT expertise and latest developments in IT in order to avoid IT 
obsolescence (Grover et al. 1996b). Relationship satisfaction is the level of satisfaction of 
the stakeholders with IT outsourcing relationship. This definition is adopted from Lee 
and Kim’s (1999) user perspective dimension of outsourcing success.  
IT OUTSOURCING CONSTRUCTS 
Relationship Quality 
Similar to the partnership quality construct in Lee and Kim (1999) study, 
relationship quality is defined as the overall evaluation of the effectiveness of a 
relationship indicated by the extent to which the parties in the relationship meet mutual 
needs and expectations through mutual commitment, cooperation and coordination. The 
three components of relationship quality proposed in the study: commitment, cooperation 
and coordination are defined as follows:  
Commitment is defined as an implicit or explicit binding on the stakeholders to 
continue the relationship, sharing the burdens and benefits equally. (Bensaou et al. 1995; 
Cook et al. 1978; Dwyer et al. 1987; Henderson 1990). Coordination is the set of tasks 
that each party expects the other to perform for effective functioning of the relationship 
(Mohr et al. 1994; Narus et al. 1987). Cooperation is the parties’ willingness to invest 
time, effort and resources in the relationship to accomplish common objectives (Grover et 
al. 1996b; Narus et al. 1987).  
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The current study approaches the IT outsourcing relationships from social 
exchange and partnership theoretic perspectives. Since no profit sharing motive is 
involved between the vendor and the client (Henderson 1990; Lacity et al. 1993a), and IT 
outsourcing contracts are analogous to make or buy decisions, this study uses the 
construct name as “relationship quality” rather than partnership quality.  
Though the construct ‘relationship quality’ is similar to partnership quality 
proposed in Lee and Kim (1999) study, it also has important differences. The dimensions 
proposed in this current study differ from Lee and Kim study in the following manner: 
Lee and Kim classified the partnership variables based on dynamic, static and contextual 
factors. Lee and Kim proposed and tested five dimensions of partnership quality: trust, 
business understanding, benefit and risk share, conflict and commitment. From a social 
exchange point of view the components of partnership quality proposed in Lee and Kim 
(1999) study align or overlap with various modes of trust and trustworthiness beliefs 
which were reviewed in chapter 3. In this study trust is presented as an independent 
construct contributing to relationship quality and not as a component of relationship 
quality. This is because social exchange theory (Blau 1964b) recognizes that trust is a 
concept distinct from the relationship itself and a key contributory factor to the 
relationship. Business understanding is similar to coordination which is a component of 
relationship quality in this current study. An additional component of relationship quality 
proposed in this study is cooperation. Past research emphasizes the importance of 
cooperation in strategic relationships (Grover et al. 1996b; Lasher et al. 1991) and 
recognizes cooperation as a component relationship (Ring et al. 1992; Ring et al. 1994). 
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The theoretical basis and relation of relationship quality with other constructs tested in 
this study are explained in the following paragraphs. 
Relationship quality and outsourcing success 
The impact of IT outsourcing relationships on the overall success of IT 
outsourcing has been confirmed in empirical research (Grover et al. 1996b; Lee et al. 
1999) as well as research using case studies and interviews of executives engaged in 
outsourcing (Barthelemy 2001; Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2001; Klepper 1995a; 
Sabherwal 1999). From analyses of outsourcing cases research has evidenced that 
relationships can decide the success or failure of outsourcing ventures (Kern et al. 2002a; 
Klepper et al. 1998; McFarlan et al. 1995). Partnership quality (Lee et al. 1999) – that is 
quality of the relationship between the vendor and the client, and strategic partnerships 
(Grover et al. 1996b) – that is client-vendor relationships to achieve common business 
goals, was found to be significantly related to outsourcing success, composing of 
financial success, technological success and user satisfaction. Based on results from 
previous studies (Grover et al. 1996b; Kern et al. 2002a; Klepper et al. 1998; Lee et al. 
1999; McFarlan et al. 1995), this study expects that relationship quality will be 
significantly related to outsourcing success. Therefore, it is hypothesized that: 
H1: Relationship quality is positively related to outsourcing success.  
ANTECEDENTS OF RELATIONSHIP QUALITY 
The antecedent factors proposed for relationship quality are: interdependence of 
parties in the relationship, service quality, trust in vendor, perceptions of strategic 
salience, and perceptions of risk. Each of the antecedents is defined and theoretical basis 
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for the hypothesized relationships between the constructs are explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
Interdependence 
Interdependence is defined as the stakeholders perception of a firm’s dependency 
on its vendor firm, relative to the vendor firms’ dependency on it (Lee et al. 1999). 
Interdependency arises between the parties in organizational relationships based on the 
following factors: size and importance of the relational exchange, prominent position in 
market of one of the parties, unavailability of substitutable relationships, and high 
switching costs (Klepper 1995b). In enterprise resources planning (ERP) relationships, 
interdependence was found to increase coordination between the parties (Gattiker et al. 
2005). Dwyer, Schurr and Oh (1987) propose that in committed relationships, 
interdependence is an important factor. In vendor-retailer relationships also, the 
hypothesis of influence of interdependence on buyer-seller relationships found partial 
support (Ganesan 1994b). Past research indicates that interdependence between the 
parties strengthens the cooperative inter-organizations relationships (Ring et al. 1992; 
Ring et al. 1994). In outsourcing relationships, Lee and Kim (1999) posited a positive 
direct relationship between mutual dependence of partner firms and partnership quality. 
Contrary to their hypothesis, they found a significant negative effect— implying more the 
dependency, lesser the partnership quality. They found also found a significant negative 
relationship with relationship commitment. Lee and Kim (1999) explain that this finding 
that might possibly have been because of perceptions of risk caused by the imbalance of 
power due to mutual dependence. The Lee and Kim (1999) however did not test the risk 
constructs – imbalances or power, conflict of interest or vendor opportunism. Lee and 
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Kim (1999) also did not test the relationship between relationship cooperation and 
coordination dimensions of the relationship. Ring and Van de Ven (1992; 1994) and 
Gattiker and Goodhue (2005) found significant positive impact of mutual dependence on 
cooperation and coordination. In outsourcing contracts, studies concluded that long term 
relationships create interdependencies that impact and strengthen the IT outsourcing 
relationships (Kern et al. 2000; Willcocks et al. 1998b; Willcocks et al. 1999b) . 
Extending the findings on outsourcing interdependencies, this study contends that the 
extent of such interdependence can be an indicator of the quality of the relationship. 
Along the same lines as posited in the past research, this study expects a positive direct 
relationship between interdependence and relationship quality. In outsourcing 
relationships, perceptions of interdependence between the stakeholders of the 
relationships should increase mutual cooperation, aid better coordination, and increase 
the relationship commitment between the parties. Therefore it is hypothesized as follows: 
H2: Interdependence is positively related to relationship quality.  
Service quality 
Service quality is defined as the degree and direction of discrepancy between the 
service receiver’s expectations of service and perceptions of actual service received 
(Grover et al. 1996b; Parasuraman et al. 1988). In marketing research a positive 
discrepancy (that is meeting or exceeding the expectations) in service quality was found 
to be a major influencer of: customer repeat purchases (Boulding et al. 1993; Cronin et al. 
1992); commitment to the organization, in terms of expressing preference to a particular 
company over others, or continuing to purchase the company’s product/service or 
intentions to increase business with the company in future (LaBarbera et al. 1983; Rust et 
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al. 1999; Rust et al. 1993); and recommending the company, or service to others 
(Boulding et al. 1993; Parasuraman et al. 1991c). Negative discrepancy in service quality 
perceptions lead to defections and loss of business (Richins 1983; Scaglione 1988). These 
findings support the contention that service quality perceptions will have an impact on 
the intentions and behaviors of the parties in a relationship.  
In the outsourcing context, service quality reflects the effectiveness of 
implementation of the outsourcing decision (Grover et al. 1996b). Grover et al found that 
service quality moderated the relation between the extent of outsourcing and outsourcing 
success. A positive discrepancy contributed to outsourcing success and a negative 
discrepancy indicated problems with the outsourcing implementation leading to failure. 
Past research found that non performance of the vendors to the expectations, resulted in 
project failures, renegotiations of contracts or termination of contracts (Lacity et al. 1994; 
Lacity et al. 1993a; Lacity et al. 1995b; Lacity et al. 1996).  
The above findings from outsourcing and marketing research streams indicate that 
service quality influences the outcomes of the outsourcing contract. In the interests of 
success of the outsourcing project, clients who perceive their vendors as not providing the 
expected service quality or the desired outcomes would try to re-negotiate the contract 
(Barthelemy 2001; Kern et al. 2000; Sabherwal 1999) and get the expected quality of 
service from the vendor, or try to impose penalties and/or terminate the contract so that 
they can get a better service from another vendor. In the face of a negative discrepancy in 
service quality, the client will not intend to be committed to continue the relationship 
with the vendor or renew the relationship when due for renewal of the contract. A 
negative discrepancy would result in lesser or no commitment between the parties to 
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continue the relationship, lesser cooperation between the parties and lesser coordination 
of joint efforts between the parties. A positive discrepancy on the other hand leads to 
better relationship quality with better commitment between the parties, better cooperation 
between the parties, and better coordination of joint efforts of the parties. Therefore it is 
hypothesized as follows: 
H3 : Service quality is positively related to relationship quality.  
Trust in Vendor 
Trust in vendor is defined as the willingness to be vulnerable to the actions of the 
IT outsourcing vendor, with an expectation that the vendor will not engage in 
opportunistic behavior. Trust in vendor is operationalized as the general level of trust in a 
specific IT outsourcing vendor, without reference to any particular behavior or 
characteristic of the trusted party (Chen et al. 2003).  
Principal function of trust in a relationship is manifold. The first function is 
reduction of uncertainty (Gefen et al. 2003b; Johnson-George et al. 1982; Lewis et al. 
1985; Luhmann 1979; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998) and the second function 
is trust induces a perception of predictability of outcomes in a business relationship and 
behavior of the trustee (Deutsch 1958a). A third function is that trust also accrues 
transaction cost benefits (McLain et al. 1999). The formal mechanisms for protecting a 
party's interest are uneconomical and inefficient. Trust efficiently and economically 
accomplishes this task which is sought to be accomplished by formal mechanisms.  
While one-way trust cannot make a relationship, the relationship is strengthened 
when trust is reciprocated (McLain et al. 1999). Trust can contribute to strengthen a 
relationship where predictable behaviors of one party become the reward for the trust 
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reposed by the other. Based on past research this study expects that trust in vendor 
contributes positively to relationship quality. Past research confirms that trust leads to 
commitment (McLain et al. 1999). In the context of ecommerce, trust in an e-vendor was 
significantly related to the repeat purchase behaviors or loyalty to the vendor (Gefen 
2000; Gefen 2002a; Kim et al. 2004). Repeat purchases or loyalty is a type of 
commitment behavior expressed by the customers. A similar positive relationship 
between trust in the IT outsourcing vendor and stakeholders’ commitment to the 
relationship is expected in the context of IT outsourcing.  
Cooperation is associated with trust and even confused with trust (Mayer et al. 
1995), but the concepts are clearly distinct (Kee et al. 1970; Mayer et al. 1995). Trust is 
significantly related to cooperative action (Gambetta 1988; Mayer et al. 1995). The same 
relationship is expected to be significant in the context of IT outsourcing context also. 
Trust includes predictability of behaviors of the parties (Dasgupta 1988; Gambetta 
1988; Mayer et al. 1995; Rotter 1980) as well as expectation about the behavior of the 
trustee (Deutsch 1958a). Coordination is reciprocal expectations of the parties in a 
relationship – that is one party performing a task and trusting the other party to 
reciprocate (Mohr et al. 1994; Narus et al. 1987). Therefore coordination relies heavily on 
trust between the parties. This study expects a significant positive relationship between 
trust in vendor and coordination. It is hypothesized that:  
H4 : Trust in vendor is positively related to relationship quality.  
Perceptions of strategic salience 
Perceptions of strategic salience is the stakeholders’ perception that the 
collaboration with IT outsourcing vendors will be beneficial to the organization and can 
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yield strategic advantage. Stakeholders as defined in chapter 1, are the middle level 
managers of the vendor and the client who are involved in the project. The middle level 
managers have the immediate positional advantage to decide whether strategic issues are 
being considered in the proper context (Bower 1970; Bower 1974). They are crucial in 
capitalizing on the firm’s strengths, conceptualizing new strategies and supporting the 
organizational initiatives at the operational level (Burgelman 1983a; Burgelman 1983b). 
Middle managers provide key insights and inputs to the top management and have 
upward influence over the decision makers. Middle managers’ upward influence could 
potentially decide the strategic course of the company (Floyd et al. 1992; Floyd et al. 
1997). Middle managers interpret the ambiguous data from strategic situations and could 
potentially frame perceptions of other decision makers, which could have a profound 
impact on the strategic agenda (Dutton et al. 1987).  
Middle managers wield downward influence over their subordinates and also their 
peers and therefore are very key actors in implementation of strategic decisions (Nonaka 
1988; Nonaka 1994). In their operational role the managers have a important role in 
bringing the operations in alignment and implement the organizational strategic decisions 
(Sayles 1993; Schendel et al. 1979).  
IT outsourcing is a strategic decision that is implemented by the stakeholders. 
Because of the upward and downward influence the stakeholders have in the 
organizations in general and in implementing the strategic decisions at the operational 
level in particular, the perceptions of the managers regarding the IT outsourcing is 
important. The strategic understanding of managers was found to have an impact on the 
commitment and involvement of managers in implementation of strategic decisions 
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(Wooldridge et al. 1990). This study expects the same results in the context of 
outsourcing also. If the stakeholders perceive the outsourcing relationship to be 
strategically important to the organization and beneficial to them, the stakeholders are 
likely to be more committed, coordinate well and cooperate in the IT outsourcing 
relationship. It is therefore hypothesized that:  
H5 : Stakeholders’ perceptions of strategic salience is positively related to 
relationship quality.  
Perceptions of risk 
Perception of risk is defined as the stakeholders’ perception of the relationship 
resulting in situations or events which may lead to negative outcomes, which are beyond 
the control of the stakeholders. This study deals with the post contract phase risks in IT 
outsourcing relationships. The factors of risk that are tested in this study are based on the 
post contract risk factors identified in the past research (Eisenhardt 1989; Jurison 1995; 
Willcocks et al. 1999b). A detailed review of the outsourcing risks identified in past 
literature (Jurison 1995; Willcocks et al. 1999b) is presented in table 2.3 of chapter 2. 
Specifically four post contract risks suggested by Willcocks, Lacity and Kern are: 1. lack 
of active relationship, 2. power asymmetries favoring the vendor, 3. difficulties on 
account of fast pace of IT change, and 4. short term outsourcing for financial leverage.  
The last risk mentioned is not a relational issue but an aspect of financial affairs 
of the client, which falls outside the scope of this study. Among the other three, lack of 
active relationship is tested in this study as the lack of stakeholders’ involvement. Power 
asymmetries favoring the vendor, and the possibility of vendor opportunism are widely 
recognized in outsourcing research (Kern et al. 2000; Kern et al. 2002a; Lacity et al. 
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1994; Lacity et al. 1993a; Willcocks et al. 1999b), as well as in agency theory (Eisenhardt 
1989). The risks arising out of such asymmetries – risk of opportunistic behavior, and 
risk of conflict of interests, are included in the current study. Difficulties due to the fast 
pace of change of IT is not tested in this study as it is not relevant in the relationship 
context. The risk of fast paced changes in IT is not specific to the relationship. The risk of 
fast paced changes in IT, and the risk of obsolescence exist whether or not the IT function 
is outsourced, and is generic to IT. The risks considered in this study are only in the 
context of post-contractual, IT outsourcing relationships. The dimensions of risk 
proposed and tested in this study are:  Vendor opportunism, conflict of interests, and 
stakeholder non-involvement risk.  
Vendor opportunism is the risk of possible opportunistic behavior by the 
outsourcing vendor seeking self-interest. Conflict of interest is the risk of a conflict 
arising between the parties in the relationship because of divergent business goals. 
Transitioning risk is the risk of incurring huge switching costs in an event of the 
company having to switch vendors. The switching could be either at the time of first 
outsourcing from inhouse systems to an external vendor, or eventually changing vendors 
during or after an outsourcing contract. Stakeholders non-involvement is  risk of the 
stakeholders having no participation in the contract affecting the project performance.  
Vendor opportunism and conflict of interest are well recognized in agency theory 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Shapiro 2005) as the problems that arise in agency relationships. 
Outsourcing also entails agency relationships where the vendor manages the IT services 
on behalf of the client. Client owns the IT facilities, and monitors the services of the 
vendor, and incurs agency costs. There is a constant possibility of power asymmetries 
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developing in IT outsourcing favoring the vendor because of excessive dependency on 
the vendor leading to vendor opportunism (Barthelemy 2001; Lacity et al. 1995b; 
Willcocks et al. 1999b), and the vendor trying to skim away the knowledgeable staff from 
the client company (Lacity et al. 2003; Lacity et al. 1995a). In the face of vendor 
opportunism, the stakeholders evaluate the relationship as oppressive, unilateral and not 
beneficial to them. When the stakeholders perceive the possibility of vendor taking 
advantage of such asymmetries, it is likely to adversely affect the relationship and the 
relational commitment, cooperation, and coordination between the parties. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized that:  
H6 . 1: Vendor opportunism is negatively related to relationship quality.  
Conflict of interests can arise in multiple ways in outsourcing. Few possibilities 
documented in research, for example are as follows: Interpretation of formal contracts, 
where all the possible situations cannot be taken into consideration, and where some 
ambiguity may exist in certain situations (Lacity et al. 1995b; Willcocks et al. 1999b; 
Williamson et al. 1993); conflict arising because of a single vendor (agent) catering to 
multiple clients (principals) having varying interests (Eisenhardt 1989; Shapiro 2005). 
Past research indicates that shared goals (or interests) between the parties is a major 
indicator of commitment and (Henderson 1990). Perceptions of conflict of interest 
diminish the solidarity in relationships (Dwyer et al. 1987; Konsynski et al. 1990). 
Conflict of interests between parties in a relationship negatively affect commitment 
(Anderson et al. 1989) and cooperation between the parties in a relationship (Ring et al. 
1994). This study expects similar results in IT outsourcing context also.  
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H6 . 2: Perception of conflict of interests is negatively related to relationship 
quality.  
Stakeholder non-involvement is an extensively prevalent risk in IT projects 
(Wallace et al. 2004). If the users or the stakeholders in the project have an unfavorable 
attitude towards a new system or a project, they are likely to be indifferent to the project 
leading to project failures (Robey et al. 1982; Tait et al. 1988). Such indifference towards 
the project implementation is identified as one of the causes for project failures (Wallace 
et al. 2004). Inadequate participation and ineffective management of the relationships are 
found to be two important reasons for failure of strategic relationships (Konsynski et al. 
1990) leading to project failures. In Outsourcing projects, the reasons for lack of 
involvement could be due to the feelings of insecurity, low morale (Khosrowpour et al. 
1996) and resistance to change (Konsynski et al. 1990) among the stakeholders because 
of the perceptions of loss of demand for talent, loss of intellectual assets, career loss, or 
loss of organizational performance (Pfannenstein et al. 2004).  
Konsynski and McFarlan (1990) describe many specific activities that are 
essential for success of relationships in the context of strategic information sharing 
partnerships – like involvement of the partners in development of common codes for 
customers, products and communications, involvement in resolution of conflicts 
(Konsynski et al. 1990). These activities encompass cooperation, coordination and 
commitment between the parties. Lack of such involvement between the parties is likely 
to negatively affect the relationship quality. Therefore it is hypothesized that:  
H6. 3: Stakeholders non-involvement is negatively related to relationship quality.  
 97 
Service quality and trust 
Trust is conceptualized as an expectation the behavior of the trusted party in a 
relationship (Blau 1964b; Luhmann 1979). Specifically, trust is an expectation about 
fulfillment of mutual obligations, moral and social orders, trustee delivering a technically 
competent role performance, fulfillment of mutual obligations and acting in good faith, 
without self interest (Barber 1983). One of the expectations laid down by Barber about 
performance is the expectation of the consumers from the vendors. This is the same as the 
expectations of service quality (Parasuraman et al. 1991a; Parasuraman et al. 1985; 
Parasuraman et al. 1988; Zeithaml et al. 1996b; Zeithaml et al. 2001). Empirical evidence 
confirms that vendor gains trust when these expectations are met and loses trust when 
these are not met (Gefen 2002a; Harris et al. 2004; Reichheld et al. 2000). In the context 
of outsourcing, one of the expectations of the outsourcing client is delivery of efficient 
service and competent technical performance by the vendor. Trust builds when the 
expectations about service quality are met and diminishes when the expectations are not 
fulfilled. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
H7: Service quality is positively related to trust.  
INTERACTION EFFECTS OF TRUST IN VENDOR 
Interaction effects explain the contextual effects of a third variable on a relation 
between two variables, affecting the direction and/or the strength of the relationship 
(Barron et al. 1986). The contextual effects of high or low levels of trust on relationships 
impacting relationship quality is explored in this study.  
From the definitions of trust in chapter 3, trust is defined as the willingness to be 
vulnerable to the actions of the IT outsourcing vendor, with an expectation that the 
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vendor will not engage in opportunistic behavior. The high level of trust implies high 
level of willingness to be vulnerable and low trust implies low level of willingness to be 
vulnerable to the actions of the IT outsourcing vendor, with an expectation that the 
vendor will not engage in opportunistic behavior. It is important to note that low trust 
does not imply distrust between the parties. Trust is distinguished from distrust as a 
distinct concept and the two are not a part of a single continuum (Lewicki et al. 1998). 
The past literature recognizes that lack of trust or low trust does not imply distrust 
between the parties (Lewicki et al. 1998; Luhmann 1979).  
Extrapolating from the definitions of trust and theoretical bases outlined in 
chapter 3, levels of trust can be explained as follows: High trust results in a high level of 
confident expectation of outcomes coupled with a high predictability of behavior of the 
trusted party. Low trust is the expectation, without a high level of predictability of 
behavior of the trusted party. Trustor’s (client’s) bases for these expectations and 
predictability of the behavior are drawn from the trustworthiness attributes of the trustee 
(vendor), and various modes of trust (Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; 
McKnight et al. 1998). Lewicki, Mcallister and Bies (1998) characterize high trust and 
low trust as follows: High trust is characterized by hope, faith, confidence, assurance and 
initiative between the parties, whereas low trust is characterized by lack of hope, faith 
and confidence coupled with passivity and hesitance. If trust can have an impact on 
relationships, then, different levels of trust (Dirks et al. 2001; Mishra et al. 1998) should 
have different levels of impact on the relationships. Interaction effect of the levels of trust 
between the parties on the other relationships impacting relationship quality, and the 
intuitions for such interactions are explained in the following paragraphs.  
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Interdependence and Relationship quality moderated by trust 
Past research indicates that interdependence between the parties strengthens the 
inter-organizations relationships (Ring et al. 1992; Ring et al. 1994). Trust defined by 
some scholars as a form of reliance on another in whom one has confidence (Moorman et 
al. 1992) has a considerable overlap with interdependence. Interdependence between 
firms results in asymmetries in power (Eisenhardt 1989; Klepper 1995b). The party 
having the adverse asymmetry of power perceives the other in the relation as being in a 
position of influence and the relationship as vulnerable to the opportunistic behavior by 
the party having the favorable asymmetry of power (Klepper 1995b). In such situations, 
trust acts as a mechanism of reducing such perceptions of opportunistic behavior and 
uncertainty in the relationships. At a given level of interdependence between the client 
and the vendor, higher trust reduces uncertainty, and increases the commitment, 
cooperation and coordination between the parties. Conversely, lower level of trust will 
negatively affect the commitment, cooperation and coordination between the parties. 
Empirical evidence indicates that higher levels of trust positively impact relationships 
where as low levels of trust have a negative impact (Joshi et al. 1999). It is therefore 
hypothesized as follows: 
H8: Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between interdependence and 
relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor increases the positive effect of 
interdependence on relationship quality and low level of trust decreases the positive 
effect.  
Service Quality and relationship quality moderated by trust 
Trust and service quality originate from sets of expectations. Trust includes 
among other things, generalized expectations about the behavior of the trustee (Deutsch 
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1958a; Mayer et al. 1995). Service quality is an expectation about the quality of service 
and perceptions of actual service received (Grover et al. 1996b; Parasuraman et al. 
1991d; Parasuraman et al. 1985). The quality of service evaluations also encompass 
beliefs about trustworthiness of the service provider (Grover et al. 1996b).  
Beliefs and perceptions about trust are updated by the experiences from repeated 
past interactions in a relationship (McKnight et al. 2001). Realization of expectations 
from previous interactions positively impact trust (Gefen 2000; Gefen et al. 2003b). Trust 
in turn impacts the future expectations from the interactions in a relationship (Gefen 
2000; Gefen et al. 2003b; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998) as well as the 
perceptions of service quality because the perceptions of service quality include 
perceptions of trustworthiness (Grover et al. 1996b). Other evidence in literature also 
confirms that satisfaction from past outcomes in a relationship positively impact the 
trustworthiness beliefs (Ganesan 1994b).  
Therefore, at a given level of service quality, higher level of trust in a vendor will 
increase the impact of service quality on the quality of relationship. With a high level of 
trust in the IT outsourcing vendor, the stakeholders in a relationship, will be more 
committed to the relationship, willing to cooperate and coordinate with the vendor. At the 
same level of service quality perceptions, when the trust in vendor of low, the 
stakeholders commitment, cooperation and coordination in the relationship is likely to be 
weaker. Therefore it is hypothezised that:  
H9: Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between service quality 
perceptions and relationship quality. High level of trust increases the positive impact of 
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service quality on relationship quality and low level of trust decreases the positive 
impact.  
Risk and relationship quality moderated by trust.  
The perceptions of risk have a negative impact on the relationship (Anderson et 
al. 1989; Ring et al. 1994). The need for trust arises in the situations of risk (Johnson-
George et al. 1982). Trust reduces the perceptions of risk (Gefen et al. 2003b; Jarvenpaa 
et al. 2000; Lewis et al. 1985; Luhmann 1979; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 1998) 
to the extent that the trustor in the relationship perceives the benefits derived from 
trusting are worth taking the risk (Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; McLain et al. 1999). Trust 
however, does not totally eliminate the perceptions of risk are but only mitigates the 
perceptions of risk. This implies that parties in a trusted relationship still perceive a 
certain level of risk even though they may trust the vendor (Johnson-George et al. 1982; 
McLain et al. 1999).  
In such situations of simultaneous trust and risk, high or low levels of trust in the 
vendor can impact the relationship between perceived risk and relationship quality. In 
situations where the stakeholders have a high trust in vendor and perceive risk, the 
negative effect of perceptions of risk on relationship quality is likely to be reduced. The 
stakeholders will be more inclined to be committed to the relationship, cooperate and 
coordinate with the IT outsourcing vendor. In situations where the stakeholders have a 
low trust in vendor and perceive risk, the negative effect of perceptions of risk on 
relationship quality is aggravated. The stakeholders will be less inclined to be committed 
to the relationship, and will be less inclined to cooperate or coordinate with the IT 
outsourcing vendor. It is therefore hypothesized as follows.  
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H10: Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between perceptions of risk and 
relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor reduces the negative impact of 
perceptions of risk on relationship quality and low level of trust increases the negative 
effect.  
TRUST CONSTRUCTS 
Modes of trust  
The trust modes tested in the current study are: calculative-based trust, institution-
based trust, transference-based trust and information-based trust, which are more relevant 
in organizational-relationships and an outsourcing context. Personality-based trust, 
cognition-based trust and characteristic-based trust are not tested. These three modes of 
trust are relevant in individual relationships, and are more salient during the formation of 
initial interpersonal trust. Characteristics-based mode is specific and salient for small 
groups where individual characteristics are of relevance (Zucker 1986). Therefore 
personality-based cognitive-based and characteristic-based trust modes are irrelevant in 
the context of outsourcing relationships.  
The study adopts the conceptualizations of calculative-based trust, institution-
based trust, transference-based trust and knowledge-based trust from the past research. In 
the context of outsourcing, the definitions of the three trust modes tested in this study and 
the theoretical basis for relationships posited in the study are explained in the following 
paragraphs: 
Transference-based trust 
Transference-based trust is defined as the stakeholders trust in the IT outsourcing 
vendor which is based on top management’s trust in the outsourcing vendor. Trust 
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transference can occur from different types of trusted sources to unknown sources 
(Milliman et al. 1988; Strub et al. 1976; Uzzi 1996). Trust transference also occurs when 
a trusted third party can exert influence over the trustor (Stewart 2003). In the context of 
outsourcing, perception of the stakeholders that the top management trusts the IT 
outsourcing vendor, and values the relationship with the vendor, can create stakeholders’ 
trust in the IT outsourcing vendor. Past outsourcing research (Lee et al. 1999) found that 
client’s top management support was significantly related to trust in vendor. When the 
top management is perceived to have trust in the outsourcing vendor, the management is 
also likely to pass the preferences down to the stake holders. Such word of the mouth 
referrals from trusted and influential sources are known to have a strong impact (Brown 
et al. 1987). Top management is a trusted and an influential source for the stakeholders. 
Therefore, perceptions of top management support to the relationship induce stakeholders 
trust in the IT outsourcing vendor. Thus it is hypothesized:  
H11.1: Transference-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing 
vendor.  
Calculative-based trust 
Calculative-based trust in this study is defined as a belief among the stakeholders 
that the vendor will not act in a manner detrimental to their interests because the vendor 
has nothing to gain in violation of trust, and that it is in the vendor’s interest to fulfill 
their outsourcing obligations because of the mutually beneficial nature of the relationship.  
 Outsourcing relationships are predominantly calculative-based because of the 
rewards and penalties structures, fierce competition and high costs involved (Sabherwal 
1999). Recognizing the calculative nature of the vendor-client outsourcing relationships, 
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“withholding a piece of business from the supplier and use that as a carrot” was 
suggested as one of the measures to maintain control over outsourcing arrangements 
(Lacity et al. 1995b). Some other measures suggested in contract negotiations in 
outsourcing are specifying escalation procedures, cash penalties etc which deter the 
vendor from nonperformance (Lacity et al. 1993a). Stakeholders in the relationship rely 
on these calculative mechanisms and trust the vendor based on the calculation that the 
vendor will not act to their detriment because it is not in vendor’s interests, and is likely 
to perform well because of the incentives for good performance. Calculative-based trust 
is a belief which influences the client’s intentions of willing to be vulnerable to the 
actions of the vendor. Therefore, it is hypothesized:  
H11.2: Calculative-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing 
vendor.  
Institutional-based trust 
Institutional-based trust in this study is defined as the belief that the vendor can 
be trusted because of the structural safeguards present in the IT outsourcing contract 
terms such as penalties, early termination clauses, protecting the client, and situational 
normality of the IT outsourcing contract. Situational normality is a perception of the 
stakeholders that the contract with the vendor is typical of any outsourcing interaction, 
and that there is nothing abnormal which would prevent the normal conduct and success 
of the IT outsourcing contract. Institutional trust is a significant factor during the initial 
trust formation (McKnight et al. 1998). In the context of online community of sellers, 
institutional trust mechanisms were significantly related to trust in the seller (Ba et al. 
2002; Gefen et al. 2003b; Pavlou et al. 2004), trust in e-channel as a banking medium 
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(Kim et al. 2004). In an enterprise resources planning (ERP) context, institutional-based 
guarantees increased the clients’ trust in the ERP customization vendors (Gefen 2004). 
Extrapolating from the findings in trust in the context of online ecommerce research 
referred above, this study expects a similar relationship in an outsourcing context. The 
situational normality in outsourcing contract, and the structural guarantees like 
termination clauses, penalty clauses, memberships of professional associations that a 
vendor has will induce trust in the vendor. Therefore it is hypothesized as follows:  
H11.3: Institution-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing 
vendor.  
Knowledge-based trust 
Knowledge-based trust in this study is defined as the stakeholders trust in the IT 
outsourcing vendor based on their positive experiences in the past and regular interaction 
between the vendor and the stakeholders. Past interactions between the parties has been a 
well known factor that increases trust between the parties (Blau 1964b; Deutsch 1958a; 
Lewicki et al. 1995; Rousseau et al. 1998). Knowledge-based prior interaction with e-
vendors was found to be a significant determinant of trust in vendor (Gefen 2000; Gefen 
et al. 2003b). Outsourcing relationships have also evidenced that past experiences with 
the vendor, or the key participants in the relationship knowing each other well established 
trust between the parties (Sabherwal 1999). Past experience with an ERP customization 
vendor was a significant determinant of trust in the vendor (Gefen 2002b). The 
stakeholders in outsourcing relationships also develop trust over time after the positive 
experiences with the IT outsourcing vendor. Therefore similar to the previous studies in 
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various contexts, a significant relationship between knowledge-based trust and trust in 
vendor is expected in outsourcing relationships also. Therefore, it is hypothesized:  
H11.4: Knowledge-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing 
vendor.  
Trustworthiness Beliefs 
Trustworthiness connotes the characteristic attributes of the trustee as perceived 
by the trustor (Mayer et al. 1995). The dimensions tested in this study are ability, 
benevolence and integrity. The reason for considering these three dimensions are as 
follows:  These three dimensions are widely accepted and the most commonly used 
dimensions of trust (Chen et al. 2003) and recognized as explaining a major portion of 
variance (Gefen 2002c; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998). 
These three dimensions are most relevant in the outsourcing context.  
The present study adapts the definitions of the dimensions of trustworthiness from 
the past research (Gefen 2002c) : Ability is defined as the stakeholders’ belief that the IT 
outsourcing vendor is competent to deliver the clients requirements as per the contract. 
Benevolence is defined as the stakeholders’ belief that the vendor will act in a legitimate 
manner, so that the client’s interests are protected. Integrity is defined as the 
stakeholders’ perception that the vendors are honest in their dealing with the 
stakeholders, and would honor commitments. Past research in various contexts including 
IT, indicates that ability, benevolence and integrity of the trustee contribute to trust (Chen 
et al. 2003; Gefen 2002c; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 
2002a; McKnight et al. 2002b; McKnight et al. 1998).  
 107 
Research on outsourcing alludes to the importance of trustworthiness attributes of 
the vendor in the process of vendor selection. The attributes of the vendor considered at 
the time of vendor selection include among other things, experience, track record and 
contract terms of the vendor (Barthelemy 2001; Kern et al. 2002b; Lacity et al. 2003; 
Lacity et al. 1993a; Lacity et al. 1995b; Willcocks et al. 1996; Willcocks et al. 1995; 
Willcocks et al. 1999a). Various vendor selection criteria proposed in the past research is 
the process of verification of the ability of the IT outsourcing vendor, and the vendor’s 
disposition towards being benevolent and honest in the execution of the outsourcing 
contract. The selection of a vendor from amongst many outsourcing bidders amounts to 
reposing trust in that particular vendor based on the vendor attributes. The factors 
contributing to the decision to trust the vendor are the trustworthiness attributes of the 
vendor. Therefore it is hypothesized that:  
H12: Perceptions of trustworthiness are positively related to trust in vendor.  
Trust modes and trustworthiness beliefs 
As defined earlier, trust modes are the various bases of trust relied upon by the 
trustor. Trustworthiness attributes – ability, benevolence and integrity – are the 
characteristics of the trustee. The relationship between trust modes and trustworthiness 
beliefs been extensively tested and replicated in multiple contexts. For example: 
knowledge based trust or the prior interaction with the parties enables the parties to know 
each other better, and knowledge based trust and trustworthiness are positively related 
(Blau 1964b; Kim et al. 2004; McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 2002a) 
Institutional-based trust was positively related to vendor’s trustworthiness (Gefen 2004; 
McKnight et al. 2001; McKnight et al. 2002a; Pavlou et al. 2004). Transference based-
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trust (Milliman et al. 1988; Stewart 2003; Strub et al. 1976; Uzzi 1996) and Calculative-
based trust (Doney et al. 1998; Lewicki et al. 1995; Shapiro et al. 1992) impact 
trustworthiness beliefs about a trustee.  
In the context of IT outsourcing also the relationship is expected to be significant. 
It is therefore posited as follows: 
H13: Trust modes are positively related to stakeholders’ beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the IT outsourcing vendor.  
Trust and risk 
Trust is recognized as a mechanism for reducing risk and uncertainty (Gefen et al. 
2003b; Lewis et al. 1985; Luhmann 1979; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; 
McKnight et al. 1998). Definition of trust itself has included the aspects of risk (discussed 
in chapter 3). Social exchange theory proposes that trust evolves as a response to 
perceptions of risk (Blau 1964b; Molm et al. 2000). In transactions where outcomes are a 
certainty, there is no need for trust (Blau 1964b; Luhmann 1979; Molm et al. 2000). 
Where the actors perceive a situation of risk, the positive consequences of trusting are 
evaluated against the possibility of risk and its consequences, to ascertain the relative 
value of trust (Johnson-George et al. 1982). Such evaluations reduce perceptions of risk 
and assure the parties in the relationship about the expected positive outcomes out of a 
relationship. Further, trust is only a mechanism to reduce the perceptions of risk to 
manageable levels facilitating relational exchange. Trust in a vendor does not alter the 
extent of risk that exists in the transaction.  
In various contexts, empirical results showed a significant impact of trust 
reducing the perceptions of risk (Gefen 2002a; Jarvenpaa et al. 2000; Mayer et al. 1995; 
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McLain et al. 1999; Pavlou 2003; Pavlou et al. 2004; Sako et al. 1998). Sako and Helper 
(1998) found that trust reduced the perceptions of supplier opportunism in inter-
organizational relationships.  
Similar relationship is expected between the client and vendors in outsourcing 
contexts also. Stakeholders’ high level of trust in the vendor reduces the perceptions of 
vendor opportunism and conflict of interests. Stakeholders are likely to involve 
themselves and participate more in trusted relationships rather than in relationships of 
low trust. Therefore it is hypothesized that: 
H14: Trust in vendor is negatively related to perceptions of risk.  
Trust and strategic salience 
The decision to outsource an IT is perceived as yielding strategic benefits (Lacity 
et al. 1993a; Loh et al. 1992a). The stakeholders in the IT outsourcing relationship are 
also likely to view the IT outsourcing relationship as strategically salient. This is because 
top management decisions shape the perceptions of the managers (Bower 1970; Bower 
1974) – the stakeholders in IT outsourcing relationships.  
Trust in the vendor based on various bases of trust including past experience 
(knowledge-based trust) and top managements perceptions of importance of the 
relationship (transference-based trust) and trustworthiness of the vendor. Trust is 
considered as accruing transaction cost benefits, where the formal governance 
mechanisms like formal contracts may become uneconomical (Gambetta 1988). When a 
client perceives a vendor trustworthy, and relationship as beneficial, the client is likely to 
perceive the relationship with the IT outsourcing vendor as strategically salient. The more 
an relational partner is trustworthy, the more are the chances that the relationship can be a 
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source of strategic advantage (Barney et al. 1994). Therefore, clients perceive a trusted 
relationship with a vendor as strategically salient. Therefore, it is hypothesized that:  
H15: Trust in vendor is positively related to perceptions of strategic salience.  
i) The operationalization of the constructs, items measuring the constructs, and 
methodology that will adopted for the study are explained in chapter 5. 
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Figure 4.1 - Research Model 
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CHAPTER 5:  RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the operationalization of the constructs tested in this study, 
research design and methodology used to test the model presented in chapter 4. 
Specification of the measures, survey instrument creation, proposed data collection 
method, and proposed statistical methods to analyze the data are discussed in the 
following sections. 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
The proposed research uses a cross-sectional, correlational design, and the data 
are proposed to be collected using surveys. Cross-sectional research design using surveys 
is the predominant research design employed in social sciences as it enables the 
researchers to examine those constructs of interest, that cannot be observed using 
experimental manipulation (Nachmias et al. 1996). The present study examines the 
factors contributing to relationship quality and outsourcing success and proposes to test 
the impact of interactions of trust with service quality, strategic salience and perceptions 
of risk. Survey research method is appropriate for this study for investigating 
stakeholders’ beliefs on various outcomes (Kerlinger 1986).  
Instrument Creation 
This section presents the operationalization of all the constructs used in this 
research. Except where noted, all the items will be measured with a seven point Lickert-
type scales ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree.  
The survey instrument is designed to be anonymous and no personal information 
of the respondents is collected. A brief working definition of IT Outsourcing, and the 
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terms vendor and client are provided to the respondents to aid them in taking the survey. 
The constructs that are being measured are not revealed to the respondents. Survey items 
are randomized in a controlled fashion, that is, items measuring multiple sub-constructs 
are randomized. The constructs for which items are randomized are: Outsourcing success, 
relationship quality, trust modes, trustworthiness constructs, service quality and 
perceptions of risk. A copy of the survey instrument used in the study is presented in 
Appendix 1. 
The items in the questionnaire measuring each construct were adopted from past 
research. Items measuring identical constructs in similar contexts were adopted with 
appropriate modifications to wording to suit the IT outsourcing context. In addition to the 
items measuring the constructs tested in the study, the study proposes to gather general 
demographics of the respondents. Demographics collected in the study are some details 
about the respondents like: the respondents’ position in the organization, experience in 
outsourcing projects, nature of the outsourcing projects, and details about the company, 
and few details of their vendors. The items measuring individual constructs and their 
sources where ever applicable are presented in the following paragraphs.  
Outsourcing success 
Outsourcing success is measured by four sub-constructs – strategic success, 
financial success, technological success and relationship satisfaction. The items for the 
first three sub-constructs were adapted from (Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996b) and 
relationship success was adapted from Lee and Kim (1999). The definition of the latent 
construct, and the sub-constructs and the items measuring the constructs are shown in 
Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 - Outsourcing Success 
 
 
 
Outsourcing Success: Outsourcing success is operationalized as a four dimensional 
concept consisting of strategic success, financial success, technological success and 
relationship satisfaction. 
Strategic success: Strategic success is defined as the firm’s ability to focus on its core 
business; outsource routine IT activities so as to focus on strategic uses of IT; and 
enhance its IT competence (Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Loh and Venkatraman 
1992a; Loh and Venkatraman 1992b).  
Items measuring strategic success have been adopted from Grover, Cheon and Teng 
(1996b) and Lee and Kim (1999) studies. 
1. As a result of outsourcing we have been able to refocus on core business. 
2. As a result of outsourcing we have enhanced our IT competence. 
3. As a result of outsourcing we have increased access to skilled personnel. 
4. As a result of outsourcing we have increased access to key information technologies. 
Financial success: Financial success is defined as the firms ability to utilize the 
economies of scale of the vendors, achieve economies in profitability, and reduce costs 
(Grover et al. 1996b; Loh et al. 1992a; Loh et al. 1992b).  
Items measuring financial success have been adapted from Grover, Cheon and Teng 
(1996b) and Lee and Kim (1999) studies. 
1. As a result of outsourcing we have increased control over ITexpenses. 
2. The outsourcing resulted in considerable financial benefits to the organization 
3. The outsourcing generated additional funds for the organization 
4. We have enhanced economies of scale in IT human resources 
Technological Success: Technological success is defined as the ability of the firm to 
gain access to IT expertise and latest developments in IT in order to avoid IT 
obsolescence (Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996).  
Items measuring Technological success have been adapted from Grover, Cheon and 
Teng (1996b) study. 
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1. We have reduced the risk of IT technological obsolescence.  
2. Our outsourcing vendor has a good understanding of our IT technical requirements. 
3. The services provided by our vendors are compatible with our in-house systems. 
4. The technologies provided by our vendors are compatible with our in-house systems. 
Relationship satisfaction: Relationship satisfaction is the level of satisfaction of the 
stakeholders with IT outsourcing relationship. This definition is adopted from Lee and 
Kim’s (1999) user perspective dimension of outsourcing success.  
Items (1, 2 and 3) measuring relationship satisfaction were adopted from (Wixom et al. 
2005) and item 4 is adopted from (Grover et al. 1996b) 
1. Overall, the benefits derived from the outsourcing relationship are very satisfying. 
2. I am very satisfied with the information I receive from my outsourcing vendor. 
3. Overall, my interaction with our outsourcing partners is very satisfying. 
4. We are satisfied with our overall benefits form outsourcing.  
 
Relationship Quality 
The items measuring the components of relationship quality are adapted from past 
research. The items were carefully reworded to suit the IT outsourcing context. The 
definitions and items measuring the constructs are presented in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.2 - Relationship Quality 
 
 
 
Relationship quality: Latent variable composing of relationship commitment, 
coordination and cooperation. 
Relationship Commitment: Commitment is defined as an implicit or explicit binding 
on the stakeholders to continue the relationship, sharing the burdens and benefits equally 
(Bensaou and Venkatraman 1995; Cook and Emerson 1978; Dwyer, Schurr and Oh 
1987; Henderson 1990). 
Items measuring relationship commitment are based on (Lee et al. 2004) and (Mohr et 
al. 1994). 
1. We intend to continue our relationship with our outsourcing vendor.  
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2. We believe our outsourcing vendor intends to continue relationship with us.  
3. We are committed to the relationship with our outsourcing vendor. 
4. We expect to have more intense ties with our outsourcing vendor. 
5. We believe our outsourcing vendor is committed to its relationship with us. 
Coordination: Coordination is the set of tasks that each party expects the other to 
perform for effective functioning of the relationship (Mohr and Spekman 1994; Narus 
and Anderson 1987). 
The first four items measuring coordination were based on (Mohr et al. 1994). Items 5, 6 
and 7 were designed for this study. 
1. We know what tasks we are supposed to do in our joint efforts with our outsourcing 
vendor. 
2. We know when we are supposed to do our tasks in our joint efforts with our 
outsourcing vendor. 
3. Our efforts and our outsourcing vendor’s efforts are well coordinated 
4. We carryout our operations in alignment with our outsourcing vendor. 
5. We include our outsourcing vendor in our planning 
6. We function well as a coordinated team with our outsourcing vendor. 
Cooperation: Cooperation is the willingness to invest time, effort and resources in the 
relationship (Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Narus and Anderson 1987).  
The items measuring cooperation were based on (Lee et al. 1999) 
1. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendors, we solve most exceptional 
problems through mutual discussion. 
2. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendors, we extend our support to our 
vendor.  
3. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendors, we are ready to provide assistance 
to our vendor without exception. 
4. We have a cooperative relationship with our outsourcing vendor. 
 
Trust constructs 
Based on the IT outsourcing literature and trust literature reviewed in chapters 2 
and 3, the following trust constructs will be tested in this study: overall trust in vendor, 
trustworthiness beliefs consisting of ability, benevolence and integrity, and trust modes: 
Institutional-based, calculative-based, transference-based and knowledge-based trust. The 
items used to measure the trust constructs were adopted from validated, established and 
widely accepted scales used in the past literature. The definitions of each trust construct 
and the items used to measure the construct and the source from which the items were 
adopted are given in Table 5.3. 
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Table 5.3 - Trust Constructs 
 
 
Trust in vendor: The trust in vendor is operationalized as the general level of trust in a 
specific IT outsourcing vendor, without reference to any particular behavior or 
characteristic of the trusted party (Chen et al. 2003). 
Items measuring trust in vendor are adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b) 
1. Overall our outsourcing vendor is dependable. 
2. Overall, our outsourcing vendor is reliable. 
3. Overall, our outsourcing vendor is honest. 
4. Overall, our outsourcing vendor is trustworthy. 
5. We trust our outsourcing vendor.  
Institution-based trust: Institutional-based trust in this study is defined as the belief 
that the vendor can be trusted because of the structural safeguards present in the IT 
outsourcing contract terms such as penalties, early termination clauses, protecting the 
client, and situational normality of the IT outsourcing contract. 
Structural assurances: Items adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b) 
1. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because our formal 
contract affords sufficient safeguards to both parties. 
2. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because of the 
provisions of escrow mechanisms in our contract. 
3. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because they have 
certifications from accredited institutions. 
4. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because of the 
performance guarantees built into our contract 
5. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because there are 
Service Level Agreements and warranties available in the contract. 
6. I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because of the financial 
guarantees built into our contract. 
Situational normality: Items adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b) 
 The outsourcing contract practices of our outsourcing vendor are typical of other 
similar contracts.  
 The nature of our relationship with our outsourcing vendor is typical of any other 
outsourcing relationship.  
 The information shared with our outsourcing vendor is typical of any other 
outsourcing information exchanges. 
Calculative-based trust: Calculative-based trust is defined as a belief among the 
stakeholders that the vendor will not indulge act in a manner detrimental to their 
interests because the vendor has nothing to gain in violation of trust, and that it is in 
vendor’s interest to fulfill their outsourcing obligations because of the mutually 
beneficial nature of the relationship. 
The items measuring calculative-based trust were adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b) 
 Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by being dishonest in its interactions 
with us. 
 Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by not caring about us. 
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 Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by not sharing knowledge when helping 
us.  
Transference-based trust: Transference-based trust is defined as the stakeholders trust 
in the IT outsourcing vendor which is based on top management’s trust in the 
outsourcing vendor. 
The items measuring transference-based trust were adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b) 
1. Our executives are interested in the relationship with our outsourcing vendor. 
2. Top executives consider our relationship with our outsourcing vendor as important 
at the organizational level. 
3. Our top executives support our outsourcing vendor with all the resources needed. 
4. Our top executives trust our outsourcing vendor. 
Past experience or Knowledge-based trust: Knowledge-based trust in this study is 
defined as the stakeholders trust in the IT outsourcing vendor based on their positive 
experiences in the past and regular interaction between the vendor and the stakeholders. 
The items measuring knowledge-based trust were adapted from (Gefen et al. 2003b). 
1. Our past experiences with our IT outsourcing vendor were positive. 
2. We received excellent service from our IT outsourcing vendor in the past. 
3. Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, we know they 
are honest. 
4. Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, we know they 
care about their clients. 
5. Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, we know they 
are not opportunistic. 
6. Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, we know they 
provide good service. 
7. Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, we know they 
are trustworthy. 
Trustworthiness of outsourcing vendor: [ability, benevolence and integrity] 
Ability: Ability is defined as the stakeholders’ belief that the IT outsourcing vendor is 
competent to deliver the clients requirements as per the contract.  
Benevolence: Benevolence is defined as the stakeholders’ belief that the vendor will act 
in a legitimate manner, so that the client’s interests are protected. 
Integrity: Integrity is defined as the stakeholders’ perception that the vendors are 
honest in their dealing with the stakeholders, and would honor commitments. 
The items measuring ability were based on (Gefen 2004)  
1. Our outsourcing vendor is competent in providing the outsourced IT services. 
              [Ability] 
2. Overall, our outsourcing vendor is capable. 
3. Overall, our outsourcing vendor is very knowledgeable.  
4. I believe that our outsourcing vendor would act in our best interest.   [Benevolence] 
5. I believe our outsourcing vendor will be willing to assist us. 
6. Our vendor is interested in our well being, not just their own.  
7. Our outsourcing vendor is truthful in dealing with us.       [Integrity] 
8. I would characterize our vendors as honest. 
9. Promises made by our outsourcing vendor are reliable.  
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Service Quality 
Considering the importance of service quality evaluation, this study adopts the 
standardized and widely accepted service quality instrument (SERVQUAL) 
(Parasuraman et al. 1988) and tested in an IT outsourcing context in the Grover, Cheon 
and Teng (1996b) study. Service quality is operationalized as a multidimensional scale 
with ten dimensions, and has been used and validated widely in marketing research 
(Parasuraman et al. 1991a; Parasuraman et al. 1991c; Parasuraman et al. 1991d; 
Parasuraman et al. 1985; Parasuraman et al. 1988; Parasuraman et al. 1994; Zeithaml et 
al. 1996a). Researchers in Information Systems discipline have validated the dimensions 
that are applicable to IS discipline (Examples: Devaraj et al. 2002; Gefen 2002a; Pitt et 
al. 1997) and in the context of IT outsourcing, (Grover et al. 1996b). However, Grover, 
Cheon and Teng study (1996b) tested only two dimensions of service quality (Tangibles 
and reliability). This study measures the five dimensions of service quality relevant to IT 
outsourcing: tangibles (physical facilities) and reliability (ability to perform the service 
dependably and accurately), responsiveness (ability to respond to problems of the clients 
in a prompt, helpful, and accurate manner), assurance (ability to inspire confidence and 
being knowledgeable), and empathy (understanding the perceptions of the clients, and 
delivering personalized service). The items measuring the five dimensions of service 
quality were adapted from Gefen (2002a) study. The individual items measuring service 
quality are listed in Table 5.4.  
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Table 5.4 - Service Quality 
 
 
Service Quality: Service quality is defined as the perceptions of actual service received 
(Grover, Cheon and Teng 1996; Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 1988)(Gefen 2002a). 
The items measuring the five dimensions of service quality are adapted from Gefen 
(2002a) study. 
Tangibles:  
1. Our outsourcing vendor has the latest technology. 
2. Our outsourcing vendor’s physical IT facilities are visually appealing. 
3. Our outsourcing vendor’s employees are neat-appearing. 
4. Materials associated with the service of our outsourcing vendor (such as pamphlets 
or statement) are visually appealing. 
Reliability:  
1. When our outsourcing vendor promises to do something by a certain time, it does so. 
2. When we have a problem, our outsourcing vendor performs the service right the first 
time. 
3. Our outsourcing vendor provides its services at the time it promises to do so. 
4. Our outsourcing vendor is dependable 
Responsiveness:  
1. Our outsourcing vendor insists on error-free records. 
2. Our outsourcing vendor informs us exactly when services will be performed 
3. Our outsourcing vendor gives us prompt service  
4. Our outsourcing vendor is always willing to help us  
5. Our outsourcing vendor is never too busy to respond to our requests  
Assurance:  
1. Our outsourcing vendor’s behavior instills confidence in us  
2. We feel safe in transacting with our outsourcing vendor  
3. Our outsourcing vendor is consistently courteous with us  
4. Our outsourcing vendor has the knowledge to do its job  
Empathy:  
1. Our outsourcing vendor gives us individual attention  
2. Our outsourcing vendor has operating hours that are convenient for us 
3. Our outsourcing vendor has our’ best interests at heart  
4. Our outsourcing vendor understands our specific needs 
5. Our outsourcing vendor understands the problems from our perspective also 
 
Interdependence 
The items measuring interdependence was developed based on the items 
measuring mutual dependency construct in Lee and Kim (1999). However, Lee and Kim 
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measured the construct using only two items, measuring the extent of dependence of the 
client on the vendor. In order to fully capture the mutual nature of dependence as 
reflected in the definition of the construct, more items were designed and added to 
measure the construct in this study. The definition of the construct and the items used to 
measure the construct are given in Table 5.5.  
Table 5.5 - Interdependence 
 
 
Interdependence: Interdependence is defined as the stakeholders’ perception of a 
firm’s dependency on its vendor firm, relative to the vendor firms’ dependency on it 
(Lee et al. 1999). 
The items measuring interdependence were adapted from Lee and Kim (1999) study.  
1. We take collective responsibility with our outsourcing vendor for the tasks to be 
completed. 
2. We depend on our outsourcing vendor for completion of the task. 
3. Our outsourcing vendor understands that our business is important for them. 
4. We and our outsourcing vendor are dependent on each other to further our business 
goals. 
5. Our outsourcing vendor’s services are complementary to our business. 
6. We believe that our outsourcing vendor also depends on us for their business. 
 
Strategic Salience 
As there were no studies which directly measured managerial perceptions of 
strategic salience, items for measuring perceptions of strategic salience were modeled 
along the lines of the items used to measure competitive advantage in Kearns and Lederer 
(2003). Appropriate changes were made in the wording to suit the IT outsourcing context, 
and the definition of strategic salience. The definition of the construct and the items used 
to measure the construct are given in Table 5.6. 
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Table 5.6 - Perceptions of Strategic Salience 
 
 
Perceptions of strategic salience is the stakeholders’ perception that the collaboration 
with IT outsourcing vendors will be beneficial to the organization and can yield strategic 
advantage. 
Items measuring perceptions of strategic salience were adopted from Kearns and 
Lederer (2003) study. 
1. I think that the current IT outsourcing project is important for our organization. 
2. I think that the current IT outsourcing project is beneficial to our organization. 
3. I think that the current IT outsourcing project could make our IT systems more 
competitive. 
4. I think that the current IT outsourcing project provides competitive advantage to us. 
5. We would have been worse-off in the absence of this IT outsourcing contract. 
 
Perceptions of Risk 
Perceptions of risk (vendor opportunism and stakeholder non-involvement) have 
not been empirically measured in the context of IT outsourcing. However, similar 
constructs have been tested in IS discipline in other contexts. The items used in prior 
research (Provan et al. 1989; Wallace et al. 2004) have been adapted and carefully re-
worded to suit the IT outsourcing context. Conflict of interest has been measured in Lee 
and Kim (1999). Lee and Kim measured the conflict in the relationship, but not conflict 
of interest directly. This study adopted and modified the scale suitably to measure 
conflict of interests. The definitions and items measuring the construct are presented in 
Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 - Perceptions of Risk 
 
 
Perceptions of Risk: Latent variable composing of Vendor opportunism, Conflict of 
interest, Stakeholders’ non-involvement risk: Perception of risk is defined as the 
stakeholders’ perception of the relationship resulting in situations or events which may 
lead to negative outcomes, which are beyond the control of the stakeholders.  
Vendor opportunism: is the risk of possible opportunistic behavior by the outsourcing 
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vendor seeking self-interest. 
The items measuring vendor opportunism have been adopted from (Provan et al. 1989) 
and (Wallace et al. 2004) studies. 
1. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor doing anything within their means to 
further its own interests. 
2. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor altering the facts slightly to get what it 
needs 
3. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor not keeping its promises to do things.  
4. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor not being completely honest while dealing 
with us. 
5. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor lying to us to us as a way of protecting its 
own interests. 
6. There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor exaggerating its needs in order to get what 
it wants from us. 
Conflict of interest: is the risk of a conflict arising between the parties in the 
relationship because of divergent business goals. 
Items measuring conflict of interest have been adopted from (Lee et al. 1999) study. 
1. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of conflicts because 
our business objectives and policies are different. 
2. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of conflicts because 
of the assignment of their experts. 
3. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of conflicts due to 
differences of opinions in the process of business. 
4. In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of conflicts due to 
differences in culture. 
Stakeholders non-involvement: risk of the stakeholders having no involvement in the 
contract affecting the project performance. 
Items measuring stakeholders non-involvement have been adopted from (Wallace et al. 
2004) study. 
1. In general there is a risk of users being resistant to the IT developed by our 
outsourcing vendor. 
2. In general there is a risk of users having a negative attitude towards the IT developed 
by our outsourcing vendor. 
3. In general there is a risk of users not being committed to the IT developed by our 
outsourcing vendor. 
4. In general there is a risk of users not cooperating in the IT development by our 
outsourcing vendor. 
5. In general there is a risk of the development team members of our outsourcing 
vendor not being adequately trained. 
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Demographics 
Some demographic information of the respondents is also collected in order to 
ascertain the sample characteristics. The following demographics information in table 5.8 
is gathered.
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Table 5.8 - Demographics 
 
1 I am involved with some outsourcing project either currently or in the past. 
 ¨Yes  ¨No 
2 Approximate number of staff in my organization is: 
 
 ¨0-50  ¨51-500  ¨More than 500  ¨Do not know 
3 My organization can be classified as the following sector: 
 
 ¨Government  ¨Services  ¨Manufacturing  ¨Retailing  ¨Wholesale O¨ther 
4 Approximate number of IS Staff in my organization is 
 1¨-10  ¨11-100  ¨101-400  ¨More than 400  ¨Do not know 
5 My position in the organization: 
 
 ¨Top level manager  ¨Middle level manager  ¨Lower level manager  ¨Technical position  ¨Sales  ¨Other 
6 Approximate value of our company’s IT budget is $_____________ 
7 Approximate value of outsourcing contact is about: 
 
 ¨0 to 20% of our total IT budget  ¨20 to 80% of total IT budget  ¨More than 80% of total IT budget 
8 Duration of the outsourcing contract is: 
 
 ¨1 to 2 years  ¨2 to 5 years  ¨5- 7 years  ¨7-10 years  ¨More than 10 years 
9 The outsourcing contract can be classified as 
 
 ¨Short term  ¨Medium term  ¨Long term  ¨Very long term  ¨Do not know 
10 The payment terms of our outsourcing contract is: 
 
 ¨Fixed price  ¨Fee for service  ¨Time and materials  ¨Payment for deliverables  
11 Our organization annual sales are approximately: 
 
 ¨$ 0 – 1 Mn.  ¨$ 1 Mn. – 500 Mn.  ¨$ 500 Mn – 1 Bln.  ¨$1 Bln – 100 Bln  ¨$ 100 Bln. and above. 
12 Our organization annual profits are approximately: 
 
 ¨$ 0 – 1 Mn  ¨$ 1 Mn – 50 Mn  ¨50 Mn – 100 Mn.  ¨$ 100 Mn – 1 Bln.  ¨$ 1 Bln and above 
13 Our Outsourcing vendors are from outside United States 
 ¨Yes  ¨No 
14 Our outsourcing vendors are from ______________________________________ (please mention the name of the country of your IT outsourcing vendors here). 
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Pretests 
The instrument will be submitted to the Institutional Review Board (IRB) for 
approval of the Drexel University. After the instrument is approved by IRB, the survey 
instrument will be subject to extensive pretests to determine the psychometric properties 
before the actual data collection is taken up. Items for the actual survey will be finalized 
after making necessary and appropriate changes for the items based on pretests. The 
necessary IRB approval for changes in the approved instrument will be obtained before 
the instrument is sent to the respondents for responses. 
Sample and Data collection 
The target sample consists of IT professionals all over the United States. The 
study proposes to obtain a list mailing addresses of IT professionals who are managers 
and involved in decision making, from a survey and consulting organization in the United 
States. The sample of IT professionals is considered appropriate for this study it is not 
specific to any industry or segment. The sample is likely to include a variety of industries 
involved in IT and IT outsourcing. Therefore the results of the study are more 
generalizable (Hoyle et al. 2002; Kerlinger 1986). Similar sampling techniques were 
successfully used in other outsourcing studies (Examples: Grover et al. 1994b; Grover et 
al. 1996b; Grover et al. 1993). 
Surveys approved by IRB will be posted on the Management Department, Lebow 
College of Business, Drexel University’s eCommerce server. The potential respondents 
will be contacted by email soliciting participation in the survey.  
The data collection, analysis, and results are presented in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6: DATA ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
This chapter describes the methods employed for developing and administering 
the online survey, description of the sample, data collection methods, data analysis and 
results. 
To measure the constructs and test the model proposed in chapter 4, an online 
survey was created using hyper text markup language (HTML). The survey was created 
using HTML-Kit software application. Coldfusion was used for the server-side scripting 
to capture the responses. The responses were stored in a Microsoft Access Database file 
on the http://ecommerce.lebow.drexel.edu server maintained at the Management 
Department, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University, Philadelphia, PA. The 
online survey is available at http://ecommerce.lebow.drexel.edu/Narasimha/survey.htm. 
as on 12/15/2006. A copy of the survey is available in Appendix 1.  
Sample 
The sample consisted of professionals all over the USA and the world involved 
with IT outsourcing, who were listed on the LinkedIn professional networking portal or 
the members of special interests groups of the Project Management Institute (PMI). 
LinkedIn is an online network of experienced professionals, representing 130 industries. 
Professionals in the areas of IT services, Internet sourcing, computer software, 
telecommunications, computer networking, and computer hardware who had their 
profiles listed on LinkedIn.com were contacted over email for participation in the online 
survey. A detailed write-up about LinkedIN, and the methodology used to identify the 
potential respondents is presented in Appendix 2. A total of 1174 professionals were 
contacted over the period from March 8th, 2006 to April 10th 2006. An initial email was 
sent to the respondents followed by a reminder requesting participation after a gap of 
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exactly one week. A total of 148 surveys were received in all, out of which 120 were 
complete and usable. The final response rate (considering only the usable surveys) was 
10.22%.  
In addition to contacting the IT professionals who were registered on the LinkedIn 
network, the survey was also sent to the Project Management Institute Global Operations 
Center, Newtown Square, Pennsylvania USA for posting the survey link on their research 
webpage. The Project Management Institute is a world renowned association for the 
project management professionals. It offers reputed project management certifications 
and credentials for project management professionals, and networking and knowledge 
sharing opportunities for the project management professionals. The PMI after review 
and approval of the survey posted a link to the survey on their website at 
http://www.pmi.org/prod/groups/public/documents/info/pp_surveylinks.asp. active as on 
8th March, 2006. 
The members of the PMI were contacted using the LISTSERVs of IT Outsourcing 
and IT Telecom special interest groups. Registered members of the LISTSERV who wish 
to contact the other group members can send emails to all the members of the special 
interest group. However, the individual email addresses of the members/recipients will 
not be available or disclosed to the sender. Therefore, there is no way of ascertaining the 
number of members that were contacted using the LISTSERVs as the email addresses of 
the respondents are not disclosed to the senders on LISTSERV. The total number of 
responses received from the members of these special interest groups of PMI was 60 out 
of which 42 were complete in all respects and usable. A more detailed write-up about the 
PMI sample is presented in Appendix 3. 
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Sample characteristics 
The majority of respondents in the sample were male (78%). 16% of the 
respondents were female. 6 % had not reported gender. The gender composition 
approximately corresponds with the gender profile of management, professional and 
related occupations sector where about 16.6 of the total workers are women out of the 
total workforce in the sector as per the current population survey (2005) of the 
Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS 2005). Out of the sample of 163 
respondents, 28% of the respondents were top level managers, 38% were middle level 
managers, 12% were entry level managers, 15% were in technical positions, 2% were in 
IT sales and 5% were in other IT related positions. 6% of the respondents were managers 
in government sector, 61% were from the services sector, 18% were in manufacturing, 
2% in retailing, 1% in wholesale and 15% were in other sectors.  
Type of outsourcing: Out of 163 respondents, 45% reported that their 
organization’s outsourcing contracts accounted for 0 to 20% of their IT budget. 47% 
reported that their IT outsourcing constituted 20 to 80% of their IT outsourcing budget. 
5% reported that their outsourcing contracts accounted for more than 80% of their IT 
budget. 2% of the respondents did not report this statistic.  
Length of the outsourcing contract: 1% of the respondents reported that their 
outsourcing contracts were for duration of one to two years. 41% of the respondents 
reported that their outsourcing contracts were for a period of two to five years. 45% 
reported contracts of five to seven years, 10 % reported contracts of seven to ten years 
and 3% over ten years. 
Type of contracts: 31% of the respondents reported that they worked in fixed-
price outsourcing contracts. 33% were in service fee contracts, 17% were in time and 
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materials contract and 17% were in payment for deliverables contracts. 1% were unaware 
of type of outsourcing contract.  
The statistics regarding characteristics of the sample are presented in Appendix 4. 
Pearson’s bivariate correlations between the measurement items are presented in 
Appendix 5 and correlations between the constructs are presented in Appendix 6. 
MANOVA 
In the next step of analysis, to determine whether the data collected at two 
different sources, LinkedIn and Project Management Institute Members, came from 
population with equal means, all the variables were entered in to one-way ANOVA. The 
null hypothesis was that the means of the populations differ versus the alternate 
hypothesis there were no differences in the means. The null hypothesis was not 
supported, indicating that there were no significant differences in the means of the 
samples. ANOVA output is presented in Appendix 7. 
A second test using MANOVA was also performed to assess group differences 
across multiple dependent variables simultaneously. The null hypothesis that the means 
of the two groups were different was rejected, confirming the one-way ANOVA results 
that the groups had equal means. Wilks-Lambda was 0.127, and F-statistic was 0.938 at 
the 0.657 level of significance. 
MANOVA for the demographic factors 
The two tests of MANOVA detailed in the preceding paragraphs was also 
performed on the demographic factors to check if any of the factors were significant and 
could potentially be tested as a control variable. One-way ANOVA indicated that none of 
the demographic factors were significant. A second test using MANOVA was also 
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performed on the demographic variables. Wilks-Lambda was 0.848 at the 0.674 level 
indicating that the variables did not have any significant effect on the variables of 
interest.  
A test of MANOVA was performed to determine any possible differences in 
responses based on Type of outsourcing, length of the outsourcing, or type of the contract 
to check if the different groups of respondents responded differently. No significant 
differences in responses type of outsourcing (wilks lambda = 0.92, F statistic = 0.919, 
significance = 0.74), length of the outsourcing contracts (Wilks lambda = 0.021, F 
statistic = 1.102 and significance = 0.201), or type of contracts (Wilks lambda = 0.019, F 
statistic = 1.175, Significance = 0.174).   
FACTOR ANALYSIS 
SPSS statistical package was used to analyze data. The data were exported into 
SPSS from the access database file. Convergent and discriminant validity of the 
constructs was examined using the Principal Components Analysis method with Varimax 
rotation. Varimax is suggested to be the most efficient (Kline 1994) and most used (Hair 
et al. 1998) method of rotation in social sciences. Varimax is commonly used in MIS 
research because it assumes perpendicular factors in uncorrelated clusters.  
The proposed model detailed in chapter 4 involved nine main constructs with 
twenty six sub constructs within the nine main constructs. 142 items were used to 
measure the constructs. Most of the items were adapted to for the current study from 
previously validated scales. The two constructs for which items were designed for this 
study are perceived risk (15 items) and perceptions of strategic salience (5 items). The 
specific items and the sources for the scales were explained in chapter 5.  
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The 142 items from the various scales were analyzed for factor loadings. Even 
though validated scales were used in the study, their adaptation in the new context of IT 
outsourcing could result in slight alteration in their psychometric properties. In addition 
past research suggests that the ratio of survey responses to number of items should be 
ideally 3 to 5 responses for each variable (Fabrigar et al. 1999; MacCallum et al. 1999).  
Therefore this research acknowledges the likely shortcomings such as problems with 
generalization of results, or the likelihood of the significance of the results changing with 
additional data, with the existing number of items and the sample size. The factor 
analysis of the items indicated that several items be dropped from the analysis based on 
the psychometric properties of statistical validity, reliability, and internal consistency of 
the items (Nunnally 1978). Some of the items were dropped from the analysis if the items 
had: (1). significant variance across multiple factors, or (2).highest loading on the 
expected factor was less than 0.60, or (3). loadings of more than the threshold limit of 
0.40 on any factor other than the expected factor.  
One construct that had to be totally dropped from the analysis was 
trustworthiness3 as the items measuring trustworthiness overlapped with trust. From the 
past literature, Trustworthiness is known to overlap with trust (Gefen 1997; Ridings 
2000), though researchers were able to separate the two constructs (Gefen et al. 2003b; 
McKnight et al. 2002a). Similarly, intercorrelations with in the trustworthiness 
constructs, and consequent multicolleniarity of the dimensions of trustworthiness has also 
                                                 
3
 The construct “trustworthiness” was dropped after consulting with the committee at the proposal stage, 
and after obtaining their consent.  It was explained to the committee that trustworthiness was included in 
the model in order to be consistent with the existing theory, to make the model theoretically complete and 
reflect all the trust constructs proposed in the previous research, as explained in chapter 3.  However, there 
could be a possibility of trust in vendor and trustworthiness being too closely correlated, and the possibility 
of the items being inseparable.  It was agreed that trustworthiness be dropped in such a situation. As the 
constructs overlap and the trustworthiness items overlap, the construct was dropped from the analyses. 
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been noted in the past research (Bhattacherjee 2002; McKnight et al. 2002a; Serva et al. 
2005).  
An initial factor analysis revealed that trust items overlapped with the service 
quality items. Therefore, based on the factor loadings, two separate analyses were 
conducted to analyze trust and service quality constructs separately. In the first analysis 
all constructs except service quality were entered in a factor analysis. In the first analysis, 
all the items measuring trust constructs, (trust and trust modes), interdependence, 
perceptions of strategic salience, perceptions of risk, relationship quality and outsourcing 
success were retained in the factor analysis. Service quality items were excluded from the 
factor analysis because the service quality items overlapped with trust. Service quality 
items have been criticized in the past literature for their unstable dimensions (Van Dyke 
et al. 1999) and also for their problems in operationalization due to its definitional 
overlaps with expectations, desirable attributes of the service provider and the normative 
expectations (Teas 1993). In order to overcome the problems with operationalization of 
the service quality construct using differential scales (Parasuraman, Zeithaml and Berry 
(1988), the perceptions scale measuring service quality (Gefen 2002) was adapted in this 
study. Even though the perceptions scale (Gefen 2002a) was used the dimensions of 
service quality construct overlapped with trust. Therefore the service quality construct 
was eliminated in the first stage of analysis and a separate analysis was conducted to 
determine the factor loadings and test the hypotheses relating to service quality. 
In the second step of the factor analysis, service quality was included in the 
analysis and trust constructs were excluded from the analysis. None of the items 
measuring interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience, perceptions of risk, 
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relationship quality and outsourcing success which were included in the first stage of 
factor analysis were dropped from the factor analysis in this second stage. The 
hypotheses regarding service quality were tested based on the psychometric properties 
revealed in this second step of factor analysis. Therefore, factor analysis of service 
quality construct and regressions on relationship quality and outsourcing success are 
presented separately.   
A list of items entered in the factor analysis is shown in table 6.1. The items that 
were either dropped from the analysis or items analyzed separately are indicated in the 
table of items. The total number of items dropped was 47. Twenty two (22) of these were 
items measuring service quality which were analyzed separately. Nine (9) items of 
trustworthiness construct were dropped from the analysis.  
The list of constructs used in the factor analysis and their reliabilities (Cronbach 
alpha) and descriptive statistics of the items are shown in table 6.2. All constructs 
demonstrated acceptable internal consistency with Cronbach alpha ranging from 0.82 to 
0.93. Factor analysis revealed eight factors explaining 68.6421% of variance. The 
variance explained is shown in table 6.3 and communalities of the items in table 6.4. The 
constructs loaded on eight distinct main factors.  
The decision about the number of factors to be retained in the analysis is based on 
two criteria: One criterion is based on the eigenvalues being greater 1 for each component 
factor (Kaiser 1960). The second criterion is based on the scree-plot where the line in the 
plot appears to flatten off to the right (Cattell 1966). Both criteria are arbitrary, and it is 
suggested by the researchers that both criteria be considered, and the number of factors 
arrived at based on the interpretability of the factors (Browne 1968; Cattell et al. 1967; 
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Johnson et al. 1998). In the current study, based on the above, and considering the 
number of interpretable factors an eight factor solution was arrived at for the analysis. 
The factors were: (1) Perceptions of risk, (2) relationship quality, (3) Outsourcing success 
and Perceptions of strategic salience, (4) trust in vendor and knowledge-based trust, (5) 
institutional-based trust, (6) interdependence, (7) calculative-based trust and (8) 
transference based trust. The factor loadings are shown in Table 6.5. For main constructs 
which had sub-constructs within (perceptions of risk, and trust constructs), and for those 
constructs which loaded together in the factor analysis (outsourcing success and 
perceptions of strategic salience), factor analysis of sub-constructs was performed, to 
show that the constructs indeed loaded distinctly.  
FACTOR ANALYSIS OF SUB CONSTRUCTS 
Factor analysis of outsourcing success and perceptions of strategic salience 
constructs: 
In order to ensure that the outsourcing success and perceptions of strategic 
salience constructs loaded on separate dimensions, a factor analysis was conducted with 
Varimax rotation. The factor analysis revealed three distinct dimensions: outsourcing 
strategic success, outsourcing financial success, and perceptions of strategic salience. The 
first two dimensions were the two sub-dimensions of outsourcing success construct. The 
factor loadings are shown in Table 6.6. 
Factor analysis of perceived risk constructs:  
In order to ensure that the sub-constructs in risk, loaded separately on distinct 
factors, a separate factor analysis was performed on items measuring perceptions of risk. 
Risk of opportunistic behavior, risk of conflict of interest and risk of user-non 
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involvement loaded on three distinct factors. The results of factor analysis of the 
perceived risk constructs are presented in Table 6.7. 
Factor analysis of trust constructs: 
A factor analysis was also performed on the trust constructs to ensure that trust in 
vendor and the sub constructs in trust modes: institutional-based trust, calculative-based 
trust, knowledge-based trust, and transference-based trust, loaded on six distinct factors. 
The results of the factor analyses are presented in Table 6.8:  
Multicolleniarity diagnostics 
Multicolleniarity is a condition where the independent variables are highly 
correlated. While testing each of the hypotheses, in order to check for multicolleniarity 
between the variables the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance statistics are 
reported for each of the variables entered the regressions in table 6.11. VIF is the 
coefficient of determination of each predictor variable with all other predictor variables 
(Belsley et al. 1979; Fox 1991). Tolerance is the inverse of VIF.  It is generally accepted 
that tolerance below 0.20 or VIF of about 10 indicates serious problems with 
multicolleniarity (Fox 1991; Gujarati 2003). For all the hypotheses tested in this study 
(including the analysis for the interaction effects and the separate regression analysis for 
service quality and the post-hoc analyses), the VIF statistic ranged between 1.14 and 
2.063 and tolerance well above 0.20. These statistics revealed no serious problems with 
multicolleniarity among the predictor variables. 
Correlations of individual items are analyzed and are presented in Appendix 5. 
The correlations of constructs (represented by the mean of all items measuring the 
construct) are presented in Appendix 6. 
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HYPOTHESES TESTING 
The study proposed 15 hypotheses including three moderation hypotheses. A list 
of hypotheses proposed is given in table 6.9. 
In order to test the hypotheses, the mean of the items measuring each construct 
was calculated and stored as a separate item in SPSS representing the construct. These 
means were entered into multiple regressions to test the hypotheses. The full research 
model was tested using several multiple regression equations as explained below for each 
of the hypotheses. The codes used for the constructs are explained in table 6.10. While 
running the regression equations in SPSS, diagnostics for problems with multicolleniarity 
of the predictor variables, and problems with autocorrelation of error terms was also 
performed, as explained below. 
Findings regarding relationship quality and outsourcing success (H1) 
This study posited that relationship quality is positively related to outsourcing 
success. The following regression equation for used for testing the relationship between 
outsourcing success and relationship quality H1: 
SUCCESS = Constant + RQ + error term 
The hypothesis was supported at the 0.001 level of significance. 37.6% of the 
variance in outsourcing success was explained by relationship quality. The standardized 
beta was 0.61 and the t-value was 9.9335. The results supported the hypothesis that 
managing and maintaining a good client-vendor relationship contributes to the success of 
an IT outsourcing project. This indicates that commitment, coordination and cooperation 
between the parties could help in successful execution of IT outsourcing projects. The 
findings are similar to the findings in the past research (Grover et al. 1996b; Lee et al. 
1999). 
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H2 through H6: Regression equation for testing factors influencing relationship quality:  
The factors that were tested in this regression were interdependence, trust, 
perceptions of strategic salience and risk constructs, regressed on relationship quality. 
The construct perceptions of risk had three sub constructs, for which three separate 
hypotheses were proposed (H6.1, H6.2 and H6.3). While testing the hypotheses regarding 
risk, the relationships were tested with the sub constructs entered into the regression 
equation. The regression equation is presented below. 
RQ = Constant + INT + TRUST + PSS + ROB + RCI + RUNI + error term 
The regression of the factors influencing relationship quality explained 49.4% of 
the variance in relationship quality. The findings of each of the hypotheses are presented. 
Findings regarding interdependence and relationship quality (H2) 
This study posited that Interdependence is positively related to relationship 
quality. Interdependence was marginally related to relationship quality at the 0.08 level of 
significance. The standardized coefficient beta was 0.1129 and t-value was 1.7377. H2 
was marginally supported. The implications of this finding are discussed in chapter 7. 
Findings regarding trust and relationship quality (H4) 
This study posited that trust in vendor is positively related to relationship quality. 
Relationship of trust and relationship quality was significant. H4 was supported at the 
0.0001 level of significance. The standardized coefficient beta was 0.4126 and t-value 
was 5.2453. This finding supports the perspective adopted by this study that trust is a 
main factor influencing the outsourcing client-vendor relationships. Trust between the 
parties facilitates successful execution of the outsourcing projects by reducing uncertainty 
(Gefen et al. 2003b; Johnson-George et al. 1982; Luhmann 1979; Mayer et al. 1995) and 
by introducing a sense of predictability of outcomes (Deutsch 1958a) in a relationship.  
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Findings regarding perceptions of strategic salience and relationship quality (H5) 
This study posited that perceptions of strategic salience is positively related to 
relationship quality. This hypothesis was supported at the 0.001 level of significance. The 
standardized coefficient beta was 0.2765 and the t-value was 3.8078. This finding implies 
that managers’ awareness that the outsourcing project is important for the client, 
influences relationship quality positively. When they recognize the importance of the 
implementation of the project, it is likely that the managers will be more involved and 
committed to the project and the relationship with the vendor, which is very essential for 
the success of the outsourcing projects.  
Findings regarding perceived risk and relationship quality (H6) 
This study posited that vendor opportunism, perceptions of conflict of interests, 
and stakeholders’ non-involvement are negatively related to relationship quality. None of 
the three hypotheses regarding perceived risk were supported.  
This study operationalized and measured perceived risk in the context of IT 
outsourcing. Items measuring perceived risk were specifically designed for this study 
based on similar items used in past research in similar circumstances. The factor analysis 
of the items indicated good psychometric properties. The reliability alpha for the 
perceived risk scale consisting 15 items was 0.958. The reliability alpha for each of the 
three sub-scales was: risk of opportunistic behavior: 0.946 comprising of 6 items; risk of 
conflict of interest: 0.891 comprising 4 items; and risk of stakeholders’ non-involvement: 
0.918. All the items loaded on separate factors, as shown in table 6.7. Perceived risk was 
entered into the regression equation as three separate constructs. The sub constructs: risk 
of opportunistic behavior (standardized coefficient beta = 0.1389 and t-value = 1.492), 
risk of conflict of interest (standardized coefficient beta = -0.0875 and t-value = -0.9343) 
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and risk of user non involvement (standardized coefficient beta = -0.109 and t-value = -
1.188) were entered into the regression equation to test the three hypotheses H6.1, H6.2 
and H6.3. None of the sub-constructs of perceived risk4 were significantly related to 
relationship quality.  
Hypothesis about service quality (H7) is tested separately as a result of the factor 
analysis, which revealed that the service quality and trust loaded on the same factor. For 
the same reason of trust and service quality loading on one factor, the hypothesis about 
trust moderating the relationship between service quality and relationship quality (H8) 
could not be tested. The analysis regarding moderation of trust (H9 and H10) is shown 
separately.  
Findings regarding trust modes and trust (H11) 
The relationship between the trust modes and trust has been confirmed in past 
research in various contexts. The same relationships were expected to be significant in 
the context of IT outsourcing also. This study hypothesized that transference-based trust 
(H11.1), calculative-based trust (H11.2), institution-based trust (H11.3) and knowledge-
based trust (H11.4) are positively related to the trust in outsourcing vendor. The 
following regression equation was used for testing the relationship between trust modes 
and Trust in vendor: 
TRUST = Constant + TBT + CBT + IBT + KBT + error term 
                                                 
4
 The impact of perceptions of risk on relationship quality as a single main construct was also tested in this 
study even though not hypothesized in the research model only to examine whether perceptions of risk as a 
single construct was related to relationship quality. To test this, in addition to testing the sub-constructs of 
risk separately, perceived risk was also regressed on relationship quality as a single construct in another 
regression.  
The standardized coefficient was -0.0545 indicating a negative relationship and the t-value was -0.8998. 
However, the relationship was not significant. The relationship was not significant.   
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H11.1 received marginal support. Transference based trust was marginally 
significant at the 0.10 level. Standardized coefficient beta was 0.0971 and the t-value was 
1.6331. H11.2 was supported. Calculative-based trust was significant at the 0.04 level. 
Standardized coefficient beta was 0.1204 and the t-value was 1.9772. Surprisingly 
hypothesis about institution-based H11.3 trust was not supported. Standardized 
coefficient beta was 0.0845 and the t-value was 1.266. Knowledge-based trust (H11.4) 
was significant at the 0.0001 level. Standardized coefficient beta was 0.5876 and the t-
value was 8.0744.  
The hypotheses regarding trustworthiness (H 12 and H13) could not be tested as 
the construct had to be dropped out of the analysis based on its psychometric properties. 
The data analysis for service quality is shown separately H3, H7 and H9, as the service 
quality items overlapped with trust items.  
Findings regarding trust and perceived risk (H14) 
This study hypothesized that trust in vendor is negatively related to perceptions of 
risk. The following regression equation was used for testing the relationship between 
trust and risk (H14):  
RISK = Constant + TRUST + error term 
As expected there was a significant negative relationship between trust and 
perceptions of risk, implying that trust reduced the perceptions of risk. The hypothesis 
was supported at the 0.0001 level of significance. This finding implies that trust in vendor 
reduces the client’s perceptions of risk. Standardized coefficient beta was -0.3561 and the 
t-value was -4.8348. In the outsourcing context, this finding confirms similar findings in 
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the past research in several other contexts such as ecommerce (Gefen 2002a; Jarvenpaa et 
al. 2000) and organizational relationships (Sako et al. 1998).  
Findings regarding trust and perceptions of strategic salience (H15) 
This study hypothesized that trust in vendor is positively related to perceptions of 
strategic salience. The following regression equation was used for testing the relationship 
between trust and perceptions of strategic salience H15: 
PSS = Constant + TRUST + error term 
Trust was significantly related to perceptions of strategic salience. The 
Hypothesis was supported at the 0.001 level of significance. Standardized coefficient beta 
was 0.6116 and the t-value was 9.8089. IT outsourcing has been perceived as a source of 
insecurity by the IT managers of the client (Huber 1993; Palvia 1995). However this 
hypothesis about the positive impact of IT outsourcing being perceived as strategically 
salient by the clients, on the relationship quality indicates the importance of the 
implementation staff’s being conversant with the rationale about the IT outsourcing 
project itself. Eventually this awareness of the strategic importance of the project could 
help in efficient implementation of the project, better client-vendor relationship, and 
finally contribute to the success of the project itself. 
 A summary of the regression results are presented in Table 6.11. Figure 6.1 
shows the research model with results.  
INTERACTION EFFECTS  
In order to test the moderator hypotheses (H8 and H10), the variables concerning 
the moderation hypotheses: relationship quality, trust, interdependence, perceptions of 
strategic salience and perceived risk were first normalized (z-scored). Normalization is 
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the process of converting individual data points into z-scores5 by subtracting the mean of 
each item and dividing by its standard deviation (Cohen et al. 1975; Hair et al. 1998). 
Normalization reduces the problems associated with high correlations or multicolleniarity 
among the variables (Cohen et al. 1975; Frazier et al. 2004). Additionally, normalization 
of variables for moderation makes the plotting of interactions easier (Cohen et al. 1975; 
Frazier et al. 2004) . The normalized variables were then entered in stepwise regression in 
SPSS. The direct effects were tested in step 1. Then, in step 2, the product term is entered 
in the regression to test the moderation hypotheses.  
First, all the variables hypothesized to be related to relationship quality: trust, 
interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience and perceived risk were regressed on 
relationship quality in step 1, and in step 2 of the regression, the product terms of the 
hypothesized moderator relationships (trust x interdependence (H9) and trust x risk 
(H10)) were entered into the regression. The regression equations entered in the two steps 
are as follows: 
Step 1: Direct effects  
RQ = Constant + INT + TRUST + PSS + RISK + error term 
Step 2 (H9): Regression equation for trust moderating the relationship between 
interdependence and relationship quality: 
RQ = Constant + INT + TRUST + PSS + RISK + TRUSTxINT + error term 
                                                 
5
 On suggestion by one of the committee members, the variables were also mean-centered and analyzed for 
the interaction effects.  Mean-centering was done by subtracting the individual item mean from the 
individual item score (Xi – X ¯  i).  Mean-centering was done to eliminate any multi-colliniarity effects for 
moderation analysis Aiken, L.S., West, S.G., and Reno, R.R. Multiple regression : testing and interpreting 
interactions Sage Publications, Newbury Park, Calif., 1991, pp. xi, 212 p..   The results of the analysis were 
exactly similar to the results with Z-Scores. 
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The direct effects revealed exactly the same results as discussed earlier. 
Interdependence was marginally significant. Trust (standardized coefficient beta = 0.40 
and t-value = 5.286) and perceptions of strategic salience (standardized coefficient beta = 
0.291 and t-value = 4.202) were significant at the 0.000 level of significance. Perceived 
risk (standardized coefficient beta = -0.068 and t-value = -1.179) was insignificant.  
Step2 (H10): In the second step, the interaction term was entered into the 
regression. The regression equation for trust moderating the relationship between risk and 
relationship quality is as follows: 
RQ = Constant + INT + TRUST + PSS + RISK + TRUSTxRISK + error term 
Findings regarding trust moderating the relationship between interdependence and 
relationship quality. (H9) 
This study posited that trust in vendor moderates the relationship between 
interdependence and relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor increases the 
positive effect of interdependence on relationship quality and low level of trust decreases 
the positive effect. This hypothesis was not supported. The standardized coefficient beta 
for the interaction term (TrustXinterdependence) was 0.031 and the t-value was 0.563. 
The change in R2 (∆ R2) accounted for by this regression was 0.003.The interaction term 
and also change in R2 were both insignificant. This hypothesis requires further 
investigation. 
Findings regarding trust moderating the relationship between perceived risk and 
relationship quality (H10) 
The study posited that trust in vendor moderates the relationship between 
perceptions of risk and relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor reduces the 
negative impact of perceptions of risk on relationship quality and low level of trust 
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increases the negative effect. This hypothesis was also not supported. The standardized 
coefficient beta for the interaction term (TrustXRisk) was 0.054 and the t-value was 
0.924. The change in R2 (∆ R2) accounted for by this regression was 0.003. The interaction 
term and also change in R2 were both insignificant.  
Even though theoretically justified, surprisingly the hypothesis of trust 
moderating the relationship between interdependence and relationship quality did not find 
support in the current data sample. A further investigation with a larger sample size is 
necessary for these two hypotheses. 
The results of regressions testing the moderations are presented below in table 
6.12. 
Post-hoc analysis: Trust moderating the relationship between perceptions of 
strategic salience and relationship quality 
A post hoc analysis was also conducted to explore if trust moderated the 
relationship between perceptions of strategic salience and relationship quality even 
though this was not hypothesized in the original research model. This analysis was driven 
by the rationale that trust is a set of expectations about the possible behavior of the 
trusted party (Gambetta 1988). Perceptions of strategic salience is a recognition of the 
importance of such expectations and what it means to the clients. The results of this study 
indicate that perceptions of strategic salience is significantly related to relationship 
quality. It is therefore possible that the parties in a relationship perceive it as strategically 
important for them, the effect will be greater when the clients have more trust in vendor, 
than when the clients have lesser trust. This is because trust is recognized to be an 
important factor which influences “interpersonal and intergroup behaviors” 
(Golembiewski et al. 1976).  
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To test the above moderator relationship, the direct effects were entered in the 
first step of the regression and the interaction term trustxPSS was entered in the second 
step of the regression. TrustxPSS was significant at the 0.0001 level. The standardized 
coefficient beta for the interaction term was 0.193 and the t-value was 3.020. The 
interaction term was positively related to relationship quality indicating that the influence 
of PSS will be more, if the client had trust in the vendor. The regression results are shown 
in table 6.13. The interactions were plotted and are shown in figure 6.2. The increase in 
R2 was 0.029% and was significant. It can be seen from the interaction plot that both 
perceptions of strategic salience have positive slope indicating a positive relationship. 
However, the slope for the interaction term is steeper than the slope for perceptions of 
strategic salience. This indicates that trust moderates the relationship between perceptions 
of strategic salience and relationship quality. Higher levels of trust in the vendor will 
contribute to better relationship quality than lower levels of trust. The implications of this 
significant moderation effect are discussed in chapter 7.  
Post-hoc analysis of the relationship between interdependence and risk perceptions 
IT outsourcing literature has varying results about the impact of interdependence 
on perceptions of risk. This study did not posit any relationship between interdependence 
and risk. However, a post-hoc analysis was conducted to examine the nature of the 
relationship between interdependence and perceived risk. The theoretical rationale behind 
conducting this analysis is explained as follows.  
Interdependence between the parties results in perceived mutual benefits (Levine 
et al. 1961) as well as realized mutual benefits (Cook 1977). Past research found that 
successful relationships have a high degree of interdependence of parties in the 
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relationship (Mohr et al. 1994). Even though research on power asymmetries indicates 
that power imbalances can creep into such interdependent relationships (Emerson 1962), 
such imbalances of power and loss of autonomy are compensated by expected mutual 
benefits (Cummings 1984). Therefore, interdependence should have a negative 
relationship with risk, to the effect of reducing the clients’ perceptions of risk.  
The relationship between interdependence and three sub constructs of risk (risk of 
opportunistic behavior (ROB), risk of conflict of interest (RCI) and risk of user non-
involvement (RUNI)), and also the relationship between interdependence and perceived 
risk comprising of all the three sub constructs, were entered into multiple regression. The 
regression equations and the results are presented below: 
ROB = Constant + INT + error term 
RCI = Constant + INT + error term 
RUNI = Constant + INT + error term 
RISK = Constant + INT + error term 
Interdependence was negatively related to perceived risk, and was marginally 
significant at the 0.10 level of confidence. But the examination of sub constructs of 
revealed interesting findings. Risk of opportunistic behavior was negatively related and 
significant at the 0.05 level of confidence. Risk of conflict of interest was very significant 
at the 0.02 level of significance. However the risk of user non-involvement was 
insignificant. The implications of these findings are discussed in chapter 7. 
Hypotheses about Service quality 
The results of the hypotheses regarding service quality construct are presented in 
this section. First, a principal component analysis with varimax rotation was performed 
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items measuring service quality, interdependence, perceptions of risk, perceptions of 
strategic salience and relationship quality constructs. Trust constructs were left out of the 
analysis. Twenty two (22) items measuring service quality and all the items measuring 
interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience and risk, used in the factor analysis 
using trust, were used in the analysis. The analysis revealed five factors explaining 
66.071% of variance (table 6.14). The factor loadings and communalities are presented in 
tables 6.15 and 6.16.  
Hypotheses Testing (Service Quality) 
The set of hypotheses of constructs influencing relationship quality 
(Interdependence, service quality, perceptions of strategic salience and perceived risk) 
were tested in the analysis. Trust was excluded from the analysis. The following 
regression equation was used to test the hypotheses of factors influencing relationship 
quality: 
RQ = Constant + INT + SQ + PSS + ROB + RCI + RUNI + error term 
The regression explained 55% of the variance in relationship quality. The results 
of the regression were very similar to the results obtained in the earlier analysis including 
trust, but excluding service quality. Interdependence was marginally supported at the 0.10 
level of significance. Perceptions of strategic salience were significant at the 0.03 level. 
None of the perceived risk constructs were significantly related to relationship quality. 
Service quality was related to relationship quality at the 0.0001 level of significance.  
The implications of the above findings, contributions to theory and implications 
for practice are discussed in the next chapter. 
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Table 6.1 - Items entered in Factor Analysis 
 
 
 
Item Item 
code Comment 
Outsourcing Success (SUCCESS)   
As a result of outsourcing we have increased control over IT 
expenses. OFS1  
The outsourcing resulted in considerable financial benefits to the 
organization. OFS2  
The outsourcing generated additional funds for the organization. OFS3  
We have enhanced economies of scale in IT human resources. OFS4 Item Dropped 
Overall, the benefits derived from the outsourcing relationship are 
very satisfying. ORS1 
Item 
Dropped 
I am very satisfied with the information I receive from my 
outsourcing vendor. ORS2 
Item 
Dropped 
Overall, my interaction with our outsourcing partners is very 
satisfying. ORS3 
Item 
Dropped 
We are satisfied with our overall benefits form outsourcing. ORS4 Item Dropped 
As a result of outsourcing we have been able to refocus on core 
business. OSS1  
As a result of outsourcing we have enhanced our IT competence. OSS2  
As a result of outsourcing we have increased access to skilled 
personnel. OSS3  
As a result of outsourcing we have increased access to key 
information technologies. OSS4  
We have reduced the risk of IT technological obsolescence. OTS1 Item Dropped 
Our outsourcing vendor has a good understanding of our IT 
technical requirements. OTS2 
Item 
Dropped 
The services provided by our vendors are compatible with our in-
house systems. OTS3 
Item 
Dropped 
The technologies provided by our vendors are compatible with our 
in-house systems. OTS4 
Item 
Dropped 
Relationship Quality (RQ)   
We intend to continue our relationship with our outsourcing vendor. RQCOM1  
We believe our outsourcing vendor intends to continue relationship 
with us. RQCOM2  
We are very committed to the relationship with our outsourcing 
vendor. RQCOM3  
We expect to have more intense ties with our outsourcing vendor. RQCOM4  
We believe our outsourcing vendor is very committed to RQCOM5  
 150 
relationship with us. 
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, we solve most 
exceptional problems through mutual discussion. RQCOOP1  
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, we recognize and 
extend our support to our vendor. RQCOOP2  
In our relationship with out outsourcing vendor, we are ready to 
provide assistance to our vendor without exception. RQCOOP3  
We have a cooperative relationship with our outsourcing vendor. RQCOOP4  
We know what tasks we are supposed to do in our joint efforts with 
our outsourcing vendor. RQCOOR1  
We know when we are supposed to do our tasks in our joint efforts 
with our outsourcing vendor. RQCOOR2  
Our efforts and our outsourcing vendor's efforts are well 
coordinated. RQCOOR3  
We carry out our operations in alignment with our vendors. RQCOOR4  
We include our vendors in our planning. RQCOOR5  
We function well as a coordinated team with our vendors. RQCOOR6  
Interdependence (INT)   
We take collective responsibility with our outsourcing vendor for 
the tasks to be completed. INT1 
Item 
Dropped 
We depend on our outsourcing vendor for completion of the task. INT2  
Our outsourcing vendor understands that our business is important 
for them. INT3  
We and our outsourcing vendor are dependent on each other to 
further our business goals. INT4  
Our outsourcing vendor's services are complementary to our 
business. INT5  
We believe that our outsourcing vendor also depends on us for their 
business. INT6  
Perceptions of strategic salience   
I think that the current IT outsourcing project is important for our 
organization. PSS1  
I think that the current IT outsourcing project is beneficial to our 
organization. PSS2  
I think that the current IT outsourcing project could make our IT 
systems more competitive. PSS3  
I think that the current IT outsourcing project provides competitive 
advantage to us. PSS4  
We would have been worse off in the absence of this IT outsourcing 
contract. 
PSS5 Item Dropped 
Perceptions of Risk (RISK)   
There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor doing anything within its 
means to further its own interests. ROB1  
There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor altering the facts slightly to 
get what it needs. ROB2  
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There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor not keeping its promises to 
do things. ROB3  
There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor not being completely 
honest while dealing with us. ROB4  
There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor lying to us to us as a way 
of protecting its own interests. ROB5  
There is a risk of our outsourcing vendor exaggerating its needs in 
order to get what it wants from us. ROB6  
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of 
conflicts because our business objectives and policies are different. RCI1  
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of 
conflicts because of the assignment of their experts. RCI2  
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of 
conflicts due to differences of opinions in the process of business. RCI3  
In our relationship with our outsourcing vendor, there is a risk of 
conflicts due to differences in culture. RCI4  
In general there is a risk of users being resistant to the IT developed 
by our outsourcing vendor. RUNI1  
In general there is a risk of users having a negative attitude towards 
the IT developed by our outsourcing vendor. RUNI2  
In general there is a risk of users not being committed to the IT 
developed by our outsourcing vendor. RUNI3  
In general there is a risk of users not cooperating in the IT 
development by our outsourcing vendor. RUNI4  
In general there is a risk of the development team members of our 
outsourcing vendor not being adequately trained. RUNI5  
Trust (TRUST)   
Overall our outsourcing vendor is dependable. TRUST1  
Overall, our outsourcing vendor is reliable. TRUST2  
Overall, our outsourcing vendor is honest. TRUST3  
Overall, our outsourcing vendor is trustworthy. TRUST4  
We trust our outsourcing vendor. TRUST5  
Trust Modes   
Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by being dishonest in its 
interactions with us. CBT1  
Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by not caring about us. CBT2  
Our outsourcing vendor has nothing to gain by not sharing 
knowledge when helping us. CBT3  
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because 
our formal contract affords sufficient safeguards to both parties. IBTSG1 
Item 
Dropped 
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because 
of the provisions of escrow mechanisms in our contract. IBTSG2  
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because 
they have certifications from accredited institutions. IBTSG3  
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because IBTSG4  
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of the performance guarantees built into our contract. 
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because 
there are Service Level Agreements and warranties available in the 
contract. 
IBTSG5  
I feel safe conducting business with our outsourcing vendor because 
of the financial guarantees built into our contract. IBTSG6  
The outsourcing contract practices of our outsourcing vendor are 
typical of other similar contracts. IBTSN1  
The nature of our relationship with our outsourcing vendor is typical 
of any other outsourcing relationship. IBTSN2  
The information shared with our outsourcing vendor is typical of 
any other outsourcing information exchanges. IBTSN3  
Our executives are interested in the relationship with our 
outsourcing vendor. TBT1  
Our top executives consider our relationship with our outsourcing 
vendor to be important at the organizational level. TBT2  
Our top executives support our outsourcing vendor with all the 
resources needed. TBT3  
Our top executives trust our outsourcing vendor. TBT4 Item Dropped 
Our past experiences with our IT outsourcing vendor were positive. KBT1  
We received excellent service from our IT outsourcing vendor in the 
past. KBT2 
Item 
Dropped 
Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, 
we know they are honest. KBT3  
Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, 
we know they care about their clients. KBT4  
Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, 
we know they are not opportunistic. KBT5 
Item 
Dropped 
Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, 
we know they provide good service. KBT6 
Item 
Dropped 
Based on our experience with our IT outsourcing vendor in the past, 
we know they are trustworthy. KBT7  
Trustworthiness (TWA) (Construct Dropped)   
Our outsourcing vendor is competent in providing the outsourced IT 
services. TWA1 
Item 
Dropped 
Overall, our outsourcing vendor is capable. TWA2 Item Dropped 
Overall, our outsourcing vendor is very knowledgeable. TWA3 Item Dropped 
I believe that our outsourcing vendor would act in our best interest. TWB1 Item Dropped 
I believe our outsourcing vendor will be willing to assist us. TWB2 Item Dropped 
Our vendor is interested in our well being, not just their own. TWB3 Item Dropped 
Our outsourcing vendor is truthful in dealing with us. TWI1 Item Dropped 
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I would characterize our vendors as honest. TWI2 Item Dropped 
Promises made by our outsourcing vendor are reliable. TWI3 Item Dropped 
Service Quality(SQ ) (Construc ncluded in separate analysis)   
Our outsourcing vendor's behavior instills confidence in us. SQAS1 Analyzed 
separately 
We feel safe in transacting with our outsourcing vendor. SQAS2 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor is consistently courteous with us. SQAS3 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor has the knowledge to do its job. SQAS4 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor gives us individual attention. SQEMP1 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor has operating hours that are convenient for 
us. 
SQEMP2 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor has our best interests at heart. SQEMP3 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor understands our specific needs. SQEMP4 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor understands the problems from our 
perspective also. SQEMP5 
Analyzed 
separately 
When our outsourcing vendor promises to do something by a certain 
time, it does so. SQREL1 
Analyzed 
separately 
When we have a problem, our outsourcing vendor performs the 
service right the first time. SQREL2 
Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor provides its services at the time it promises 
to do so. SQREL3 
Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor is dependable. SQREL4 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor insists on error-free records. SQRES1 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor informs us exactly when services will be 
performed SQRES2 
Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor gives us prompt service. SQRES3 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor is always willing to help us. SQRES4 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor is never too busy to respond to our requests SQRES5 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor has the latest technology. SQTAN1 Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor's physical IT facilities are visually 
appealing. SQTAN2 
Analyzed 
separately 
Our outsourcing vendor's employees are neat-appearing. SQTAN3 Analyzed 
separately 
Materials associated with the service of our outsourcing vendor 
(such as pamphlets or statement) are visually appealing. SQTAN4 
Analyzed 
separately 
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Table 6.2 - Reliability Alpha and descriptive statistics for constructs used in the study 
 
 
 
Construct Measurement Original 
# of 
Items 
Final # 
of Items 
Cronba
ch 
Alpha 
Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Outsourcing 
Success 
(SUCCESS) 
Likert scale (1-7) 16 7 0.897 4.7204 1.3505 
Relationship 
Quality (RQ) Likert scale (1-7) 15 15 0.957 5.0045 1.2207 
Interdependence 
(INT) Likert scale (1-7) 6 5 0.829 5.2552 1.2245  
Strategic Salience 
(PSS) Likert scale (1-7) 5 4 0.904  5.1702 1.4207  
Risk (RISK) Likert scale (1-7) 15 15 0.958 4.2777 1.3399  
Service Quality 
(SQ) Likert Scale(1-7) 22 22    
Trust (TRUST) Likert scale (1-7) 5 5 0.965 5.0466 1.5521  
Trust Modes Likert scale (1-7) 23 18 0.931 5.0034 1.0162  
Reliability alpha for the sub-constructs  
Relationship 
Quality (RQ)             
Commitment Likert scale (1-7) 5 5 0.912  5.1252 1.3408 
Coordination Likert scale (1-7) 6 6 0.921 4.9294 1.3040 
Cooperation Likert scale (1-7) 4 4 0.911 4.9663   1.3595 
Risk             
Risk of 
Opportunistic 
Behavior (ROB) 
Likert scale (1-7) 6 6 0.946 4.5164 1.4794 
Risk of Conflict 
of Interest (RCI) Likert scale (1-7) 4 4 0.891 4.1963 1.4242 
Risk of user non-
involvement 
(RUNI) 
Likert scale (1-7) 5 5 0.918 4.0564 1.5277 
Trust Modes             
Institutional-
based trust (IBT) Likert scale (1-7) 9 8 0.906 4.9502 1.1539 
Calculative-based 
trust (CBT) Likert scale (1-7) 3 3 0.873 4.9366 1.4494 
Transference-
based trust (TBT) Likert scale (1-7) 4 3 0.836 5.4294 1.1745 
Knowledge-based 
trust (KBT) Likert scale (1-7) 7 4 0.946 4.8405 1.4212 
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Table 6.3 - Total Variance Explained in the PCA 
 
 
Comp
onent Initial Eigenvalues  
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulativ
e % 
1 24.3558 35.2983 35.2983 24.3558 35.2983 35.2983 10.0891 14.6219 14.62193 
2 8.2687 11.9836 47.2819 8.2687 11.9836 47.2819 9.9224 14.3803 29.00223 
3 3.6998 5.3620 52.6439 3.6998 5.3620 52.6439 7.8281 11.3451 40.34737 
4 2.8311 4.1031 56.7470 2.8311 4.1031 56.7470 6.1157 8.8634 49.21072 
5 2.5357 3.6749 60.4219 2.5357 3.6749 60.4219 4.8271 6.9957 56.20647 
6 2.0346 2.9487 63.3705 2.0346 2.9487 63.3705 3.4397 4.9851 61.19158 
7 1.8609 2.6969 66.0675 1.8609 2.6969 66.0675 2.7131 3.9321 65.12365 
8 1.7765 2.5746 68.6421 1.7765 2.5746 68.6421 2.4277 3.5184 68.64208 
9 1.5432 2.2366 70.8787       
10 1.3721 1.9886 72.8673       
11 1.2859 1.8637 74.7310       
12 1.2223 1.7714 76.5024       
13 1.0478 1.5185 78.0209       
14 0.9522 1.3800 79.4009       
15 0.9053 1.3120 80.7129       
16 0.8627 1.2503 81.9632       
17 0.7250 1.0508 83.0139       
18 0.6989 1.0129 84.0268       
19 0.6527 0.9459 84.9727       
20 0.5818 0.8432 85.8159       
21 0.5430 0.7869 86.6029       
22 0.5294 0.7672 87.3701       
23 0.5055 0.7326 88.1027       
24 0.4668 0.6766 88.7793       
25 0.4438 0.6433 89.4226       
26 0.4228 0.6127 90.0352       
27 0.3905 0.5660 90.6012       
28 0.3834 0.5557 91.1569       
29 0.3522 0.5104 91.6673       
30 0.3266 0.4733 92.1407       
31 0.3157 0.4576 92.5983       
32 0.2994 0.4340 93.0322       
33 0.2873 0.4164 93.4486       
34 0.2845 0.4123 93.8608       
35 0.2451 0.3552 94.2160       
36 0.2409 0.3492 94.5652       
37 0.2389 0.3462 94.9114       
38 0.2310 0.3348 95.2462       
39 0.2185 0.3167 95.5629       
40 0.2072 0.3003 95.8631       
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41 0.2028 0.2940 96.1571       
42 0.1897 0.2750 96.4320       
43 0.1762 0.2553 96.6873       
44 0.1663 0.2410 96.9283       
45 0.1625 0.2355 97.1638       
46 0.1564 0.2267 97.3905       
47 0.1492 0.2163 97.6068       
48 0.1378 0.1998 97.8065       
49 0.1319 0.1911 97.9976       
50 0.1207 0.1749 98.1726       
51 0.1171 0.1698 98.3423       
52 0.1077 0.1560 98.4983       
53 0.0999 0.1448 98.6432       
54 0.0926 0.1341 98.7773       
55 0.0900 0.1305 98.9078       
56 0.0864 0.1253 99.0331       
57 0.0793 0.1149 99.1480       
58 0.0758 0.1099 99.2579       
59 0.0718 0.1041 99.3620       
60 0.0665 0.0964 99.4584       
61 0.0619 0.0897 99.5481       
62 0.0580 0.0841 99.6322       
63 0.0488 0.0707 99.7029       
64 0.0424 0.0615 99.7644       
65 0.0393 0.0569 99.8213       
66 0.0369 0.0535 99.8748       
67 0.0348 0.0504 99.9252       
68 0.0299 0.0434 99.9686       
69 0.0217 0.0314 100.0000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.      
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Table 6.4 - Communalities in the PCA 
 
 
Communalities  
  Initial Extraction 
OSS1 1 0.5685 
OSS2 1 0.6611 
OSS3 1 0.5966 
OSS4 1 0.6495 
OFS1 1 0.6869 
OFS2 1 0.6090 
OFS3 1 0.4272 
RQCOM1 1 0.6937 
RQCOM2 1 0.5812 
RQCOM3 1 0.6568 
RQCOM4 1 0.6784 
RQCOM5 1 0.6284 
RQCOOR1 1 0.7149 
RQCOOR2 1 0.6777 
RQCOOR3 1 0.7482 
RQCOOR4 1 0.7262 
RQCOOR5 1 0.5273 
RQCOOR6 1 0.7357 
RQCOOP1 1 0.7280 
RQCOOP2 1 0.6556 
RQCOOP3 1 0.6858 
RQCOOP4 1 0.7100 
INT2 1 0.5427 
INT3 1 0.6852 
INT4 1 0.7189 
INT5 1 0.6204 
INT6 1 0.5727 
PSS1 1 0.5257 
PSS2 1 0.7399 
PSS3 1 0.6649 
PSS4 1 0.6637 
ROB1 1 0.6602 
ROB2 1 0.7600 
ROB3 1 0.7545 
ROB4 1 0.7787 
ROB5 1 0.7729 
ROB6 1 0.7384 
RCI1 1 0.6465 
RCI2 1 0.5900 
RCI3 1 0.6816 
RCI4 1 0.5780 
RUNI1 1 0.7697 
RUNI2 1 0.7967 
RUNI3 1 0.8017 
RUNI4 1 0.8126 
RUNI5 1 0.5379 
TRUST1 1 0.7305 
TRUST2 1 0.7757 
TRUST3 1 0.8060 
TRUST4 1 0.8543 
TRUST5 1 0.8173 
IBTSG2 1 0.7071 
IBTSG3 1 0.6949 
IBTSG4 1 0.7187 
IBTSG5 1 0.7278 
IBTSG6 1 0.8135 
IBTSN1 1 0.6218 
IBTSN2 1 0.6800 
IBTSN3 1 0.6436 
CBT1 1 0.7732 
CBT2 1 0.6450 
CBT3 1 0.7511 
TBT1 1 0.6824 
TBT2 1 0.6092 
TBT3 1 0.5844 
KBT1 1 0.6809 
KBT3 1 0.7290 
KBT4 1 0.7837 
KBT7 1 0.7731 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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Table 6.5 - Factor Loadings in the PCA 
 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix(a)       
  Component       
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
RUNI4 0.8582 -0.0695 -0.0732 0.0851 -0.0052 0.0019 0.0073 -0.2420 
RUNI3 0.8228 -0.0827 -0.0753 0.1428 0.0257 0.0353 -0.0047 -0.2997 
ROB5 0.8029 -0.0539 0.0571 -0.1749 0.0657 -0.1172 -0.2426 0.1207 
ROB6 0.8008 -0.0569 -0.0435 -0.1878 0.0005 -0.1043 -0.1866 0.1046 
ROB3 0.8006 -0.0110 -0.0497 -0.3093 0.0124 -0.0033 -0.0252 0.1201 
ROB2 0.7999 -0.0393 0.0192 -0.2556 0.0184 -0.0362 -0.1777 0.1403 
ROB4 0.7975 -0.0770 0.0296 -0.2197 -0.0514 -0.0563 -0.2117 0.1925 
RUNI2 0.7934 -0.0783 -0.1261 0.1719 -0.0520 0.0633 0.0234 -0.3293 
RUNI1 0.7855 -0.0355 -0.1120 0.1255 -0.0479 0.1371 0.0572 -0.3143 
RCI1 0.7805 -0.0380 -0.0680 -0.1201 -0.0592 -0.0876 0.0498 -0.0553 
ROB1 0.7740 -0.0453 -0.0051 -0.1172 -0.0170 -0.0296 -0.1937 0.0815 
RCI3 0.7641 -0.1512 -0.1431 -0.1409 -0.0649 0.0000 0.1705 0.0368 
RCI4 0.7117 -0.0470 -0.1587 -0.0527 -0.1236 -0.0023 -0.0040 -0.1611 
RCI2 0.7092 -0.2207 -0.1167 -0.1107 -0.0619 -0.0907 0.0112 -0.0127 
RUNI5 0.6699 -0.0779 -0.1602 -0.1441 -0.0278 -0.0046 0.0730 0.1749 
RQCOOR1 -0.0646 0.7903 0.2545 -0.0140 0.1100 0.0679 0.0669 0.0063 
RQCOOR4 -0.0409 0.7822 0.2255 0.1711 0.1533 0.0603 0.0713 -0.0175 
RQCOOR2 -0.0888 0.7555 0.2124 -0.0116 0.2003 0.0286 0.1084 0.0334 
RQCOOP3 -0.0385 0.7169 0.1483 -0.0260 0.2757 0.0857 0.2492 0.0481 
RQCOOP2 -0.0399 0.7104 0.1199 0.0463 0.2249 0.1737 0.2035 0.1031 
RQCOOR6 -0.1176 0.7026 0.2552 0.3669 0.1520 0.0577 0.0223 -0.0384 
RQCOM4 -0.1493 0.6967 0.2394 0.2334 -0.0254 0.2173 0.0869 0.0590 
RQCOOR5 -0.0161 0.6924 0.0207 0.0947 0.1204 0.1042 0.0431 0.1048 
RQCOM2 -0.0387 0.6913 0.1477 0.0659 -0.0051 0.0873 -0.0923 0.2439 
RQCOOR3 -0.2001 0.6872 0.2648 0.3459 0.2130 -0.0018 0.0193 0.0203 
RQCOM5 -0.0826 0.6832 0.2769 0.1496 0.1204 0.1968 -0.0060 0.0501 
RQCOOP1 -0.1235 0.6778 0.3102 0.3016 0.0640 0.0444 0.2379 -0.0592 
RQCOM3 -0.1529 0.6556 0.2882 0.3027 0.0444 0.0997 -0.0327 0.1264 
RQCOOP4 -0.2078 0.6506 0.2736 0.2922 0.2251 0.0501 0.1518 0.0837 
RQCOM1 -0.1384 0.6428 0.3220 0.2694 0.0644 0.1966 -0.0610 0.1963 
PSS2 -0.1051 0.2665 0.7664 0.1677 0.0921 0.0708 0.1382 0.0990 
OSS4 -0.0676 0.2184 0.7406 0.0897 0.1138 -0.0014 0.1664 0.0020 
OFS1 -0.0838 0.2993 0.7170 0.0966 0.2160 -0.0034 -0.0540 -0.1316 
OSS2 -0.1022 0.2581 0.7026 0.2064 0.1416 -0.0527 0.0953 0.1262 
PSS3 -0.0595 0.2421 0.6864 0.0893 0.1811 0.1762 0.2265 0.0919 
OSS1 -0.0858 0.1225 0.6802 0.2546 -0.0007 0.1075 0.0239 0.0808 
PSS4 0.0006 0.2701 0.6551 0.2164 0.2134 0.2231 0.1340 0.0376 
OSS3 -0.1345 0.2956 0.6267 0.1474 0.1325 0.1017 0.1853 0.1199 
OFS2 -0.1670 0.3018 0.5961 0.2835 0.1684 0.0364 0.0351 -0.1532 
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PSS1 -0.0209 0.2119 0.5919 0.1046 0.1106 0.2761 0.0004 0.1750 
OFS3 -0.0750 0.2384 0.5036 0.1851 0.1346 0.1116 0.0566 -0.2074 
TRUST4 -0.2127 0.3379 0.2956 0.7185 0.1155 0.1556 0.1978 0.1206 
TRUST5 -0.1893 0.3546 0.3007 0.6963 0.0793 0.2233 0.1406 0.0680 
TRUST3 -0.2163 0.3282 0.3064 0.6868 0.0982 0.1208 0.2062 0.1386 
TRUST2 -0.1501 0.3360 0.3562 0.6702 0.1322 0.1954 0.0407 0.0832 
TRUST1 -0.1553 0.3205 0.3561 0.6361 0.1072 0.2253 0.0402 0.0920 
KBT4 -0.2781 0.2032 0.3478 0.5805 0.3571 0.0572 0.1721 0.2160 
KBT7 -0.2699 0.1613 0.4002 0.5687 0.2570 0.0579 0.2572 0.2349 
KBT3 -0.2626 0.1673 0.3587 0.5677 0.2344 0.1349 0.2373 0.2273 
KBT1 -0.2492 0.1396 0.3934 0.5563 0.2858 0.1262 0.0883 0.1726 
IBTSG6 -0.0884 0.2194 0.2712 0.1941 0.7879 0.1292 -0.0127 -0.0932 
IBTSN2 0.0856 0.3571 0.0409 -0.0391 0.6840 0.2015 0.1017 0.1523 
IBTSG2 -0.0251 0.2020 0.3039 0.2895 0.6828 0.1263 0.0644 0.0567 
IBTSG4 -0.1962 0.0693 0.3125 0.3747 0.6519 0.1105 0.0131 0.0103 
IBTSG5 -0.1852 0.0551 0.3655 0.3265 0.6514 0.0985 0.1175 0.0493 
IBTSN3 0.1166 0.4250 0.0333 -0.0935 0.6201 0.0402 0.1236 0.1952 
IBTSN1 0.0327 0.3512 0.0493 -0.0952 0.6043 0.0900 0.2266 0.2474 
IBTSG3 -0.0978 0.1613 0.3816 0.3810 0.5911 0.0555 0.1001 -0.0778 
INT4 -0.0399 0.1719 0.1209 0.2179 0.1572 0.7695 0.0929 -0.0130 
INT2 0.0304 0.1669 0.0232 0.0288 -0.0125 0.7052 -0.1101 0.0538 
INT6 0.0169 0.0743 0.1407 0.0844 0.1955 0.6896 0.0908 0.1338 
INT3 -0.2004 0.2217 0.0670 0.1734 0.2755 0.6863 -0.0328 0.1152 
INT5 -0.0511 0.1508 0.2699 0.0931 0.0004 0.6863 0.2032 0.0356 
CBT1 -0.0752 0.1672 0.1996 0.1774 0.1843 0.1397 0.7826 0.0488 
CBT3 -0.1713 0.2495 0.2425 0.2334 0.0779 -0.0238 0.7248 0.1195 
CBT2 -0.1364 0.1412 0.3144 0.1651 0.1815 0.0601 0.6662 -0.0022 
TBT1 -0.0848 0.3192 -0.0336 0.3633 0.0573 0.0731 0.0044 0.6569 
TBT2 -0.0378 0.2044 0.0994 0.2338 0.1680 0.2276 0.0520 0.6471 
TBT3 -0.0323 0.2380 0.1635 0.2565 0.2166 0.2183 0.2075 0.5446 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
A Rotation converged in 8 iterations.     
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Table 6.6 - Factor analysis of OSS and PSS constructs 
 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix(a)  
  Component  
 1 2 3 
OSS1 0.2270 0.6837 0.3309 
OSS2 0.3106 0.7168 0.3424 
OSS3 0.3743 0.7782 0.1376 
OSS4 0.2793 0.8253 0.2328 
OFS1 0.3268 0.4175 0.6584 
OFS2 0.2823 0.2684 0.8279 
OFS3 0.1084 0.1906 0.8730 
PSS1 0.8316 0.2070 0.0897 
PSS2 0.7880 0.3460 0.3070 
PSS3 0.7878 0.3416 0.2038 
PSS4 0.7929 0.2967 0.2777 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
A Rotation converged in 5 iterations. 
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Table 6.7 - Factor analysis of risk constructs 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix(a)  
  Component  
 1 2 3 
ROB1 0.745965 0.30478 0.262688 
ROB2 0.829013 0.246056 0.287252 
ROB3 0.718409 0.268581 0.40059 
ROB4 0.824553 0.239517 0.29566 
ROB5 0.801364 0.256128 0.305379 
ROB6 0.794969 0.294052 0.287482 
RCI1 0.354547 0.263645 0.789712 
RCI2 0.381883 0.227439 0.704117 
RCI3 0.318976 0.29853 0.778089 
RCI4 0.196399 0.438527 0.690957 
RUNI1 0.217523 0.841409 0.33268 
RUNI2 0.238588 0.886313 0.278686 
RUNI3 0.358338 0.846025 0.226013 
RUNI4 0.441591 0.761224 0.286594 
RUNI5 0.452101 0.711862 0.566793 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
A Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
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Table 6.8 - Factor analysis of trust constructs 
 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix(a)     
  Component     
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
TRUST1 0.8269 0.2504 0.1806 0.1140 0.0896 0.1777 
TRUST2 0.8523 0.2689 0.1736 0.1163 0.1054 0.1727 
TRUST3 0.8206 0.2124 0.2685 0.2635 0.0652 0.1599 
TRUST4 0.8414 0.2127 0.2964 0.2416 0.0905 0.1618 
TRUST5 0.8288 0.2122 0.2750 0.1921 0.0626 0.1521 
IBTSG2 0.2219 0.7493 0.1634 0.1098 0.2501 0.1933 
IBTSG3 0.2393 0.7615 0.1802 0.2082 0.0874 0.1760 
IBTSG4 0.2892 0.7602 0.2353 0.1136 0.1656 0.0384 
IBTSG5 0.2250 0.7665 0.3192 0.1937 0.1477 0.0337 
IBTSG6 0.1559 0.8567 0.0592 0.1024 0.3145 0.0769 
IBTSN1 0.0557 0.1578 0.1700 0.1450 0.8549 0.1195 
IBTSN2 0.1210 0.2876 0.0608 0.0375 0.8569 0.1077 
IBTSN3 0.0770 0.1962 -0.0017 0.1145 0.8705 0.1453 
CBT1 0.1709 0.1315 0.1794 0.7950 0.1897 0.1185 
CBT2 0.1821 0.2609 0.1072 0.8491 0.0612 0.0195 
CBT3 0.2552 0.1041 0.1518 0.8428 0.0706 0.1647 
TBT1 0.2993 0.0239 0.0718 0.0317 0.0975 0.8224 
TBT2 0.0865 0.1272 0.1919 0.0802 0.1428 0.8558 
TBT3 0.1754 0.1994 0.1582 0.1938 0.1467 0.7503 
KBT1 0.3288 0.3660 0.7046 0.1237 0.0354 0.2399 
KBT3 0.4421 0.2086 0.7690 0.2019 0.1520 0.1520 
KBT4 0.4089 0.3856 0.6698 0.2021 0.1080 0.2276 
KBT7 0.4286 0.2597 0.7086 0.2833 0.1173 0.1885 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
A Rotation converged in 6 iterations.   
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Table 6.9 - List of Hypotheses 
 
 
H1 Relationship quality is positively related to outsourcing success. 
H2 Interdependence is positively related to relationship quality.  
Service quality 
H3 Service quality is positively related to relationship quality. 
H4 Trust in vendor is positively related to relationship quality. 
H5 Stakeholders’ perceptions of strategic salience is positively related to 
relationship quality. 
H6.1 Vendor opportunism is negatively related to relationship quality. 
H6.2 Perception of conflict of interests is negatively related to relationship quality. 
H6.3 Stakeholders’ non-involvement is negatively related to relationship quality. 
H7 Service quality is positively related to trust. 
H8 Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between interdependence and 
relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor increases the positive effect of 
interdependence on relationship quality and low level of trust decreases the 
positive effect. 
H9 Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between service quality perceptions 
and relationship quality. High level of trust increases the positive impact of 
service quality on relationship quality and low level of trust decreases the 
positive impact. 
H10 Trust in vendor moderates the relationship between perceptions of risk and 
relationship quality. High level of trust in vendor reduces the negative impact of 
perceptions of risk on relationship quality and low level of trust increases the 
negative effect. 
H11.1 Transference-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing vendor. 
H11.2 Calculative-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing vendor. 
H11.3 Institution-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing vendor. 
H11.4 Knowledge-based trust is positively related to the trust in outsourcing vendor. 
H12 Perceptions of trustworthiness are positively related to trust in vendor.  
H13 Trust modes are positively impact to stakeholders’ beliefs about the 
trustworthiness of the IT outsourcing vendor. 
H14 Trust in vendor is negatively related to perceptions of risk. 
H15 Trust in vendor is positively related to perceptions of strategic salience. 
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Table 6.10 - Hypotheses Testing – Results 
 
 
    DV 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. Result 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
Adjusted 
R2 
      B Std. Error Beta     
  Tolerance VIF   
  (Constant)   1.3075 0.3536   3.6978 0.0003 
  
      
H1 RQ SUCCESS 0.682 0.0687 0.6164 9.9335 0.0001 SUPPORTED 1 1 0.376 
  (Constant)   1.7118 0.4727   3.6213 0.0004 
  
      
H2  INT RQ 0.1228 0.0706 0.1129 1.7377 0.0842 SUPPORTED 0.7584 1.319   
H3  Service Quality RQ Tested Separately       
  
      
H4 TRUST RQ 0.3245 0.0619 0.4126 5.2453 0.0001 SUPPORTED 0.5171 1.934   
H5 PSS RQ 0.2364 0.0621 0.2765 3.8078 0.0002 SUPPORTED 0.6068 1.648   
H6 RISK RQ -0.0497 0.0552 -0.0545 -0.8998 0.3696 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 0.8716 1.147 0.494 
H6.1 ROB RQ 0.1146 0.0768 0.1389 1.492 0.1377 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 0.3661 2.731   
H6.2 RCI RQ -0.075 0.0803 -0.0875 -0.9343 0.3516 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 0.3616 2.766   
H6.3 RUNI RQ -0.0871 0.0733 -0.109 -1.188 0.2366 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 0.3766 2.655 0.0784 
H7 Service Quality TRUST Could  not  be tested     
  
      
H8 TRUSTxINT RQ Interaction  effects  shown  separately   
  
      
H9 TRUSTxSQ RQ Interaction  effects  Could not Be tested   
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H10 TRUSTxRISK RQ Interaction  effects  shown  separately   
  
      
  (Constant)   0.045 0.4352   0.1033 0.9178 
  
      
H11.1 TBT TRUST 0.1283 0.0785 0.0971 1.6331 0.1044 SUPPORTED 0.7266 1.376   
H11.2 CBT TRUST 0.129 0.0652 0.1204 1.9772 0.0498 SUPPORTED 0.6917 1.446   
H11.3 IBT TRUST 0.1136 0.0897 0.0845 1.266 0.2074 
NOT 
SUPPORTED 0.5767 1.734   
H11.4 KBT TRUST 0.6417 0.0795 0.5876 8.0744 0.0001 SUPPORTED 0.4846 2.063 0.584 
H12 Trustworthiness TRUST Could  not  be  tested    
  
      
H13 Trust Modes 
Trustworthi
ness Could  not  be  tested            
  (Constant)   5.8289 0.3356   17.3694 0.0001 
  
      
H14 TRUST RISK -0.3074 0.0636 -0.3561 -4.8348 0.0001 SUPPORTED 1 1 0.121 
  (Constant)   2.3306 0.3028   7.6969 0 
  
      
H15 TRUST PSS 0.5627 0.0574 0.6116 9.8089 0.0001 SUPPORTED 1 1 0.37 
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Figure 6.1 - Research Model – Results 
 
 
 
Trust Modes 
• Institutional Based [β=0.0897] 
• Calculative-based [β=0.1204**] 
• Transference-based (top-management 
support) [β=0.0971*] 
• Knowledge-based Trust (Past 
experiences with the Vendor) 
[β=0.0795***] 
Outsourcing Success 
• Strategic Success 
• Financial Success 
Trust in 
vendor 
Service Quality 
Perceptions of 
Strategic Salience 
Relationship Quality 
• Commitment 
• Cooperation 
• Coordination 
Risk 
• Vendor opportunism [β=-0.1389] 
• Conflict of interest [β=-0.0875] 
• Stakeholder non-involvement [β=-0.109] 
Interdependence 
Trust constructs 
Outsourcing constructs 
+H1 
+H6 +H5 +H4 
β=0.1129* 
+H11 
R2=0.584 
–H14 
+H15 
+H3 
+H2 
+H8 +H9 
+H10 
R2=0.121 
R2=0.376 
R2=0.494 
R2=0.0.37 
β=0.3561*** 
β=0.0721*** 
β=0.4126*** 
β=0.6116*** 
β=0.2765*** 
*** Supported at 0.01 level of significance or better 
** Supported at the 0.05 level of significance or better 
* Supported at the 0.10 level of significance 
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Table 6.11 - Moderation effects 
 
 
 
Model   DV Unstandardized Coefficients  
Standardized 
Coefficients T Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics  R
2
  ∆ R2  
   B Std. Error Beta   Tolerance VIF   
1 (Constant) RQ -0.002 0.039  -0.047 0.962     
 INT RQ 0.152 0.066 0.148 2.31 0.022 0.713 1.403   
 PSS RQ 0.262 0.062 0.291 4.202 0.000 0.611 1.638   
 Risk RQ -0.066 0.056 -0.068 -1.179 0.24 0.883 1.133   
 Trust RQ 0.336 0.064 0.4 5.286 0.000 0.512 1.955 0.525  
2 (Constant) RQ -0.001 0.045  -0.018 0.986     
 INT RQ 0.166 0.068 0.162 2.46 0.015 0.682 1.466   
 PSS RQ 0.262 0.063 0.292 4.189 0 0.606 1.650   
 Risk RQ -0.079 0.058 -0.081 -1.35 0.179 0.825 1.212   
 Trust RQ 0.318 0.066 0.379 4.8 0.000 0.474 2.110   
 TTUSTXINT RQ 0.035 0.061 0.031 0.563 0.574 0.985 1.016   
 TTUSTXRISK RQ 0.055 0.06 0.054 0.924 0.357 0.873 1.145 0.523 0.003 
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Table 6.12 - Trust moderating the relationship between PSS and RQ 
 
 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients t Sig. Collinearity Statistics 
    B Std. Error Beta     Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 
-0.002 0.039   -0.047 0.962     
  @INT 0.152 0.066 0.148 2.310 0.022 0.713 1.403 
  @PSS 0.262 0.062 0.291 4.202 0.000 0.611 1.638 
  @Risk 
-0.066 0.056 -0.068 -1.179 0.240 0.883 1.133 
  @Trust 0.336 0.064 0.400 5.286 0.000 0.512 1.955 
2 (Constant) -0.042 0.046   -0.916 0.361     
  @INT 0.158 0.066 0.153 2.390 0.018 0.681 1.469 
  @PSS 0.304 0.063 0.338 4.852 0.000 0.577 1.732 
  @Risk 
-0.108 0.058 -0.111 -1.871 0.063 0.802 1.247 
  @Trust 0.309 0.065 0.368 4.778 0.000 0.473 2.114 
  @TTUSTXRISK 0.081 0.059 0.078 1.369 0.173 0.855 1.169 
  @TTUSTXPSS 0.187 0.062 0.193 3.020 0.003 0.683 1.464 
  @TTUSTXINT 
-0.067 0.069 -0.060 -0.982 0.328 0.746 1.340 
 
 
Table 6.12 continued: Model Summary: 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of 
the Estimate Change Statistics 
          
R Square 
Change F Change df1 df2 Sig. F Change 
1 0.733(a) 0.537 0.525 0.49884 0.537 45.808 4 158 .000 
2 0.752(b) 0.566 0.546 0.48772 0.029 3.429 3 155 .019 
a Predictors: (Constant), @Trust, @Risk, @INT, @PSS 
b Predictors: (Constant), @Trust, @Risk, @INT, @PSS, @TTUSTXINT, @TTUSTXRISK, @TTUSTXPSS 
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Figure 6.2 - Interaction plot: Trust X PSS 
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Table 6.13 - Total Variance Explained in PCA 
 
 
 
Total Variance Explained        
Component Initial Eigenvalues  
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 25.1763 41.2727 41.2727 25.1763 41.2727 41.2727 14.5844 23.9088 23.9088 
2 7.9165 12.9778 54.2505 7.9165 12.9778 54.2505 9.9374 16.2908 40.1996 
3 2.9680 4.8655 59.1160 2.9680 4.8655 59.1160 9.3674 15.3564 55.5560 
4 2.5390 4.1623 63.2783 2.5390 4.1623 63.2783 3.6000 5.9017 61.4577 
5 1.8281 2.9969 66.2752 1.8281 2.9969 66.2752 2.9386 4.8174 66.2752 
6 1.6339 2.6786 68.9538       
7 1.5328 2.5127 71.4665       
8 1.3345 2.1878 73.6542       
9 1.0914 1.7892 75.4434       
10 1.0269 1.6835 77.1269       
11 0.9705 1.5910 78.7179       
12 0.8408 1.3784 80.0963       
13 0.7683 1.2595 81.3558       
14 0.6868 1.1259 82.4817       
15 0.6059 0.9933 83.4750       
16 0.5973 0.9791 84.4542       
17 0.5612 0.9200 85.3742       
18 0.5337 0.8749 86.2491       
19 0.4553 0.7464 86.9955       
20 0.4482 0.7347 87.7302       
21 0.4320 0.7082 88.4384       
22 0.4023 0.6595 89.0979       
23 0.3784 0.6203 89.7183       
24 0.3677 0.6028 90.3211       
25 0.3577 0.5863 90.9074       
26 0.3282 0.5381 91.4455       
27 0.3213 0.5267 91.9722       
28 0.2997 0.4914 92.4636       
29 0.2844 0.4663 92.9298       
30 0.2735 0.4484 93.3782       
31 0.2471 0.4050 93.7833       
32 0.2451 0.4017 94.1850       
33 0.2339 0.3834 94.5684       
34 0.2334 0.3826 94.9510       
35 0.2160 0.3541 95.3050       
36 0.2101 0.3444 95.6495       
37 0.1914 0.3138 95.9632       
38 0.1796 0.2944 96.2577       
39 0.1692 0.2773 96.5350       
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40 0.1630 0.2672 96.8022       
41 0.1596 0.2617 97.0639       
42 0.1506 0.2468 97.3107       
43 0.1472 0.2413 97.5520       
44 0.1346 0.2206 97.7727       
45 0.1232 0.2020 97.9747       
46 0.1228 0.2012 98.1759       
47 0.1145 0.1877 98.3637       
48 0.1091 0.1789 98.5425       
49 0.1042 0.1707 98.7133       
50 0.1008 0.1652 98.8784       
51 0.0885 0.1450 99.0235       
52 0.0843 0.1383 99.1617       
53 0.0741 0.1214 99.2831       
54 0.0737 0.1209 99.4040       
55 0.0649 0.1064 99.5104       
56 0.0618 0.1013 99.6117       
57 0.0549 0.0899 99.7016       
58 0.0488 0.0801 99.7817       
59 0.0464 0.0761 99.8578       
60 0.0449 0.0735 99.9313       
61 0.0419 0.0687 100.0000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.      
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Table 6.14 - Factor Loadings with Service Quality included in the analysis 
 
 
 
Rotated Component Matrix(a)    
  Component    
 1 2 3 4 5 
SQREL1 0.8615 -0.1913 0.2244 0.0775 0.0582 
SQREL2 0.8595 -0.1374 0.2766 0.0036 0.0281 
SQREL3 0.8473 -0.1992 0.2816 0.0801 -0.0026 
SQRES3 0.8414 -0.1881 0.2537 0.1026 0.0023 
SQREL4 0.8106 -0.2617 0.2303 0.1630 0.0160 
SQRES2 0.8093 -0.1782 0.2887 0.1022 0.1213 
SQRES1 0.8017 -0.0649 0.1850 0.0509 0.0129 
SQAS1 0.7789 -0.2175 0.2977 0.0649 0.1391 
SQRES5 0.7448 -0.1027 0.3209 0.1075 0.1000 
SQAS2 0.7435 -0.2893 0.2867 0.1558 0.1268 
SQEMP4 0.7242 -0.2025 0.3311 0.0998 0.1575 
SQEMP5 0.7159 -0.1409 0.3162 0.1284 0.1216 
SQAS4 0.6966 -0.2011 0.2832 0.2472 0.2929 
SQEMP3 0.6862 -0.1779 0.2694 0.2499 0.2332 
SQRES4 0.6679 -0.1508 0.3529 0.2439 0.1415 
RQCOOR6 0.6212 -0.0868 0.5962 0.0547 0.0169 
SQAS3 0.5653 -0.1314 0.3143 0.2589 0.2233 
SQTAN4 0.5638 -0.0847 0.3165 0.0793 0.3044 
SQTAN2 0.5557 -0.1146 0.2980 0.0624 0.2746 
SQTAN1 0.5072 -0.1841 0.3461 0.0457 0.2823 
SQEMP1 0.5016 -0.1121 0.3321 0.2352 0.2033 
SQTAN3 0.4850 -0.1133 0.3202 0.2310 0.1897 
SQEMP2 0.4543 -0.1351 0.3050 0.2523 0.2045 
RUNI4 0.0275 0.8614 -0.1230 -0.0018 -0.1929 
RUNI3 0.0666 0.8277 -0.1557 0.0237 -0.1662 
ROB5 -0.1517 0.8064 -0.0111 -0.1325 0.1332 
ROB2 -0.2191 0.8025 0.0088 -0.0528 0.1251 
ROB3 -0.2813 0.7984 0.0407 -0.0149 0.1259 
ROB6 -0.2420 0.7975 -0.0034 -0.1236 0.0789 
RUNI2 0.0428 0.7934 -0.1613 0.0535 -0.2089 
ROB4 -0.2670 0.7886 -0.0192 -0.0777 0.1623 
RUNI1 0.0125 0.7877 -0.1010 0.1271 -0.1941 
RCI1 -0.1512 0.7775 -0.0195 -0.0935 -0.0339 
ROB1 -0.1754 0.7715 -0.0144 -0.0524 0.1052 
RCI3 -0.1354 0.7598 -0.1477 -0.0008 -0.0698 
RCI4 -0.1773 0.7100 -0.0505 -0.0154 -0.1916 
RCI2 -0.2375 0.6955 -0.1871 -0.0817 0.0107 
RUNI5 -0.1801 0.6610 -0.0439 0.0284 -0.0872 
RQCOOR1 0.2884 -0.0397 0.7582 0.0490 0.1300 
RQCOOR4 0.3884 -0.0247 0.7422 0.0692 0.0423 
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RQCOOP3 0.2888 -0.0162 0.7227 0.1022 0.0498 
RQCOOR2 0.3136 -0.0627 0.7222 0.0199 0.0957 
RQCOM2 0.1145 -0.0430 0.7181 0.0891 0.2042 
RQCOOP2 0.3157 -0.0188 0.6914 0.1930 0.0713 
RQCOM5 0.3054 -0.0716 0.6842 0.2089 0.1577 
RQCOOR5 0.2145 -0.0034 0.6826 0.1408 -0.0606 
RQCOM4 0.3577 -0.1420 0.6744 0.2140 0.0265 
RQCOM1 0.3086 -0.1481 0.6662 0.2182 0.1856 
RQCOOP4 0.4436 -0.2013 0.6576 0.1031 0.1263 
RQCOM3 0.3426 -0.1559 0.6572 0.1103 0.1633 
RQCOOP1 0.4998 -0.1083 0.6255 0.0391 0.1416 
RQCOOR3 0.5924 -0.1772 0.6002 0.0103 0.0460 
INT4 0.2370 -0.0304 0.1759 0.7913 0.0030 
INT3 0.2822 -0.1785 0.1987 0.7302 0.0137 
INT2 -0.0794 0.0302 0.2063 0.7003 0.0777 
INT6 0.1792 0.0269 0.0899 0.6994 0.1232 
INT5 0.2549 -0.0436 0.1168 0.6614 0.1685 
PSS1 0.2578 -0.0293 0.2165 0.2569 0.7087 
PSS2 0.4825 -0.1006 0.2432 0.0485 0.6857 
PSS3 0.4181 -0.0535 0.2420 0.1529 0.6507 
PSS4 0.5368 0.0148 0.2134 0.1998 0.5624 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a 
Rotation converged in 6 
iterations. 
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Table 6.15 - Communalities in the PCA of service quality constructs 
 
 
 
 
Communalities  
  Initial Extraction 
RQCOM1 1.00 0.6431 
RQCOM2 1.00 0.5803 
RQCOM3 1.00 0.6125 
RQCOM4 1.00 0.6495 
RQCOM5 1.00 0.6350 
RQCOOR1 1.00 0.6790 
RQCOOR2 1.00 0.6334 
RQCOOR3 1.00 0.7448 
RQCOOR4 1.00 0.7089 
RQCOOR5 1.00 0.5355 
RQCOOR6 1.00 0.7521 
RQCOOP1 1.00 0.6743 
RQCOOP2 1.00 0.6205 
RQCOOP3 1.00 0.6190 
RQCOOP4 1.00 0.6963 
INT2 1.00 0.5462 
INT3 1.00 0.6843 
INT4 1.00 0.7143 
INT5 1.00 0.5463 
INT6 1.00 0.5453 
PSS1 1.00 0.6825 
PSS2 1.00 0.7746 
PSS3 1.00 0.6830 
PSS4 1.00 0.6900 
ROB1 1.00 0.6401 
ROB2 1.00 0.7105 
ROB3 1.00 0.7343 
ROB4 1.00 0.7260 
ROB5 1.00 0.7087 
ROB6 1.00 0.7160 
RCI1 1.00 0.6376 
RCI2 1.00 0.5819 
RCI3 1.00 0.6222 
RCI4 1.00 0.5750 
RUNI1 1.00 0.6848 
RUNI2 1.00 0.7038 
RUNI3 1.00 0.7419 
RUNI4 1.00 0.7951 
RUNI5 1.00 0.4796 
SQTAN1 1.00 0.4927 
SQTAN2 1.00 0.4901 
SQTAN3 1.00 0.4400 
SQTAN4 1.00 0.5241 
SQREL1 1.00 0.8385 
SQREL2 1.00 0.8349 
SQREL3 1.00 0.8433 
SQREL4 1.00 0.8054 
SQRES1 1.00 0.6840 
SQRES2 1.00 0.7953 
SQRES3 1.00 0.8182 
SQRES4 1.00 0.6729 
SQRES5 1.00 0.6898 
SQAS1 1.00 0.7662 
SQAS2 1.00 0.7591 
SQAS3 1.00 0.5525 
SQAS4 1.00 0.7529 
SQEMP1 1.00 0.4711 
SQEMP2 1.00 0.4231 
SQEMP3 1.00 0.6921 
SQEMP4 1.00 0.7099 
SQEMP5 1.00 0.6636 
Extraction Method: Principal Component 
Analysis. 
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Table 6.16 - Hypotheses testing – Service Quality and relationship quality 
 
 
 
  DV Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardize
d 
Coefficients 
T 
Sig.  Collinearity 
Statistics 
R 
Square
d 
   B Std. Error Beta 
  
 
Toleranc
e VIF  
 
(Constant
)  1.0786 0.4488  2.4035 0.0174     
H2 INT RQ 0.1037 0.0643 0.0963 1.6139 0.1085 Supported 0.7700 1.2988  
H3 SQ RQ 0.5690 0.0721 0.6031 7.8875 0.0000 Supported 0.4691 2.1318  
H5 PSS RQ 0.1266 0.0593 0.1496 2.1362 0.0342 Supported 0.5595 1.7873  
H6 RISK RQ 0.0183 0.0515 0.0203 0.3558 0.7225 Not Supported 0.8427 1.1867  
H6.1 ROB RQ 0.1240 0.0688 0.1517 1.8012 0.1736 Not Supported 0.3829 2.6119  
H6.2 RCI RQ 
-0.0164 0.0738 -0.0194 -0.2228 0.8240 Not Supported 0.3594 2.7821  
H6.3 RUNI RQ 
-0.0851 0.0667 -0.1076 -1.2758 0.2039 Not Supported 0.3820 2.6176 0.5598 
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CHAPTER 7:  DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discusses the results of the study. First, implications of the results of 
each of the hypothesis tests in this study are discussed followed by a discussion of overall 
impact of the findings of the study. The contributions of this study to theory, implications 
for practice and limitations of this study are presented next.  
The objective of this study was to address the following research questions: (1) 
what are the factors that influence the quality of relationship between the IT outsourcing 
vendor and client and how does relationship quality impact outsourcing success? (2) 
What is the effect of trust and perceptions of risk on relationship quality? (3) How does 
trust in vendor interact with other determinants of relationship quality?  
The results of the study indicated that relationship quality is positively related to 
IT outsourcing success. The study hypothesized that trust in vendor, perceptions of risk, 
interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience, and service quality influenced 
relationship quality. The hypothesis about perceptions of risk was not supported. 
Hypothesis about interdependence was marginally supported. Trust in vendor, 
perceptions of strategic salience and service quality were significantly related to 
relationship quality. The interaction effects proposed in the study, of trust moderating the 
relationships between interdependence and relationship quality, and risk and relationship 
quality were not supported. However a post-hoc analysis revealed that trust moderated 
the relationship between strategic salience and relationship quality. The hypotheses about 
trustworthiness could not be tested.  
The study hypothesized that trust modes: transference-based trust, calculative-
based trust, institutional-based trust and knowledge-based trust contributed to the trust in 
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vendor. The hypothesis about transference based trust was marginally supported. 
Calculative-based trust and knowledge-based trust were significantly related to trust in 
vendor. Surprisingly, institutional based trust was insignificant.  
The implications of the findings in the context of the research questions addressed 
by the study are discussed in the following sections. 
Research Question 1: what are the factors that influence the quality of relationship 
between the IT outsourcing vendor and client and how does relationship quality 
impact outsourcing success? 
The study results of hypothesis H1 about the impact of relationship quality on IT 
outsourcing success indicate that quality of client-vendor relationship has a significant 
impact on the success of IT outsourcing projects. The results replicate similar findings in 
other studies (Grover et al. 1996a; Lee et al. 1999).  
The study posited interdependence, service quality, trust in vendor and 
perceptions of strategic salience as positively impacting relationship quality, and the three 
sub-constructs of perceptions of risk: risk of opportunistic behavior, risk of conflict of 
interest and user non-involvement as negatively influencing relationship quality. All the 
hypotheses relating to the research question 1 were supported except the hypotheses 
about perceptions of risk. 
Of the factors impacting the relationship quality, addressed the first research 
question, the implications of the findings about interdependence, service quality and 
perceptions addressed by research question 1, have important implications which are 
discussed below. 
   
178 
Implications of findings regarding interdependence 
This study posited that Interdependence is positively related to relationship 
quality. This hypothesis was marginally supported. Results indicated that 
interdependence was significantly related to relationship quality at the 0.08 level of 
confidence.  
There have been conflicting results about the impact of interdependence on 
relationships. Interdependence between the parties was positively related to relationship 
quality (Bensaou et al. 1995; Emerson 1962; Mohr et al. 1994). However, Lee and Kim 
(1999) found a negative relationship between interdependence and relationship quality, 
which was attributed to the possible apprehensions of the client about the risk of vendors 
opportunistic behavior. Mohr and Spekman (Mohr et al. 1994) also found that 
interdependence negatively impacted strategic partnerships.  
The results of this study could offer some ideas on how to resolve the conflicting 
findings about interdependence. The study tested whether the clients indeed perceive risk 
due to interdependence In the context of outsourcing. This study found that 
interdependence was significantly related to relationship quality at the 0.08 level of 
confidence. 
Asymmetries of power and resources may develop in favor of the vendor 
(Fitzgerald et al. 1994) in client-vendor IT outsourcing relationships. But the vendors are 
likely to take more responsibility and risk as the relationship develops, which is 
beneficial for the clients (Grover et al. 1996b; Meyer 1994). The results of this study 
indicate that perceived risk was not found to be significantly related to relationship 
quality, where as interdependence was significant. As the parties get to know each other, 
and depend on each other, trust develops in the relationship reducing the perceptions of 
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risk (Gefen et al. 2003b; Luhmann 1979; McKnight et al. 2002a), and the relationship 
strengthens. Therefore, in ongoing relationships rooted in mutual trust, the perceptions of 
risk are reduced and therefore, interdependence of parties strengthens the relationship. 
However, where power asymmetries develop into the relationship (Kern et al. 
2000; Willcocks et al. 1998b; Willcocks et al. 1999b), in the absence of balancing 
mechanisms like trust between the parties, or the vendors taking more risk and 
responsibility the parties are very likely to perceive greater risk. In such situations it is 
likely that interdependence of parties could negatively impact the relationships (Emerson 
1962; Lee et al. 1999; Mohr et al. 1994). However this idea could be tested only using 
longitudinal data. This would be an interesting area for future research. 
Another interesting finding from the post-hoc analysis of the relationship between 
risk and interdependence is that, the impact of interdependence of the parties is itself 
likely to have a similar effect to that of trust, in reducing the perceptions of risk. At the 
0.10 level of significance, interdependence between the parties was negatively related to 
the perceptions of risk. It is possible that because interdependence in the relationship, 
clients’ perceptions of risk might have been reduced. At the sub-constructs level, 
interdependence was significantly related to risk of opportunistic behavior (significance = 
0.05 and risk of conflict of interests (significance = 0.02). The finding also supports the 
inference that interdependence in relationships could potentially reduce clients’ perceived 
risk of conflict of interests and risk of opportunistic behavior by the vendor. This idea 
could also be tested only using a longitudinal research design. This can be an interesting 
area for future research. Interdependence of parties did not have any significant impact on 
the risk of user non-involvement.  
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This finding from the post-hoc analysis about the relationship between risk and 
interdependence has to be seen in the light of the limitation that the study tested the 
interdependence between the parties, trust in vendor, and clients’ perceptions of risk. But 
the study did not test whether asymmetries of power existed, and what the impact of such 
asymmetries of power will be, on the client-vendor relationships.    
Implications of findings regarding service quality 
As mentioned in chapter 6, hypotheses related to service quality were analyzed 
separately, excluding trust from the analysis. This was necessary because service quality 
and trust loaded on a single dimension in factor analysis. This was because some of the 
items measuring service quality dimensions (reliability, assurance and empathy) were 
very similar to the items measuring trust.  
This study hypothesized that service quality is positively related to relationship 
quality. This hypothesis was supported at the 0.0001 level of significance. Service quality 
was significantly related to the client-vendor relationship quality. Service quality in IT 
outsourcing context has not been tested in terms of how it impacts a client-vendor 
relationship.  
Service quality has been tested in an outsourcing context in interaction with the 
type of functions outsourced, and its impact on IT outsourcing success (Grover et al. 
1996b). The Grover, et al (1996b) study found that service quality is an essential factor in 
outsourcing success. Grover et al tested only tangibles and reliability dimensions of 
service quality. 
The current study extends the findings by explaining how service quality 
indirectly impacts IT outsourcing success, through relationship quality. Service quality in 
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the context of IS services is the perceptions of service received from the IS providers, 
evaluated against the user expectations (Pitt et al. 1997). The levels of service essential 
for successful implementation are represented by the five dimensions of the service 
quality as perceived by the client. In addition to tangibles and reliability that were tested 
by Grover, Cheon and Teng (1996b), the other three dimensions: responsiveness, 
reliability and empathy, are also very important factors in determining the service quality 
in an outsourcing context. The responsiveness dimension corresponds to timeliness of 
actions of the vendor, and reliability and empathy dimensions are broadly similar in 
conceptualization to trust in vendor. These five dimensions have also been applied 
extensively in several other information systems contexts (Gefen 2002a; Jiang et al. 
2002; Pitt et al. 1995; Pitt et al. 1997). Therefore all the five dimensions are key 
indicators that impact the quality of client-vendor relationships and ultimately contribute 
to the success of the project.  
Service quality is important in IT Outsourcing because IT outsourcing projects are 
highly service oriented and service dependent. Often the pricing of the project itself is 
based on the level of service required. Therefore, the important theoretical linkage of the 
clients’ perception of service quality to relationship quality highlights the importance of 
monitoring the quality of service in the implementation of the project both from the client 
and vendor points of view. It is important for the vendors to know how their service is 
being perceived by their clients. By assessing perceptions of service quality, vendors can 
compare their level of services versus the level of service that was being received 
internally by the clients, and also from other external vendors. Clients can compare the 
level of service received against the price paid for the service.  
   
182 
The constructs service quality and trust could not be tested together in the analysis 
because of overlap of the factor loadings of trust and service quality. The analyses were 
carried out in two separate iterations. First iteration of analysis was carried out with trust 
included and service quality excluded in the analysis and the second iteration with service 
quality included and trust excluded. Interestingly, when the set of hypotheses relating to 
these constructs were analyzed separately, all the other relationships included in the 
regression equation (interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience and perceptions of 
risk, influencing relationship quality) yielded exactly similar results. These results might 
offer a corroborative explanation for the overlap of service quality and trust constructs, 
because of the overlap in the original conceptualizations of some of the service quality 
dimensions with that of trust.  
Implications of findings regarding strategic salience 
The results indicated that the understanding among the client’s managers that the 
IT outsourcing project is strategically important was positively related to the relationship 
quality. IT outsourcing has been perceived as a source of insecurity by the IT managers 
of the client (Huber 1993; Palvia 1995). However this hypothesis about the positive 
impact of IT strategic salience on the relationship quality is a reliable pointer to the 
importance of the implementation staff being conversant with the rationale of the IT 
outsourcing project itself.   
Successful strategic decisions including decision to outsource IT, involve 
formulation and effective implementation of policies by the management. Successful 
implementation involves understanding of the importance of such strategic decisions and 
involvement of the managers at all levels (Beach 1990; Mintzberg 1990). Strategic 
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decisions will be hard to implement without the understanding of their importance and 
impact by the people implementing it (Westley et al. 1989). In the context of IT 
outsourcing, the results of the present study confirm the findings from the past research 
about the importance of strategic salience and extend the previous research to the client-
vendor relationships. The findings indicate that managers’ perceptions of strategic 
salience is related to the client-vendor relationship. Good client-vendor relationships in 
turn are positively related to outsourcing success. Eventually this awareness of the 
strategic importance of the project could help in efficient implementation of the project, 
better client-vendor relationship, and for the success of the project itself. 
Research Question 2: What is the effect of trust and perceptions of risk on 
relationship quality? 
This study expected to find the following relationships. First, trust in vendor will 
be positively related to the client-vendor relationships.  Perceptions of risk will be 
negatively related to the client-vendor relationship quality. Trust in vendor should have 
the effect of reducing the client’s risk perceptions.  
As expected, trust was positively related to relationship quality, and also reduced 
client’s perceived risk. But perceived risk was not significant. Implications of these 
findings are discussed below. 
Implications of findings regarding trust 
This finding implies that the clients’ trust in vendor will positively influence the 
client-vendor relationship quality. Given the fast changing nature of IT, and the need to 
constantly review and update the requirements of IT projects to prevent redundancy and 
obsolescence of IT projects, maintaining good client-vendor relationships are very 
important. Trust is recognized as an important element in interpersonal as well as 
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business relationships. It is especially important in IT outsourcing relationships because, 
it infuses flexibility into the relationship, and reduces the cost of implementation, and 
unwanted expenses on renegotiations for both parties. The findings of this study confirm 
the findings from past research regarding trust in IT outsourcing relationships (Lee et al. 
1999; Sabherwal 1999). However, the previous studies measured trust using a single item 
measure in a survey (Lee et al. 1999) or by way of interviews (Sabherwal 1999). The 
current study makes an important theoretical contribution by conceptualizing trust in the 
context of IT outsourcing, based on the social exchange theory. The study findings 
confirm the importance of trust in relationships. 
Implications of findings regarding trust modes 
This study also tested the relationship of trust modes to trust. The study found 
calculative-based trust and knowledge-based trust were significantly related to trust in 
vendor. Transference based trust was moderately supported. Institutional-based trust was 
not significant.  
 Certifications and guarantees such as vendor’s memberships or accreditations of 
professional associations, and termination and penalty clauses in the IT outsourcing 
contracts are recognized as institutional-based trust building mechanisms that build 
client’s trust. Institutional based trust was found to be significantly related to trust in 
vendor in the contexts of ecommerce (Ba 2001; Gefen et al. 2003b; Pavlou et al. 2004), 
internet banking (Lee et al. 2004), and enterprise resource planning (ERP) (Gefen 2004). 
Institutional-based trust is very significant during the initial trust formation between the 
parties (McKnight et al. 2002a; McKnight et al. 1998). In the context of IT outsourcing, it 
is possible that institutional based trust is helpful during the initial stages of finalizing the 
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IT outsourcing contracts such as vendor selection. At that stage because the parties may 
not have acquaintance of each other, institution-based trust mechanisms help build trust 
between the parties. But as time passes, in an ongoing relationship, the client and the 
vendor get to know each other, and therefore, it is possible that institution-based trust 
may not be the most important aspect of trust in such relationships. However, past 
research in ERP, and ecommerce contexts points out that institution-based trust is 
significant and important even in ongoing relationships (Gefen 2004; Pavlou et al. 2004).  
Implications of findings regarding perceptions of risk 
The three sub-constructs of perceptions of risk: risk of opportunistic behavior, risk 
of conflict of interest and risk of user non-involvement were regressed on relationship 
quality. None of the three sub-constructs were significant6.  
Given that the study tested ongoing relationships, and considering that 
interdependence, perceptions of strategic salience and trust were significantly related to 
relationship quality, one possible explanation for the lack of a significant relationship of 
perceived risk with relationship quality could be as follows: Trust develops over time in 
relationships (Blau 1964b; Lewis et al. 1985; Zand 1972). Since the study was about 
ongoing IT outsourcing relationships, it is possible that the parties in the relationship got 
to know each other well enough. Trust has been recognized in the past research as 
reducing the perceptions of risk (Gefen et al. 2003b; Lewis et al. 1985; Luhmann 1979). 
It is therefore possible that the parties may not have perceived risk in such ongoing 
relationships. The clients might have perceived the relationship as trusted, strategically 
important, and as interdependent. 
                                                 
6
 As mentioned in Chapter 6, the relationship of perceptions of risk to relationship quality was also tested as 
a single construct.  This relationship was also not significant. 
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To corroborate further, this study found that trust was also significantly related to 
perceived risk (H14) confirming the established relationship in theory that trust reduces 
the perceptions of risk (Gefen et al. 2003b; Luhmann 1979; McKnight et al. 2002a). The 
post-hoc analysis also revealed that interdependence is negatively related to risk, 
reducing the perceptions of risk.  Assuming that there are no asymmetries of power 
(Emerson 1962) in the relationship, because of mutual dependence parties enjoy equal 
positions of power. Since the vendor is trusted by the clients, and also perceive the 
relationship with the vendor as strategically important for them, the perceptions of risk if 
any might be minimized. The hypothesis about perceived risk deserves further 
investigation. 
Research Question 3: How does trust in vendor interact with other determinants of 
relationship quality?  
An important question investigated by this study was the impact of trust 
moderating the relationships between: (1) interdependence and relationship quality, (2) 
risk and relationship quality and (3) service quality and relationship quality. 
The moderation effect of trust on service quality and relationship quality could 
not be tested because of the overlap of the service quality and trust factors. The other two 
moderator relationships were tested in this study. However, both the moderator 
relationships were not significant. Both the hypotheses require a detailed further 
investigation with a larger sample size. 
Even though not hypothesized, the study analyzed post-hoc the impact of trust 
moderating the relationship between perceptions of strategic salience and relationship 
quality. The moderation effects were significant. The implications of the findings are 
discussed below.  
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Post-hoc analysis regarding trust moderating the relationship between perceptions 
of strategic salience and relationship quality 
This study analyzed the moderation effect of trust on the relationship between 
perceptions of strategic salience and relationship quality. The theoretical basis for 
examining this relationship post-hot was explained in chapter 6. In the first step of 
regression, both trust and perceptions of strategic salience were significantly related to 
relationship quality at the 0.001 level of significance. In the second step of the regression, 
interaction term (trustXperceptions of strategic salience) was entered into the regression 
equation. The results indicated that the interaction term was significantly related to 
relationship quality. The increase in R2 was 0.029 which was also significant at the 0.001 
level. The interaction plot (figure 6.2) shows a significantly steeper slope. The 
implication of this finding is that when the clients perceive the IT outsourcing project as 
strategically important for them, high level of trust in vendor will have a more positive 
impact on the relationship quality than low trust. This finding highlights the importance 
of trust building in strategic relationships for better client-vendor commitment, 
coordination and cooperation. Trust is important both from the vendor and client points 
of view because it reduces the cost of monitoring, and excessive dependence on 
exhaustive legal contracts (Fukuyama 1995; Gefen 2004). Trust in long term business 
relationships reduces uncertainty (Fukuyama 1995; Gefen et al. 2003b; Luhmann 1979), 
and possibility of business conflict (Fukuyama 1995; Ganesan 1994b; Gefen 2004).  
Given the quick rate of obsolescence in IT projects and the incomplete nature of 
formal contracts, in order to maintain currency of the IT outsourcing projects, reduce the 
uncertainties and have the flexibility that is required in implementation of these projects 
it may be required to building mutual trust between the client and the vendor. IT 
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outsourcing projects are undertaken with a primary motive of gaining strategic market 
advantages, or gaining substantial cost advantages for the organization. Both of these 
aims are strategically important for the organization. For successful implementation of 
such projects, managers awareness of their importance was found to be a determining 
factor (Lacity et al. 1994). The significant interaction implies that the impact the 
realization of the strategic importance of the project will have a far greater positive 
impact on the relationship quality where greater trust prevails between the parties. 
Contributions to theory  
An important contribution of this study is the finding about the relationship 
between interdependence on IT outsourcing relationship quality. IT outsourcing research 
had conflicting results about interdependence of client and the vendor. Some studies 
(Kern et al. 2000; Willcocks et al. 1998b; Willcocks et al. 1999b) concluded that mutual 
dependence of the parties has a positive influence on the IT outsourcing relationships, 
where as another study (Lee et al. 1999) concluded that mutual dependence of parties 
negatively affect the relationship, because of clients’ perceptions of risk due to of the 
asymmetries of power developing in favor of the vendor. This study tested both 
interdependence and perceptions of risk and found that interdependence indeed is 
positively related to relationship quality, while perceptions of risk did not have a 
significant impact on relationship quality. The results of this study indicate that even 
though asymmetries may develop in favor of the vendor, where the clients perceive the 
relationship as strategically important, and when the vendors enjoy the trust of the clients, 
the perceptions of risk are reduced, and interdependence of parties in fact enhances the 
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relationship quality. Trust, interdependence and perceptions of strategic salience 
indirectly contribute to IT outsourcing success through relationship quality. 
Considering the findings of the earlier studies and this study together, the findings 
about interdependence of parties are in fact complementary but not conflicting. The 
findings about interdependence in IT outsourcing relationships can be summarized as 
follows: Interdependence does positively impact relationship quality (Bensaou et al. 
1995; Kern et al. 2000). This study found that when the clients trust the vendor, perceive 
the outsourcing project as strategically important, and the perceptions of risk are 
insignificant, interdependence will positively influence relationship quality. When the 
clients perceive risk due to imbalances in power favoring the vendor, interdependence 
will negatively impact the relationship (Lee et al. 1999).  
Another contribution this study makes is that this study examined the role of trust 
as a moderator. The study proposed and tested two moderator hypotheses with trust 
moderating the relationship between risk and relationship quality and the the relationship 
between interdependence and relationship quality. These hypotheses were not significant. 
However, the study analyzed post-hoc the relationship between perceptions of strategic 
salience and relationship quality moderated by trust. Trust moderated the relationship 
between perceptions of strategic salience and relationship quality. Trust is recognized as 
a very important factor in relationships. The interaction of trust with other factors in a 
relationship is relatively less understood. This study gives an insight into the impact of 
high versus low levels of trust in interaction with other factors in a relationship. This 
study tested the impact of high or low levels of trust interact with other contributory 
factors in a relationship. The level of trust in relationships can potentially change level of 
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impact of those factors on the quality of the relationship comprising of commitment, 
cooperation and coordination. This finding about trust as a moderator is not just limited 
to the context of IT outsourcing, but to a larger context of relationships in general, and 
specifically to all business relationships. The understanding about the influence the levels 
of trust could have in relationships can help our understanding of relationship building 
itself, and better management of business relationships. 
Another important contribution of this study is the conceptualization of 
perceptions of strategic salience. Earlier studies recognized the importance of the 
managers’ awareness of importance of the IT outsourcing project (Lacity et al. 1994). 
However the perceptions of the strategic salience have not been measured empirically. 
This study conceptualized and operationalized perceptions of strategic salience. The 
items measuring perceptions of strategic salience was specifically created for this study 
after extensive pre-tests and validation. The final scale measuring perceptions of strategic 
salience consisted of 4 items, with a Cronbach alpha of 0.90. 
This study operationalized perceptions of risk, comprising of three sub constructs: 
risk of opportunistic behavior, risk of conflict of interest and risk of user non-
involvement. The risk of conflict of interest and opportunistic behavior arising in IT 
outsourcing contracts because of asymmetries of power favoring the vendor has been 
acknowledged in research (Fitzgerald et al. 1994; Goles et al. 2005; Lee et al. 1999). 
These have not been empirically measured. This study developed items measuring 
client’s perceptions of risk of opportunistic behavior, risk of conflict of interest and risk 
of user non-involvement. The items were extensively pre-tested for clarity and 
psychometric properties. The validated final measures consisted of 6 items of risk of 
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opportunistic behavior (Cronbach alpha: 0.946), four items measuring risk of conflict of 
interest (Cronbach alpha: 0.891) and five items measuring risk of user non-involvement 
(Cronbach alpha: 0.918).  
The regressions revealed that perceived risk was not significantly related to 
relationship quality in this data sample. But the important contribution of this study is the 
operationalization of the construct and developing and validating scales for measuring 
risk perceptions. This construct requires more future research for arriving at more 
detailed conclusions. 
Another contribution of this study is that all the five commonly used dimensions 
of service quality are tested in the context of IT outsourcing. Grover et.al (1996b) study 
tested only two dimensions of service quality: tangibles and reliability using the 
SERVQUAL differential scale (Parasuraman et al. 1991b). This study measured all the 
five dimensions of service quality: Tangibles, reliability, responsiveness, assurance and 
empathy using the perceptions scale of service quality measurement (Gefen 2002a).  
Implications for practice 
This study investigated the success of outsourcing as measured by (1) a firm’s 
ability to focus on its core abilities and on its strategic uses of IT (strategic success); and 
(2) the ability to utilize the economies of scale of the vendors and improve the firm’s 
profitability and reduce costs (financial success). These two factors have been the most 
important reasons for which firms outsource IT (Lacity et al. 1998; Loh et al. 1992a; 
Smith et al. 1998). This study found that relationship quality is a key indicator of 
outsourcing success. The unpredictable changes that can occur in IT and the incomplete 
nature of the formal contracts can render the contracts outdated if the projects are not 
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kept flexible and managed effectively. To maintain the flexibility of the project as well as 
the formal contracts, maintaining effectual client-vendor relationships is very essential. 
Maintaining flexibility and good client-vendor relationships also helps in problem-free 
execution of the projects, avoids cost and time over-runs during implementation of the IT 
outsourcing projects. 
The important factors identified by this study as contributing to relationship 
quality are service quality, perceptions of strategic salience, interdependence and trust in 
vendor. The study also identified the various modes of trust that help create trust in 
vendor. With the factors identified above, the relationships can be established based on 
the characteristics of the vendor, various bases of trust for the client, extent of 
commitment and cooperation, extent of interdependence between the parties, and the 
level of service quality. The criteria above represent the criteria based on which the 
vendor selection can be done. By considering these factors at the time of vendor 
selection, the element of risk associated in IT outsourcing in terms of asymmetries 
favoring the vendor, risk of conflict of interest and risk of vendor’s opportunistic 
behavior.  
The importance of service quality in a service intensive IT outsourcing projects 
cannot be overlooked. Both the client and the vendor can arrive at and agree upon project 
specific and service specific standards of service quality requirements to ensure the 
success of IT outsourcing projects.  
The results from this research about interdependence can provide pointers to the 
practitioners about the aspects of strategic management of interdependence. The parties 
can manage the dependencies between the parties in such a manner that the vendor will 
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not have concentration of power, and client does not become overly dependent on the 
vendors.  
Limitations:  
This study has some limitations within which the findings of the study should be 
interpreted. This study uses cross-sectional data, thus studying the relationships between 
the variables at a given point in time. All the variables are measured based on the 
perceptions of the respondents at the time of responding to the survey. Therefore 
causality between the variables cannot be established.  
A second limitation of the study is self-reporting. Data collected using self-reports 
suffer the disadvantage of dependence on the respondents’ personal memory. In addition, 
the reporting scales used by the respondents may vary across the respondents. The data 
may also be subject to the personal biases and social-desirability biases in responses 
(Hoyle et al. 2002). Since all the data used for the study were collected using survey 
techniques, the research is subject to common method variance. Common method 
variance occurs when observed correlations between variables are inflated or is affected 
by some sort of systematic respondent bias.  
Another issue is the generalizability of the results from this sample to the 
population of IT outsourcing professionals. The professionals responding to this study 
were actively involved in IT outsourcing. The sample is not limited to one industry or a 
specific type of outsourcing. The sample is adequately representative of the population of 
managers who are involved in IT outsourcing contracts. However, the generalization of 
the results must be done with caution.  
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Another limitation of this study is that, some of the posited hypotheses could not 
be tested because of the overlap in factor loadings, and also relatively large number of 
questionnaire items (142) measuring several constructs proposed in the research model. 
The sample size of only 163 usable survey responses is relatively small for the number of 
questionnaire items and the number of constructs tested in the study. All the 
questionnaire items were adopted from the validated scales in past research. However, 
items measuring risk constructs and perceptions of strategic salience were specifically 
designed for this study, based on similar scales used in research in comparable settings. 
Therefore the findings about perceived risk and perceptions of strategic salience merit 
further investigation.  
The items for measuring the constructs in this study were carefully chosen from 
the previous literature. The measures of trustworthiness did not have the ideal 
psychometric properties for testing the hypothesized relationships involving the two 
constructs in the current dataset used in this study. It may be possible that academic 
researchers and practitioners may be interested in alternative measures used in literature 
for this construct.  
Directions for future research 
The study examined the role of trust in vendor as a moderator. The findings of 
this study indicate that trust in vendor could be a potential moderator. However, the 
limitations of sample size of this study warrant additional investigation into the role of 
trust as a moderator. 
An interesting result is that the perceptions of risk did not prove to be a significant 
factor that could impact relationship quality. It is possible that the other factors such as 
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interdependence and trust in vendor might have contributed to reduce the risk 
perceptions. Another important factor could be because of the stage of the relationship. 
The study deals with ongoing relationships. Therefore it is likely that the managers that 
are involved in the implementation of the project had learned over time to manage the 
risks that are associated in such client-vendor relationships. But the impact of perceptions 
of risk deserves a detailed investigation for the following reasons: It needs further 
investigation to know whether perceptions of risk have an impact on the relationship 
quality. Whether the other factors in the analysis did reduce the impact of risk 
perceptions on relationship quality needs to be investigated. Limitation of sample size is 
also a reason for investigating this relationship further.  
The other interesting results were the trust modes impacting trust in vendor. 
Institutional-based trust was expected to have a significant impact on trust in vendor, 
based on several empirical studies in other contexts such as ecommerce (Gefen et al. 
2003b; Mayer et al. 1995; McKnight et al. 2002a; Pavlou et al. 2004). However, the 
impact of institutional based trust was insignificant. Future research could investigate into 
the reasons why the effect of institutional-based trust was insignificant.  
Conclusion 
This study tested the impact of relationship quality on IT outsourcing success. 
The study was able to gather statistical support that managing client-vendor relationship 
is a very important factor in the implementation phase of the IT outsourcing contracts. 
The factors influencing relationship quality, tested in this study were: trust in vendor, 
interdependence, service quality, perceptions of risk and perceptions of strategic salience. 
The study posited trust as a moderator because high or low levels of trust can have a 
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profound effect in ongoing relationships. Though the original hypotheses of moderation 
were not supported, the study found in the post-hoc analyses that trust indeed moderated 
the relationship between the perceptions of strategic salience and relationship quality. In 
the context of IT outsourcing projects which are very service intensive, and time and cost 
sensitive, this study concludes that though good client-vendor relationships are not the 
only ingredient of a project success, the importance of relationships built on mutual trust 
between the parties, interdependence and service quality in ensuring project success 
cannot be understated.  
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APPENDIX 2 – DATA COLLECTED FROM PROFESSIONALS REGISTERED ON LINKEDIN 
NETWORKING PORTAL 
LinkedIn (www.linkedin.com) is an online networking portal with a membership 
enrolment of about 9 million professionals from around the world according to the 
membership information available on the LinkedIn portal’s webpage as on 02/01/2007. 
LinkedIn’s investors are Greylock and Sequoia Capital, the VC’s behind Google and 
Yahoo!. Angel investors include the founders of Netscape, Excite, PayPal and Half.com. 
Personal memberships on LinkedIn are free of charge. Each member creates a profile that 
summarizes their professional accomplishments. The professional profile listed on the 
LinkedIn portal helps the members to network with potential business contacts such as 
former colleagues, clients, and partners. The free personal membership accounts have 
access to a powerful search functionality, in order to locate and contact people within 
one’s network free of charge.  
The LinkedIn professional network is used by its members to find potential clients, 
service providers, subject experts, and partners who collaborate and further mutual 
professional and business interests or for searching for employment opportunities or 
seeking potential and talented employees by recruiters. The company’s main revenue is 
derived from its premium services, which are utilized by companies for search and 
recruitment of professionals. LinkedIn’s most active members include recruiters, 
investment professionals from almost all industries and business across the world, 
management consultants, analysts, and market researchers. 
The profile of members is accessible to the member of LinkedIn. Profiles of 
professionals registered on LinkedIn in the areas of Information systems, 
Telecommunications, Computers and Network Security, Computer Software and 
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Computer Hardware, Information Services, and Information Technology and Services 
were accessed over the worldwide web and were reviewed. Based on the profile available 
on the LinkedIN portal, a total of 1174 email addresses of the professionals listed under 
these areas were gathered. The professionals were contacted over the period from March 
8th, 2006 to April 10th 2006, via email requesting to participate in the survey. An initial 
email was sent to the respondents followed by a reminder requesting participation after a 
gap of exactly one week. A total of 148 surveys were received, out of which 120 were 
complete and usable. The final response rate (considering only the usable surveys) was 
10.22%. The 120 usable responses received from the professionals registered on the 
LinkedIn portal were included in the data analysis for this study. 
   
224 
APPENDIX 3 – DATA COLLECTED FROM PROJECT MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, 
NEWTOWN SQUARE, PHILADELPHIA 
The Project Management Institute (PMI) is the world’s reputed association of 
professionals engaged in project management. It has its headquarters in Newtown Square, 
outside Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. The PMI web page (www.pmi.org accessed on 
01/25/2007) informs that PMI has more than 200000 members.   
PMI also offers several certifications and credentials in the area such as Project 
Management Professional (PMP), the Certified Associate in Project Management 
(CAPM), the Organizational Project Management Maturity Model (OPM3) ProductSuite 
certification, and Program Management Professional (PgMPSM) credential. 
Project Management is defined as “the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and 
techniques to a broad range of activities in order to meet the requirements of a particular 
project. Project management is comprised of five Project Management Process Groups – 
Initiating Processes, Planning Processes, Executing Processes, Monitoring and 
Controlling Processes, and Closing Processes – as well as nine Knowledge Areas. These 
nine Knowledge Areas center on management expertise in Project Integration 
Management, Project Scope Management, Project Time Management, Project Cost 
Management, Project Quality Management, Project Human Resources Management, 
Project Communications Management, Project Risk Management and Project 
Procurement Management” (Project Management Institute. 2004). 
PMI professionals come from several major industries including, aerospace, 
automotive, business management, construction, engineering, financial services, 
information technology, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, and telecommunications. The 
professionals from these industries form special interest groups within the PMI, know as 
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SIGs. Detailed information about the special interest groups of the PMI can the found at 
the following URL: 
http://www.pmi.org/prod/groups/public/documents/info/gmc_siglisting.asp 
PMI was contacted during February 2006 for permission to post the URL for the 
current study’s survey on the Research page of the PMI’s website. The PMI reviewed the 
survey for verifying the suitability of the research to the area of Project Management. The 
PMI after scrutiny of the survey posted the survey URL on it web page 
http://www.pmi.org/prod/groups/public/documents/info/pp_surveylinks.asp, where the 
PMI surveys are posted, for access and participation by its members in the study.  
In addition to posting the link on the PMI’s webpage, the members of the special 
interest groups of PMI were also contacted via emails. The SIGs selected as potential 
samples for this study were: Service & Outsourcing SIG, and Information Technology & 
Telecommunications SIG. These SIGs were selected because the interests and the 
profession of the members in these three SIGs were directly related directly to IT 
outsourcing or IT projects, and where the members could be contacted via emails. The 
members of these SIGs were contacted via the email LISTSERVs for these SIGs. The 
email addresses of the members are not revealed to the senders. Instead, the emails will 
be sent via the LISTSERVs. Therefore, there is no means of knowing howmany members 
of each of these SIGs were contacted for the study. The number of responses received 
from these two SIGs were 60, out of which 42 responses were complete and usable. 
These 42 responses were included in the data analysis in this study.  
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APPENDIX 4 – SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
 
 SECTOR Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Did not disclose 1 0.61 0.61 0.61 
Government 10 6.13 6.13 6.75 
Services 98 60.12 60.12 66.87 
Manufacturing 28 17.18 17.18 84.05 
Retailing 2 1.23 1.23 85.28 
Wholesale 1 0.61 0.61 85.89 
Other 23 14.11 14.11 100.00 
Total 163 100 100   
 
 
 
POSITION of the 
respondent Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Top Level Manager 46 28.22 28.22 28.22 
Middle Level Manager 62 38.04 38.04 66.26 
Entry Level Manager 19 11.66 11.66 77.91 
Technical position 26 15.95 15.95 93.87 
Sales 3 1.84 1.84 95.71 
Other 7 4.29 4.29 100.00 
Total 163 100 100   
 
 
Type of IT Outsourcing Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Not responded 4 2.45 2.45 2.45 
0-20% Partial outsourcing 74 45.40 45.40 47.85 
20-80 Total 77 47.24 47.24 95.09 
>80  8 4.91 4.91 100.00 
Total 163 100 100   
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Appendix 4 (continued)  
 
 
DURATION of IT 
Outsourcing Contract Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
1-2 Years 1 0.61 0.61 0.61 
2-5 Years 73 44.79 44.79 45.40 
5-7 Years 68 41.72 41.72 87.12 
7-10 Years 16 9.82 9.82 96.93 
> 10 Years 5 3.07 3.07 100.00 
Total 163 100 100   
 
PAYTYPE of IT 
outsourcing Contract Frequency Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Not Known 2 1.23 1.23 1.23 
Fixed Price Contracts 51 31.29 31.29 32.52 
Service Fee Contracts 54 33.13 33.13 65.64 
Time and Materials Contract 28 17.18 17.18 82.82 
Payment for Deliverables. 28 17.18 17.18 100.00 
Total 163 100 100   
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APPENDIX 5 – PEARSON’S CORRELATIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ITEMS 
 
Correlations             
  
OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OFS1 OFS2 OFS3 RQCOM1 RQCOM2 RQCOM3 RQCOM4 RQCOM5 RQCOOR1 
OSS1 1.000             
OSS2 0.574 1.000            
OSS3 0.540 0.652 1.000           
OSS4 0.604 0.693 0.727 1.000          
OFS1 0.600 0.587 0.500 0.562 1.000         
OFS2 0.499 0.554 0.479 0.482 0.696 1.000        
OFS3 0.394 0.466 0.347 0.440 0.561 0.704 1.000       
RQCOM1 0.456 0.482 0.499 0.404 0.480 0.443 0.370 1.000      
RQCOM2 0.250 0.260 0.319 0.247 0.258 0.242 0.165 0.676 1.000     
RQCOM3 0.360 0.453 0.467 0.356 0.421 0.433 0.286 0.816 0.584 1.000    
RQCOM4 0.363 0.416 0.506 0.349 0.420 0.463 0.316 0.739 0.603 0.719 1.000   
RQCOM5 0.303 0.364 0.366 0.364 0.465 0.468 0.403 0.647 0.674 0.640 0.657 1.000  
RQCOOR1 0.301 0.382 0.398 0.351 0.449 0.421 0.380 0.537 0.576 0.498 0.579 0.628 1.000 
RQCOOR2 0.246 0.381 0.409 0.352 0.423 0.421 0.378 0.516 0.516 0.513 0.528 0.581 0.882 
RQCOOR3 0.374 0.504 0.535 0.432 0.439 0.566 0.416 0.601 0.502 0.618 0.649 0.528 0.678 
RQCOOR4 0.318 0.487 0.397 0.392 0.442 0.417 0.328 0.592 0.527 0.623 0.586 0.614 0.694 
RQCOOR5 0.164 0.298 0.316 0.234 0.230 0.273 0.186 0.445 0.389 0.456 0.463 0.427 0.532 
RQCOOR6 0.359 0.463 0.489 0.422 0.407 0.500 0.380 0.563 0.461 0.601 0.592 0.592 0.657 
RQCOOP1 0.320 0.441 0.437 0.445 0.443 0.501 0.393 0.577 0.427 0.645 0.643 0.600 0.557 
RQCOOP2 0.213 0.346 0.419 0.316 0.311 0.346 0.269 0.530 0.480 0.539 0.605 0.550 0.525 
RQCOOP3 0.212 0.363 0.413 0.394 0.364 0.334 0.284 0.528 0.428 0.516 0.549 0.529 0.557 
RQCOOP4 0.380 0.485 0.509 0.478 0.472 0.474 0.385 0.645 0.500 0.664 0.641 0.647 0.574 
INT2 0.103 0.053 0.124 0.045 0.039 0.101 0.094 0.281 0.216 0.147 0.220 0.192 0.252 
INT3 0.251 0.204 0.351 0.192 0.165 0.267 0.210 0.389 0.211 0.319 0.374 0.375 0.283 
INT4 0.246 0.197 0.260 0.212 0.224 0.260 0.292 0.374 0.186 0.303 0.426 0.413 0.216 
INT5 0.279 0.253 0.344 0.268 0.273 0.246 0.296 0.316 0.183 0.290 0.334 0.307 0.277 
INT6 0.232 0.152 0.212 0.179 0.151 0.163 0.180 0.254 0.204 0.210 0.274 0.305 0.163 
PSS1 0.415 0.440 0.469 0.427 0.430 0.361 0.238 0.431 0.360 0.412 0.335 0.359 0.353 
PSS2 0.501 0.630 0.582 0.581 0.587 0.571 0.404 0.452 0.342 0.484 0.409 0.469 0.441 
PSS3 0.466 0.545 0.568 0.571 0.512 0.452 0.365 0.424 0.295 0.449 0.364 0.419 0.349 
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OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OFS1 OFS2 OFS3 RQCOM1 RQCOM2 RQCOM3 RQCOM4 RQCOM5 RQCOOR1 
PSS4 0.479 0.531 0.588 0.524 0.546 0.534 0.375 0.466 0.259 0.482 0.432 0.401 0.422 
ROB1 -0.117 -0.159 -0.221 -0.162 -0.074 -0.195 -0.121 -0.182 -0.011 -0.203 -0.229 -0.089 -0.035 
ROB2 -0.149 -0.159 -0.192 -0.101 -0.058 -0.226 -0.156 -0.181 -0.047 -0.217 -0.219 -0.099 -0.063 
ROB3 -0.208 -0.209 -0.213 -0.141 -0.171 -0.270 -0.189 -0.204 -0.048 -0.181 -0.205 -0.130 -0.119 
ROB4 -0.155 -0.138 -0.235 -0.142 -0.124 -0.215 -0.095 -0.160 -0.062 -0.215 -0.209 -0.127 -0.117 
ROB5 -0.106 -0.082 -0.175 -0.082 -0.084 -0.196 -0.156 -0.155 -0.052 -0.179 -0.202 -0.095 -0.086 
ROB6 -0.195 -0.243 -0.205 -0.157 -0.133 -0.277 -0.231 -0.202 -0.054 -0.223 -0.217 -0.109 -0.101 
RCI1 -0.130 -0.104 -0.163 -0.127 -0.193 -0.248 -0.117 -0.224 -0.076 -0.194 -0.202 -0.147 -0.129 
RCI2 -0.184 -0.246 -0.241 -0.227 -0.257 -0.296 -0.200 -0.303 -0.175 -0.337 -0.302 -0.245 -0.247 
RCI3 -0.197 -0.181 -0.224 -0.161 -0.263 -0.300 -0.162 -0.275 -0.152 -0.281 -0.244 -0.254 -0.261 
RCI4 -0.151 -0.236 -0.280 -0.210 -0.170 -0.213 -0.044 -0.228 -0.089 -0.289 -0.217 -0.161 -0.056 
RUNI1 -0.124 -0.194 -0.134 -0.118 -0.116 -0.125 -0.075 -0.150 -0.122 -0.127 -0.130 -0.173 -0.146 
RUNI2 -0.106 -0.198 -0.152 -0.129 -0.146 -0.143 -0.069 -0.194 -0.166 -0.174 -0.159 -0.191 -0.179 
RUNI3 -0.127 -0.169 -0.139 -0.088 -0.084 -0.149 -0.022 -0.196 -0.177 -0.186 -0.193 -0.171 -0.135 
RUNI4 -0.116 -0.155 -0.198 -0.063 -0.080 -0.131 -0.034 -0.229 -0.159 -0.227 -0.186 -0.121 -0.115 
RUNI5 -0.191 -0.169 -0.182 -0.161 -0.195 -0.240 -0.226 -0.218 -0.091 -0.193 -0.200 -0.125 -0.140 
TRUST1 0.501 0.516 0.481 0.379 0.417 0.531 0.417 0.546 0.363 0.488 0.526 0.504 0.429 
TRUST2 0.490 0.527 0.459 0.379 0.420 0.505 0.375 0.567 0.359 0.552 0.494 0.510 0.417 
TRUST3 0.454 0.513 0.489 0.437 0.414 0.437 0.313 0.554 0.381 0.538 0.490 0.490 0.393 
TRUST4 0.463 0.501 0.504 0.439 0.415 0.483 0.344 0.576 0.379 0.571 0.520 0.508 0.388 
TRUST5 0.474 0.470 0.487 0.415 0.417 0.505 0.343 0.584 0.386 0.572 0.563 0.518 0.401 
IBTSG2 0.282 0.485 0.392 0.415 0.434 0.394 0.351 0.383 0.204 0.382 0.317 0.373 0.286 
IBTSG3 0.350 0.513 0.450 0.479 0.456 0.480 0.410 0.366 0.181 0.330 0.316 0.318 0.310 
IBTSG4 0.402 0.386 0.398 0.361 0.425 0.423 0.270 0.343 0.201 0.353 0.272 0.369 0.226 
IBTSG5 0.366 0.448 0.429 0.395 0.414 0.410 0.284 0.344 0.209 0.356 0.268 0.364 0.233 
IBTSG6 0.283 0.391 0.318 0.342 0.443 0.444 0.403 0.397 0.214 0.359 0.283 0.397 0.326 
IBTSN1 0.078 0.239 0.328 0.168 0.241 0.211 0.127 0.295 0.293 0.256 0.280 0.322 0.416 
IBTSN2 0.159 0.219 0.335 0.221 0.249 0.209 0.174 0.363 0.287 0.288 0.298 0.329 0.391 
IBTSN3 0.114 0.216 0.261 0.186 0.293 0.177 0.141 0.374 0.396 0.303 0.260 0.367 0.404 
CBT1 0.248 0.305 0.300 0.297 0.254 0.314 0.296 0.309 0.120 0.271 0.319 0.280 0.264 
CBT2 0.319 0.371 0.372 0.364 0.282 0.414 0.307 0.232 0.204 0.248 0.324 0.331 0.339 
CBT3 0.323 0.373 0.435 0.373 0.268 0.331 0.247 0.341 0.241 0.315 0.396 0.333 0.385 
TBT1 0.189 0.259 0.224 0.125 0.101 0.175 0.112 0.396 0.357 0.364 0.311 0.276 0.277 
TBT2 0.222 0.276 0.235 0.152 0.133 0.232 0.251 0.347 0.295 0.269 0.276 0.268 0.291 
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Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
OSS1 OSS2 OSS3 OSS4 OFS1 OFS2 OFS3 RQCOM1 RQCOM2 RQCOM3 RQCOM4 RQCOM5 RQCOOR1 
TBT3 0.338 0.368 0.384 0.297 0.199 0.270 0.236 0.434 0.189 0.369 0.359 0.309 0.214 
KBT1 0.421 0.463 0.497 0.379 0.410 0.568 0.431 0.492 0.220 0.502 0.459 0.360 0.249 
KBT3 0.436 0.485 0.551 0.448 0.392 0.498 0.373 0.510 0.286 0.496 0.442 0.374 0.275 
KBT4 0.461 0.514 0.526 0.473 0.467 0.558 0.399 0.480 0.284 0.487 0.467 0.412 0.354 
KBT7 0.458 0.522 0.515 0.459 0.433 0.527 0.405 0.482 0.255 0.476 0.425 0.399 0.330 
SQTAN1 0.396 0.400 0.523 0.500 0.410 0.378 0.288 0.450 0.402 0.417 0.426 0.416 0.484 
SQTAN2 0.417 0.462 0.453 0.452 0.399 0.424 0.374 0.442 0.347 0.418 0.482 0.343 0.425 
SQTAN3 0.290 0.380 0.415 0.368 0.322 0.227 0.182 0.431 0.350 0.381 0.427 0.440 0.468 
SQTAN4 0.325 0.379 0.456 0.425 0.390 0.405 0.329 0.466 0.365 0.410 0.459 0.464 0.451 
SQREL1 0.449 0.557 0.511 0.465 0.516 0.535 0.367 0.535 0.318 0.515 0.524 0.504 0.462 
SQREL2 0.453 0.584 0.488 0.489 0.523 0.527 0.379 0.484 0.303 0.515 0.505 0.474 0.467 
SQREL3 0.458 0.545 0.488 0.462 0.537 0.564 0.396 0.502 0.353 0.513 0.569 0.535 0.507 
SQREL4 0.428 0.483 0.443 0.399 0.414 0.489 0.304 0.533 0.317 0.524 0.541 0.505 0.400 
SQRES1 0.434 0.512 0.440 0.390 0.450 0.475 0.321 0.432 0.224 0.438 0.465 0.342 0.375 
SQRES2 0.447 0.531 0.526 0.468 0.474 0.583 0.351 0.521 0.388 0.532 0.551 0.506 0.458 
SQRES3 0.430 0.477 0.491 0.434 0.467 0.557 0.359 0.462 0.293 0.485 0.522 0.508 0.477 
SQRES4 0.400 0.450 0.438 0.407 0.390 0.427 0.286 0.508 0.441 0.495 0.494 0.580 0.458 
SQRES5 0.410 0.495 0.524 0.426 0.464 0.499 0.341 0.459 0.332 0.474 0.527 0.491 0.505 
SQAS1 0.491 0.543 0.561 0.498 0.545 0.546 0.365 0.576 0.374 0.582 0.588 0.556 0.461 
SQAS2 0.435 0.525 0.492 0.411 0.480 0.522 0.343 0.541 0.352 0.548 0.571 0.559 0.427 
SQAS3 0.357 0.402 0.435 0.354 0.389 0.350 0.240 0.491 0.390 0.427 0.429 0.545 0.460 
SQAS4 0.400 0.485 0.541 0.477 0.371 0.435 0.298 0.477 0.416 0.488 0.471 0.511 0.501 
SQEMP1 0.283 0.363 0.337 0.310 0.228 0.371 0.290 0.389 0.391 0.349 0.377 0.437 0.486 
SQEMP2 0.345 0.367 0.420 0.378 0.307 0.300 0.227 0.431 0.382 0.345 0.362 0.413 0.451 
SQEMP3 0.434 0.551 0.523 0.466 0.410 0.478 0.333 0.563 0.322 0.544 0.517 0.464 0.370 
SQEMP4 0.423 0.554 0.520 0.436 0.438 0.521 0.350 0.507 0.404 0.510 0.499 0.447 0.503 
SQEMP5 0.385 0.515 0.449 0.394 0.384 0.455 0.319 0.481 0.376 0.515 0.459 0.404 0.464 
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Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
RQCOOR2 RQCOOR3 RQCOOR4 RQCOOR5 RQCOOR6 RQCOOP1 RQCOOP2 RQCOOP3 RQCOOP4 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 
RQCOOR2 1.000             
RQCOOR3 0.681 1.000            
RQCOOR4 0.659 0.725 1.000           
RQCOOR5 0.456 0.516 0.699 1.000          
RQCOOR6 0.620 0.804 0.742 0.634 1.000         
RQCOOP1 0.520 0.682 0.681 0.524 0.763 1.000        
RQCOOP2 0.549 0.520 0.570 0.580 0.568 0.689 1.000       
RQCOOP3 0.586 0.531 0.596 0.581 0.556 0.695 0.845 1.000      
RQCOOP4 0.580 0.679 0.619 0.512 0.654 0.743 0.675 0.686 1.000     
INT2 0.177 0.157 0.225 0.253 0.156 0.113 0.113 0.122 0.108 1.000    
INT3 0.268 0.339 0.293 0.330 0.361 0.268 0.420 0.313 0.350 0.459 1.000   
INT4 0.166 0.227 0.249 0.266 0.318 0.318 0.362 0.301 0.355 0.488 0.624 1.000  
INT5 0.303 0.297 0.315 0.197 0.286 0.283 0.204 0.179 0.267 0.449 0.437 0.579 1.000 
INT6 0.166 0.167 0.167 0.092 0.180 0.198 0.319 0.261 0.263 0.313 0.529 0.566 0.482 
PSS1 0.277 0.360 0.380 0.303 0.380 0.390 0.297 0.247 0.311 0.354 0.276 0.264 0.359 
PSS2 0.401 0.512 0.479 0.248 0.501 0.561 0.361 0.334 0.475 0.114 0.234 0.212 0.340 
PSS3 0.350 0.390 0.409 0.251 0.463 0.556 0.485 0.483 0.499 0.088 0.303 0.263 0.378 
PSS4 0.406 0.471 0.431 0.274 0.526 0.558 0.446 0.383 0.481 0.139 0.389 0.335 0.354 
ROB1 -0.083 -0.228 -0.149 -0.040 -0.200 -0.230 -0.137 -0.118 -0.245 0.017 -0.217 -0.079 -0.089 
ROB2 -0.107 -0.287 -0.158 -0.037 -0.199 -0.230 -0.104 -0.049 -0.238 0.005 -0.191 -0.073 -0.176 
ROB3 -0.104 -0.270 -0.116 -0.031 -0.259 -0.189 -0.019 0.011 -0.222 -0.043 -0.170 -0.107 -0.081 
ROB4 -0.148 -0.282 -0.147 -0.114 -0.242 -0.236 -0.157 -0.155 -0.301 0.003 -0.233 -0.086 -0.153 
ROB5 -0.106 -0.192 -0.098 -0.096 -0.174 -0.226 -0.107 -0.117 -0.234 -0.079 -0.233 -0.123 -0.129 
ROB6 -0.135 -0.313 -0.129 -0.081 -0.216 -0.250 -0.166 -0.126 -0.282 0.002 -0.283 -0.128 -0.192 
RCI1 -0.116 -0.257 -0.096 -0.095 -0.220 -0.165 -0.073 -0.060 -0.240 0.006 -0.273 -0.177 -0.088 
RCI2 -0.257 -0.391 -0.266 -0.144 -0.344 -0.313 -0.264 -0.297 -0.350 -0.013 -0.295 -0.169 -0.148 
RCI3 -0.233 -0.354 -0.218 -0.095 -0.314 -0.222 -0.083 -0.081 -0.293 -0.025 -0.225 -0.101 -0.082 
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RQCOOR2 RQCOOR3 RQCOOR4 RQCOOR5 RQCOOR6 RQCOOP1 RQCOOP2 RQCOOP3 RQCOOP4 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 
RCI4 -0.082 -0.302 -0.113 -0.094 -0.215 -0.258 -0.169 -0.157 -0.301 0.056 -0.204 -0.181 -0.140 
RUNI1 -0.143 -0.158 -0.048 -0.064 -0.081 -0.105 -0.032 -0.061 -0.218 0.079 -0.106 0.025 0.006 
RUNI2 -0.204 -0.181 -0.081 -0.087 -0.089 -0.145 -0.110 -0.151 -0.265 0.020 -0.175 -0.017 -0.052 
RUNI3 -0.164 -0.182 -0.099 -0.063 -0.077 -0.144 -0.115 -0.120 -0.235 -0.008 -0.179 0.001 -0.047 
RUNI4 -0.162 -0.220 -0.084 -0.098 -0.091 -0.143 -0.130 -0.112 -0.283 -0.029 -0.195 -0.033 -0.074 
RUNI5 -0.144 -0.284 -0.137 -0.129 -0.278 -0.186 -0.076 -0.066 -0.241 0.022 -0.156 -0.129 -0.058 
TRUST1 0.410 0.557 0.424 0.285 0.550 0.544 0.427 0.334 0.522 0.245 0.423 0.442 0.335 
TRUST2 0.414 0.594 0.490 0.315 0.574 0.557 0.393 0.344 0.581 0.216 0.397 0.405 0.365 
TRUST3 0.375 0.582 0.507 0.352 0.562 0.587 0.384 0.359 0.623 0.158 0.374 0.381 0.334 
TRUST4 0.401 0.615 0.498 0.316 0.573 0.596 0.411 0.373 0.640 0.167 0.413 0.408 0.357 
TRUST5 0.405 0.616 0.494 0.340 0.576 0.571 0.403 0.360 0.611 0.153 0.446 0.431 0.433 
IBTSG2 0.333 0.457 0.440 0.306 0.432 0.387 0.403 0.480 0.503 0.111 0.383 0.349 0.287 
IBTSG3 0.319 0.478 0.407 0.304 0.522 0.437 0.350 0.382 0.447 0.033 0.346 0.354 0.197 
IBTSG4 0.251 0.404 0.312 0.204 0.366 0.330 0.276 0.278 0.506 0.122 0.393 0.332 0.228 
IBTSG5 0.266 0.383 0.306 0.218 0.359 0.370 0.325 0.333 0.456 0.093 0.344 0.360 0.238 
IBTSG6 0.355 0.421 0.397 0.317 0.424 0.371 0.396 0.458 0.458 0.169 0.358 0.364 0.189 
IBTSN1 0.466 0.388 0.395 0.278 0.277 0.272 0.400 0.358 0.347 0.133 0.275 0.168 0.215 
IBTSN2 0.449 0.448 0.369 0.267 0.324 0.262 0.398 0.415 0.384 0.197 0.384 0.257 0.276 
IBTSN3 0.473 0.399 0.390 0.296 0.325 0.236 0.413 0.409 0.328 0.091 0.281 0.143 0.129 
CBT1 0.325 0.296 0.304 0.198 0.285 0.416 0.332 0.359 0.378 0.053 0.212 0.302 0.380 
CBT2 0.282 0.304 0.327 0.219 0.294 0.381 0.222 0.269 0.382 0.091 0.148 0.289 0.246 
CBT3 0.349 0.380 0.333 0.239 0.363 0.447 0.338 0.394 0.436 -0.003 0.149 0.253 0.231 
TBT1 0.278 0.380 0.322 0.439 0.364 0.264 0.336 0.290 0.364 0.145 0.276 0.178 0.191 
TBT2 0.308 0.338 0.297 0.277 0.376 0.248 0.313 0.238 0.310 0.213 0.309 0.314 0.304 
TBT3 0.243 0.352 0.329 0.391 0.387 0.341 0.469 0.456 0.422 0.131 0.439 0.363 0.224 
KBT1 0.278 0.553 0.330 0.185 0.524 0.504 0.321 0.289 0.517 0.150 0.392 0.331 0.309 
KBT3 0.359 0.559 0.380 0.209 0.471 0.495 0.327 0.305 0.531 0.183 0.400 0.302 0.386 
KBT4 0.384 0.575 0.397 0.290 0.513 0.522 0.380 0.351 0.618 0.121 0.393 0.331 0.261 
KBT7 0.344 0.535 0.374 0.225 0.507 0.534 0.322 0.292 0.563 0.129 0.341 0.306 0.338 
SQTAN1 0.432 0.593 0.481 0.335 0.527 0.518 0.405 0.424 0.534 0.183 0.201 0.225 0.282 
SQTAN2 0.400 0.551 0.441 0.336 0.515 0.482 0.408 0.424 0.521 0.151 0.249 0.294 0.247 
SQTAN3 0.459 0.501 0.476 0.421 0.454 0.387 0.390 0.350 0.458 0.173 0.370 0.372 0.339 
SQTAN4 0.488 0.477 0.384 0.256 0.527 0.559 0.486 0.459 0.515 0.068 0.337 0.296 0.232 
SQREL1 0.453 0.677 0.545 0.329 0.680 0.575 0.387 0.364 0.557 0.087 0.374 0.313 0.301 
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RQCOOR2 RQCOOR3 RQCOOR4 RQCOOR5 RQCOOR6 RQCOOP1 RQCOOP2 RQCOOP3 RQCOOP4 INT2 INT3 INT4 INT5 
 
             
SQREL2 0.471 0.675 0.566 0.368 0.720 0.624 0.452 0.469 0.567 0.005 0.309 0.305 0.311 
SQREL3 0.473 0.677 0.556 0.398 0.723 0.615 0.415 0.426 0.576 0.062 0.377 0.341 0.328 
SQREL4 0.400 0.633 0.508 0.354 0.671 0.579 0.417 0.400 0.584 0.094 0.413 0.390 0.350 
SQRES1 0.435 0.568 0.437 0.313 0.554 0.481 0.446 0.445 0.461 0.030 0.319 0.270 0.272 
SQRES2 0.473 0.692 0.508 0.346 0.652 0.580 0.505 0.491 0.600 0.089 0.408 0.328 0.306 
SQRES3 0.508 0.671 0.492 0.359 0.652 0.572 0.458 0.415 0.579 0.083 0.423 0.316 0.279 
SQRES4 0.488 0.564 0.526 0.389 0.606 0.582 0.565 0.511 0.584 0.143 0.515 0.365 0.359 
SQRES5 0.542 0.645 0.515 0.393 0.670 0.574 0.518 0.496 0.544 0.034 0.413 0.279 0.309 
SQAS1 0.454 0.698 0.508 0.293 0.677 0.639 0.421 0.398 0.640 0.043 0.361 0.308 0.368 
SQAS2 0.431 0.654 0.522 0.344 0.647 0.620 0.464 0.424 0.644 0.076 0.425 0.376 0.385 
SQAS3 0.446 0.490 0.455 0.369 0.532 0.465 0.491 0.389 0.545 0.182 0.498 0.360 0.298 
SQAS4 0.500 0.664 0.502 0.393 0.638 0.546 0.473 0.430 0.601 0.217 0.467 0.403 0.402 
SQEMP1 0.465 0.560 0.435 0.374 0.535 0.464 0.471 0.387 0.493 0.269 0.472 0.265 0.313 
SQEMP2 0.443 0.490 0.408 0.380 0.468 0.346 0.405 0.386 0.458 0.272 0.391 0.278 0.339 
SQEMP3 0.394 0.589 0.454 0.359 0.585 0.581 0.524 0.499 0.638 0.138 0.469 0.396 0.347 
SQEMP4 0.494 0.715 0.553 0.403 0.665 0.594 0.481 0.458 0.598 0.141 0.372 0.283 0.352 
SQEMP5 0.452 0.702 0.547 0.426 0.695 0.601 0.460 0.426 0.594 0.116 0.376 0.327 0.361 
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INT6 PSS1 PSS2 PSS3 PSS4 ROB1 ROB2 ROB3 ROB4 ROB5 ROB6 RCI1 RCI2 
INT6 1.000             
PSS1 0.233 1.000            
PSS2 0.202 0.713 1.000           
PSS3 0.328 0.620 0.747 1.000          
PSS4 0.347 0.620 0.757 0.773 1.000         
ROB1 -0.001 -0.062 -0.151 -0.123 -0.113 1.000        
ROB2 0.010 -0.110 -0.172 -0.093 -0.067 0.793 1.000       
ROB3 0.003 -0.054 -0.160 -0.079 -0.090 0.678 0.768 1.000      
ROB4 -0.072 -0.066 -0.146 -0.163 -0.095 0.695 0.758 0.742 1.000     
ROB5 -0.040 -0.089 -0.117 -0.109 -0.069 0.663 0.751 0.735 0.828 1.000    
ROB6 -0.094 -0.098 -0.208 -0.184 -0.132 0.705 0.768 0.695 0.792 0.795 1.000   
RCI1 -0.092 -0.135 -0.189 -0.122 -0.163 0.544 0.552 0.643 0.563 0.633 0.610 1.000  
RCI2 -0.167 -0.156 -0.229 -0.259 -0.217 0.587 0.550 0.542 0.593 0.572 0.593 0.692 1.000 
RCI3 -0.039 -0.149 -0.240 -0.172 -0.190 0.537 0.597 0.647 0.563 0.553 0.553 0.765 0.692 
RCI4 -0.030 -0.166 -0.248 -0.214 -0.161 0.507 0.507 0.501 0.488 0.484 0.507 0.669 0.585 
RUNI1 0.039 -0.032 -0.140 -0.095 0.016 0.472 0.476 0.580 0.507 0.514 0.498 0.531 0.478 
RUNI2 -0.015 -0.066 -0.165 -0.152 -0.038 0.520 0.484 0.509 0.498 0.524 0.532 0.545 0.536 
RUNI3 -0.029 -0.058 -0.157 -0.099 -0.002 0.575 0.566 0.556 0.550 0.565 0.609 0.557 0.509 
RUNI4 -0.016 -0.115 -0.186 -0.152 -0.069 0.635 0.646 0.613 0.615 0.598 0.644 0.596 0.521 
RUNI5 0.018 -0.193 -0.255 -0.148 -0.204 0.460 0.572 0.602 0.577 0.537 0.527 0.604 0.495 
TRUST1 0.306 0.475 0.533 0.432 0.558 -0.183 -0.308 -0.373 -0.282 -0.259 -0.283 -0.205 -0.241 
TRUST2 0.292 0.498 0.569 0.509 0.598 -0.193 -0.299 -0.355 -0.313 -0.226 -0.288 -0.218 -0.309 
TRUST3 0.248 0.432 0.536 0.499 0.521 -0.260 -0.333 -0.373 -0.363 -0.348 -0.365 -0.307 -0.328 
TRUST4 0.290 0.400 0.517 0.498 0.547 -0.274 -0.347 -0.379 -0.371 -0.340 -0.370 -0.298 -0.351 
TRUST5 0.339 0.417 0.505 0.480 0.550 -0.244 -0.340 -0.330 -0.351 -0.305 -0.371 -0.268 -0.366 
IBTSG2 0.349 0.332 0.426 0.494 0.419 -0.086 -0.081 -0.076 -0.158 -0.008 -0.110 -0.090 -0.206 
IBTSG3 0.261 0.385 0.441 0.493 0.517 -0.136 -0.183 -0.225 -0.246 -0.129 -0.180 -0.206 -0.276 
IBTSG4 0.264 0.355 0.408 0.411 0.467 -0.208 -0.242 -0.305 -0.278 -0.159 -0.230 -0.221 -0.233 
IBTSG5 0.286 0.404 0.468 0.475 0.480 -0.202 -0.228 -0.226 -0.278 -0.175 -0.233 -0.193 -0.206 
IBTSG6 0.263 0.393 0.382 0.408 0.422 -0.110 -0.123 -0.150 -0.159 -0.089 -0.147 -0.178 -0.202 
IBTSN1 0.225 0.290 0.279 0.261 0.353 -0.033 -0.015 0.029 -0.028 -0.010 -0.062 -0.026 -0.023 
IBTSN2 0.310 0.244 0.203 0.282 0.382 -0.018 0.032 0.060 -0.013 0.059 0.001 0.023 -0.050 
IBTSN3 0.162 0.290 0.236 0.257 0.303 0.049 0.070 0.104 0.055 0.063 0.041 -0.001 -0.069 
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INT6 PSS1 PSS2 PSS3 PSS4 ROB1 ROB2 ROB3 ROB4 ROB5 ROB6 RCI1 RCI2 
 
             
CBT1 0.199 0.230 0.358 0.462 0.373 -0.205 -0.214 -0.118 -0.245 -0.254 -0.246 -0.143 -0.191 
CBT2 0.223 0.309 0.439 0.339 0.362 -0.187 -0.224 -0.226 -0.207 -0.257 -0.187 -0.179 -0.151 
CBT3 0.150 0.268 0.405 0.351 0.369 -0.237 -0.275 -0.263 -0.310 -0.269 -0.263 -0.195 -0.213 
TBT1 0.181 0.275 0.183 0.165 0.200 -0.073 -0.119 -0.146 -0.088 -0.136 -0.142 -0.186 -0.203 
TBT2 0.311 0.334 0.294 0.239 0.272 -0.059 -0.058 -0.129 -0.001 -0.072 -0.066 -0.198 -0.188 
TBT3 0.323 0.263 0.327 0.393 0.381 -0.136 -0.069 -0.025 -0.077 -0.069 -0.134 -0.191 -0.290 
KBT1 0.302 0.366 0.551 0.475 0.537 -0.304 -0.333 -0.344 -0.305 -0.248 -0.343 -0.304 -0.358 
KBT3 0.301 0.358 0.524 0.500 0.495 -0.334 -0.359 -0.335 -0.377 -0.343 -0.401 -0.291 -0.350 
KBT4 0.312 0.364 0.486 0.438 0.485 -0.334 -0.354 -0.379 -0.354 -0.312 -0.380 -0.368 -0.371 
KBT7 0.238 0.401 0.556 0.500 0.519 -0.329 -0.367 -0.375 -0.340 -0.331 -0.322 -0.359 -0.359 
SQTAN1 0.198 0.415 0.485 0.422 0.427 -0.186 -0.212 -0.305 -0.296 -0.248 -0.282 -0.253 -0.226 
SQTAN2 0.196 0.400 0.477 0.433 0.431 -0.173 -0.200 -0.232 -0.188 -0.165 -0.220 -0.138 -0.260 
SQTAN3 0.308 0.331 0.430 0.361 0.396 -0.090 -0.156 -0.175 -0.185 -0.178 -0.212 -0.218 -0.239 
SQTAN4 0.276 0.363 0.475 0.470 0.508 -0.121 -0.133 -0.205 -0.126 -0.102 -0.156 -0.176 -0.252 
SQREL1 0.209 0.382 0.551 0.457 0.555 -0.275 -0.340 -0.411 -0.370 -0.283 -0.339 -0.320 -0.374 
SQREL2 0.196 0.301 0.526 0.495 0.503 -0.231 -0.263 -0.325 -0.320 -0.217 -0.292 -0.220 -0.386 
SQREL3 0.245 0.321 0.525 0.443 0.538 -0.291 -0.308 -0.408 -0.358 -0.296 -0.338 -0.337 -0.399 
SQREL4 0.309 0.302 0.489 0.435 0.519 -0.331 -0.357 -0.405 -0.388 -0.321 -0.377 -0.360 -0.418 
SQRES1 0.164 0.301 0.474 0.409 0.511 -0.219 -0.264 -0.269 -0.270 -0.186 -0.264 -0.150 -0.245 
SQRES2 0.271 0.360 0.539 0.499 0.549 -0.233 -0.276 -0.336 -0.343 -0.250 -0.319 -0.253 -0.370 
SQRES3 0.280 0.265 0.474 0.412 0.539 -0.273 -0.283 -0.369 -0.356 -0.243 -0.331 -0.331 -0.383 
SQRES4 0.344 0.330 0.495 0.500 0.504 -0.217 -0.206 -0.228 -0.297 -0.208 -0.253 -0.212 -0.345 
SQRES5 0.315 0.330 0.513 0.519 0.629 -0.214 -0.222 -0.240 -0.292 -0.198 -0.277 -0.187 -0.376 
SQAS1 0.214 0.359 0.584 0.489 0.546 -0.251 -0.309 -0.364 -0.337 -0.263 -0.315 -0.307 -0.423 
SQAS2 0.314 0.337 0.563 0.484 0.526 -0.344 -0.350 -0.383 -0.378 -0.303 -0.386 -0.358 -0.435 
SQAS3 0.295 0.388 0.494 0.424 0.480 -0.164 -0.188 -0.188 -0.236 -0.179 -0.210 -0.210 -0.249 
SQAS4 0.300 0.544 0.573 0.511 0.582 -0.257 -0.290 -0.288 -0.341 -0.284 -0.327 -0.269 -0.321 
SQEMP1 0.204 0.396 0.437 0.368 0.387 -0.208 -0.182 -0.185 -0.189 -0.162 -0.254 -0.155 -0.216 
SQEMP2 0.181 0.454 0.378 0.336 0.376 -0.180 -0.195 -0.212 -0.222 -0.179 -0.220 -0.193 -0.200 
SQEMP3 0.344 0.436 0.545 0.583 0.574 -0.297 -0.259 -0.247 -0.311 -0.264 -0.368 -0.251 -0.382 
SQEMP4 0.184 0.459 0.512 0.434 0.506 -0.255 -0.322 -0.326 -0.346 -0.279 -0.355 -0.272 -0.327 
SQEMP5 0.235 0.396 0.480 0.468 0.504 -0.214 -0.254 -0.244 -0.304 -0.219 -0.324 -0.235 -0.338 
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RCI3 RCI4 RUNI1 RUNI2 RUNI3 RUNI4 RUNI5 TRUST1 TRUST2 TRUST3 TRUST4 TRUST5 IBTSG2 
RCI4 0.648 1.000            
RUNI1 0.603 0.633 1.000           
RUNI2 0.547 0.587 0.879 1.000          
RUNI3 0.545 0.560 0.805 0.869 1.000         
RUNI4 0.579 0.605 0.763 0.824 0.868 1.000        
RUNI5 0.546 0.505 0.432 0.412 0.447 0.570 1.000       
TRUST1 -0.286 -0.204 -0.172 -0.171 -0.159 -0.171 -0.260 1.000      
TRUST2 -0.320 -0.271 -0.149 -0.126 -0.099 -0.166 -0.277 0.892 1.000     
TRUST3 -0.334 -0.306 -0.200 -0.200 -0.196 -0.217 -0.252 0.771 0.810 1.000    
TRUST4 -0.334 -0.295 -0.160 -0.182 -0.198 -0.222 -0.255 0.809 0.845 0.957 1.000   
TRUST5 -0.332 -0.275 -0.119 -0.141 -0.141 -0.187 -0.275 0.783 0.813 0.872 0.907 1.000  
IBTSG2 -0.158 -0.219 -0.078 -0.096 -0.032 -0.059 -0.128 0.417 0.473 0.474 0.496 0.491 1.000 
IBTSG3 -0.229 -0.214 -0.062 -0.057 -0.026 -0.059 -0.311 0.519 0.512 0.484 0.493 0.468 0.717 
IBTSG4 -0.267 -0.282 -0.186 -0.196 -0.164 -0.197 -0.211 0.480 0.521 0.510 0.531 0.494 0.627 
IBTSG5 -0.222 -0.297 -0.196 -0.234 -0.171 -0.219 -0.219 0.469 0.494 0.517 0.511 0.491 0.650 
IBTSG6 -0.219 -0.191 -0.099 -0.114 -0.049 -0.073 -0.188 0.422 0.426 0.390 0.397 0.374 0.779 
IBTSN1 -0.013 -0.067 -0.072 -0.084 -0.074 -0.075 0.074 0.269 0.231 0.253 0.262 0.225 0.403 
IBTSN2 -0.018 -0.083 -0.005 0.008 0.050 -0.003 0.056 0.268 0.324 0.238 0.279 0.249 0.474 
IBTSN3 -0.019 -0.029 0.042 0.006 0.043 0.046 0.045 0.214 0.242 0.218 0.237 0.208 0.414 
CBT1 -0.032 -0.185 -0.037 -0.093 -0.061 -0.070 -0.073 0.324 0.371 0.451 0.470 0.413 0.355 
CBT2 -0.207 -0.193 -0.153 -0.139 -0.142 -0.125 -0.186 0.361 0.348 0.457 0.444 0.407 0.357 
CBT3 -0.178 -0.233 -0.177 -0.160 -0.184 -0.178 -0.221 0.408 0.410 0.506 0.495 0.444 0.274 
TBT1 -0.169 -0.189 -0.194 -0.167 -0.161 -0.161 -0.069 0.383 0.410 0.409 0.420 0.401 0.271 
TBT2 -0.102 -0.123 -0.144 -0.146 -0.135 -0.122 -0.070 0.356 0.326 0.322 0.328 0.296 0.302 
TBT3 -0.073 -0.192 -0.093 -0.134 -0.123 -0.110 -0.057 0.374 0.395 0.425 0.433 0.418 0.450 
KBT1 -0.310 -0.346 -0.198 -0.221 -0.201 -0.263 -0.309 0.582 0.586 0.575 0.622 0.611 0.519 
KBT3 -0.307 -0.304 -0.205 -0.265 -0.251 -0.307 -0.204 0.606 0.630 0.705 0.735 0.697 0.515 
KBT4 -0.337 -0.306 -0.241 -0.284 -0.283 -0.274 -0.247 0.628 0.640 0.691 0.714 0.672 0.555 
KBT7 -0.345 -0.358 -0.245 -0.277 -0.243 -0.298 -0.243 0.632 0.643 0.710 0.726 0.675 0.515 
SQTAN1 -0.226 -0.266 -0.188 -0.166 -0.218 -0.244 -0.295 0.464 0.449 0.520 0.516 0.478 0.359 
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RCI3 RCI4 RUNI1 RUNI2 RUNI3 RUNI4 RUNI5 TRUST1 TRUST2 TRUST3 TRUST4 TRUST5 IBTSG2 
 
             
SQTAN2 -0.172 -0.247 -0.172 -0.139 -0.147 -0.203 -0.254 0.502 0.475 0.458 0.477 0.471 0.431 
SQTAN3 -0.233 -0.219 -0.181 -0.179 -0.158 -0.177 -0.208 0.439 0.401 0.519 0.487 0.543 0.358 
SQTAN4 -0.218 -0.241 -0.222 -0.188 -0.138 -0.159 -0.194 0.525 0.465 0.510 0.508 0.520 0.425 
SQREL1 -0.329 -0.301 -0.160 -0.170 -0.129 -0.163 -0.306 0.690 0.711 0.723 0.742 0.718 0.475 
SQREL2 -0.250 -0.271 -0.200 -0.198 -0.127 -0.122 -0.262 0.622 0.625 0.666 0.664 0.663 0.528 
SQREL3 -0.329 -0.282 -0.204 -0.200 -0.155 -0.170 -0.313 0.659 0.645 0.671 0.686 0.688 0.453 
SQREL4 -0.362 -0.377 -0.234 -0.258 -0.238 -0.253 -0.302 0.675 0.683 0.697 0.731 0.733 0.461 
SQRES1 -0.134 -0.157 -0.049 -0.066 -0.074 -0.119 -0.198 0.569 0.566 0.531 0.567 0.569 0.486 
SQRES2 -0.293 -0.295 -0.199 -0.209 -0.189 -0.260 -0.267 0.669 0.682 0.671 0.695 0.701 0.505 
SQRES3 -0.328 -0.300 -0.201 -0.207 -0.162 -0.190 -0.257 0.639 0.646 0.649 0.675 0.661 0.436 
SQRES4 -0.239 -0.300 -0.226 -0.257 -0.228 -0.221 -0.154 0.616 0.619 0.665 0.669 0.673 0.482 
SQRES5 -0.211 -0.191 -0.119 -0.174 -0.139 -0.144 -0.220 0.609 0.609 0.593 0.613 0.647 0.400 
SQAS1 -0.348 -0.369 -0.231 -0.216 -0.204 -0.214 -0.302 0.657 0.687 0.720 0.739 0.724 0.455 
SQAS2 -0.350 -0.428 -0.281 -0.307 -0.307 -0.313 -0.287 0.631 0.659 0.710 0.717 0.684 0.457 
SQAS3 -0.260 -0.238 -0.216 -0.198 -0.198 -0.222 -0.192 0.547 0.523 0.609 0.593 0.598 0.387 
SQAS4 -0.250 -0.394 -0.216 -0.229 -0.214 -0.276 -0.258 0.667 0.671 0.684 0.706 0.676 0.457 
SQEMP1 -0.161 -0.198 -0.189 -0.170 -0.184 -0.174 -0.159 0.499 0.486 0.486 0.484 0.498 0.316 
SQEMP2 -0.208 -0.184 -0.188 -0.202 -0.194 -0.212 -0.136 0.486 0.499 0.496 0.507 0.472 0.320 
SQEMP3 -0.205 -0.301 -0.156 -0.217 -0.199 -0.243 -0.189 0.600 0.657 0.698 0.704 0.702 0.476 
SQEMP4 -0.312 -0.328 -0.197 -0.193 -0.220 -0.229 -0.272 0.613 0.629 0.637 0.668 0.631 0.460 
SQEMP5 -0.268 -0.330 -0.142 -0.138 -0.138 -0.158 -0.200 0.571 0.630 0.644 0.662 0.678 0.500 
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Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
IBTSG3 IBTSG4 IBTSG5 IBTSG6 IBTSN1 IBTSN2 IBTSN3 CBT1 CBT2 CBT3 TBT1 TBT2 TBT3 
IBTSG3 1.000             
IBTSG4 0.637 1.000            
IBTSG5 0.666 0.804 1.000           
IBTSG6 0.718 0.725 0.749 1.000          
IBTSN1 0.305 0.331 0.362 0.450 1.000         
IBTSN2 0.341 0.453 0.406 0.523 0.741 1.000        
IBTSN3 0.331 0.320 0.313 0.473 0.719 0.765 1.000       
CBT1 0.386 0.295 0.358 0.322 0.324 0.262 0.306 1.000      
CBT2 0.395 0.399 0.468 0.359 0.274 0.207 0.193 0.655 1.000     
CBT3 0.396 0.331 0.363 0.252 0.250 0.202 0.236 0.679 0.774 1.000    
TBT1 0.218 0.230 0.191 0.173 0.219 0.242 0.226 0.151 0.144 0.321 1.000   
TBT2 0.316 0.251 0.283 0.261 0.328 0.253 0.275 0.257 0.215 0.237 0.695 1.000  
TBT3 0.412 0.286 0.303 0.314 0.278 0.317 0.318 0.406 0.234 0.351 0.556 0.643 1.000 
KBT1 0.585 0.554 0.554 0.462 0.273 0.268 0.177 0.377 0.327 0.408 0.350 0.397 0.466 
KBT3 0.484 0.498 0.561 0.383 0.341 0.315 0.255 0.463 0.399 0.441 0.332 0.373 0.436 
KBT4 0.587 0.633 0.682 0.503 0.346 0.324 0.266 0.413 0.452 0.477 0.431 0.422 0.452 
KBT7 0.546 0.532 0.589 0.423 0.325 0.295 0.268 0.486 0.477 0.522 0.365 0.421 0.430 
SQTAN1 0.427 0.414 0.392 0.334 0.376 0.366 0.260 0.290 0.324 0.425 0.360 0.322 0.311 
SQTAN2 0.532 0.390 0.360 0.407 0.308 0.336 0.230 0.395 0.393 0.485 0.382 0.322 0.353 
SQTAN3 0.392 0.343 0.406 0.359 0.327 0.320 0.275 0.347 0.362 0.348 0.325 0.294 0.306 
SQTAN4 0.527 0.439 0.456 0.425 0.329 0.275 0.234 0.305 0.341 0.432 0.310 0.338 0.295 
SQREL1 0.593 0.578 0.590 0.464 0.307 0.324 0.256 0.408 0.408 0.463 0.320 0.329 0.355 
SQREL2 0.590 0.469 0.502 0.449 0.292 0.289 0.239 0.436 0.380 0.489 0.345 0.319 0.422 
SQREL3 0.584 0.500 0.498 0.430 0.286 0.297 0.236 0.381 0.405 0.451 0.302 0.294 0.348 
SQREL4 0.564 0.534 0.540 0.427 0.221 0.278 0.195 0.421 0.407 0.501 0.373 0.331 0.422 
SQRES1 0.550 0.515 0.454 0.452 0.268 0.333 0.271 0.353 0.323 0.455 0.292 0.226 0.326 
SQRES2 0.579 0.576 0.546 0.500 0.312 0.388 0.287 0.316 0.339 0.402 0.336 0.302 0.350 
SQRES3 0.543 0.572 0.527 0.463 0.303 0.342 0.208 0.368 0.365 0.449 0.324 0.280 0.370 
SQRES4 0.441 0.477 0.502 0.395 0.267 0.347 0.304 0.368 0.313 0.391 0.412 0.427 0.488 
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Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
IBTSG3 IBTSG4 IBTSG5 IBTSG6 IBTSN1 IBTSN2 IBTSN3 CBT1 CBT2 CBT3 TBT1 TBT2 TBT3 
SQRES5 0.473 0.479 0.427 0.382 0.259 0.347 0.270 0.344 0.277 0.444 0.410 0.311 0.400 
SQAS1 0.502 0.450 0.441 0.365 0.265 0.307 0.266 0.428 0.384 0.489 0.336 0.328 0.396 
SQAS2 0.505 0.497 0.517 0.364 0.290 0.288 0.183 0.403 0.362 0.470 0.365 0.373 0.431 
SQAS3 0.365 0.472 0.455 0.387 0.358 0.392 0.336 0.253 0.269 0.329 0.327 0.354 0.366 
SQAS4 0.543 0.525 0.550 0.420 0.399 0.436 0.330 0.393 0.357 0.467 0.419 0.409 0.401 
SQEMP1 0.306 0.342 0.357 0.286 0.349 0.389 0.312 0.233 0.248 0.323 0.503 0.487 0.363 
SQEMP2 0.318 0.427 0.400 0.362 0.340 0.394 0.334 0.204 0.253 0.303 0.403 0.366 0.335 
SQEMP3 0.502 0.479 0.511 0.399 0.283 0.345 0.299 0.498 0.369 0.477 0.370 0.359 0.531 
SQEMP4 0.533 0.514 0.515 0.438 0.370 0.380 0.331 0.375 0.391 0.501 0.459 0.389 0.334 
SQEMP5 0.539 0.462 0.487 0.384 0.333 0.355 0.350 0.417 0.372 0.464 0.458 0.401 0.404 
 
 
   
240 
Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
KBT1 KBT3 KBT4 KBT7 SQTAN1 SQTAN2 SQTAN3 SQTAN4 SQREL1 SQREL2 SQREL3 SQREL4 SQRES1 
KBT1 1.000             
KBT3 0.783 1.000            
KBT4 0.776 0.843 1.000           
KBT7 0.763 0.879 0.836 1.000          
SQTAN1 0.443 0.385 0.494 0.439 1.000         
SQTAN2 0.462 0.391 0.459 0.442 0.634 1.000        
SQTAN3 0.307 0.362 0.453 0.368 0.490 0.574 1.000       
SQTAN4 0.488 0.463 0.552 0.497 0.512 0.619 0.582 1.000      
SQREL1 0.597 0.619 0.688 0.644 0.555 0.542 0.550 0.599 1.000     
SQREL2 0.598 0.580 0.625 0.592 0.537 0.564 0.543 0.578 0.851 1.000    
SQREL3 0.595 0.572 0.629 0.607 0.544 0.545 0.547 0.566 0.883 0.892 1.000   
SQREL4 0.646 0.650 0.679 0.651 0.498 0.538 0.520 0.574 0.846 0.820 0.859 1.000  
SQRES1 0.497 0.486 0.513 0.508 0.433 0.553 0.420 0.486 0.717 0.752 0.744 0.723 1.000 
SQRES2 0.581 0.567 0.600 0.564 0.574 0.622 0.526 0.616 0.791 0.780 0.804 0.781 0.778 
SQRES3 0.593 0.560 0.665 0.576 0.551 0.551 0.546 0.634 0.844 0.808 0.838 0.802 0.742 
SQRES4 0.500 0.593 0.592 0.574 0.425 0.450 0.564 0.592 0.701 0.687 0.689 0.717 0.573 
SQRES5 0.526 0.505 0.567 0.488 0.464 0.500 0.540 0.573 0.715 0.748 0.727 0.689 0.658 
SQAS1 0.626 0.623 0.629 0.648 0.557 0.523 0.510 0.539 0.783 0.797 0.798 0.758 0.636 
SQAS2 0.618 0.644 0.676 0.654 0.545 0.529 0.499 0.576 0.790 0.774 0.768 0.795 0.611 
SQAS3 0.342 0.423 0.463 0.437 0.419 0.427 0.572 0.576 0.619 0.583 0.593 0.581 0.517 
SQAS4 0.550 0.558 0.583 0.595 0.652 0.626 0.557 0.551 0.721 0.655 0.697 0.731 0.621 
SQEMP1 0.419 0.451 0.535 0.473 0.503 0.454 0.467 0.497 0.496 0.512 0.511 0.499 0.451 
SQEMP2 0.231 0.336 0.397 0.359 0.449 0.397 0.367 0.368 0.493 0.432 0.489 0.492 0.521 
SQEMP3 0.547 0.616 0.616 0.628 0.534 0.566 0.492 0.533 0.680 0.662 0.659 0.681 0.598 
SQEMP4 0.519 0.553 0.626 0.594 0.647 0.575 0.475 0.536 0.713 0.704 0.715 0.703 0.681 
SQEMP5 0.538 0.566 0.635 0.596 0.578 0.537 0.486 0.494 0.693 0.703 0.694 0.698 0.574 
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Appendix 5 – Pearson’s Correlations of Individual Items (Continued) 
 
SQRES2 SQRES3 SQRES4 SQRES5 SQAS1 SQAS2 SQAS3 SQAS4 SQEMP1 SQEMP2 SQEMP3 SQEMP4 SQEMP5 
SQRES2 1.000             
SQRES3 0.821 1.000            
SQRES4 0.729 0.715 1.000           
SQRES5 0.716 0.785 0.747 1.000          
SQAS1 0.764 0.761 0.725 0.741 1.000         
SQAS2 0.754 0.769 0.744 0.713 0.826 1.000        
SQAS3 0.628 0.626 0.704 0.604 0.595 0.633 1.000       
SQAS4 0.742 0.697 0.716 0.623 0.696 0.732 0.643 1.000      
SQEMP1 0.555 0.542 0.613 0.514 0.499 0.511 0.564 0.663 1.000     
SQEMP2 0.548 0.527 0.554 0.483 0.477 0.439 0.595 0.677 0.587 1.000    
SQEMP3 0.725 0.677 0.712 0.642 0.722 0.709 0.594 0.729 0.614 0.549 1.000   
SQEMP4 0.750 0.700 0.611 0.581 0.702 0.691 0.592 0.778 0.654 0.612 0.710 1.000  
SQEMP5 0.694 0.646 0.626 0.593 0.698 0.688 0.548 0.736 0.585 0.506 0.692 0.853 1.000 
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APPENDIX 6 – PEARSON’S CORRELATIONS OF CONSTRUCTS 
 Success RQ INT PSS TRUST TRxRISK TRxPSS TRxINT RQCOM RQCOOR RQCOOP ROB RCI RUNI IBT CBT TBT KBT SQ 
Success 1.000                   
RQ 0.616 1.000                  
INT 0.337 0.426 1.000                 
PSS 0.707 0.585 0.406 1.000                
TRUST 0.610 0.654 0.467 0.612 1.000               
TRxRISK 0.313 0.349 0.250 0.363 0.567 1.000              
TRxPSS 0.730 0.720 0.487 0.854 0.903 0.518 1.000             
TRxINT 0.573 0.645 0.787 0.595 0.894 0.489 0.848 1.000            
RQCOM 0.563 0.906 0.432 0.533 0.627 0.336 0.681 0.624 1.000           
RQCOOR 0.574 0.933 0.361 0.523 0.584 0.300 0.647 0.575 0.744 1.000          
RQCOOP 0.552 0.902 0.378 0.558 0.584 0.326 0.651 0.570 0.740 0.779 1.000         
ROB -0.236 -0.225 -0.148 -0.147 -0.379 0.454 -0.282 -0.336 -0.202 -0.197 -0.222 1.000        
RCI -0.288 -0.309 -0.181 -0.246 -0.359 0.431 -0.329 -0.328 -0.297 -0.277 -0.272 0.724 1.000       
RUNI -0.197 -0.220 -0.067 -0.148 -0.229 0.565 -0.216 -0.198 -0.229 -0.184 -0.193 0.717 0.735 1.000      
IBT 0.546 0.567 0.422 0.555 0.547 0.340 0.619 0.538 0.472 0.538 0.550 -0.157 -0.230 -0.133 1.000     
CBT 0.457 0.445 0.287 0.454 0.502 0.238 0.533 0.476 0.373 0.400 0.461 -0.294 -0.224 -0.169 0.458 1.000    
TBT 0.333 0.479 0.391 0.360 0.469 0.222 0.482 0.498 0.432 0.446 0.438 -0.116 -0.232 -0.168 0.413 0.334 1.000   
KBT 0.639 0.560 0.411 0.582 0.753 0.320 0.730 0.694 0.527 0.491 0.527 -0.415 -0.416 -0.314 0.625 0.528 0.504 1.000  
SQ 0.678 0.767 0.457 0.649 0.813 0.391 0.832 0.777 0.664 0.735 0.701 -0.374 -0.400 -0.287 0.651 0.533 0.522 0.726 1.000 
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APPENDIX 7 – ANOVA TO CHECK DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LINKEDIN AND PMI 
SAMPLES 
 
 
ANOVA       
    
Sum of 
Squares df 
Mean 
Square F Sig. 
OSS1 
Between 
Groups 9.681 2 4.841 1.746 0.178 
 Within Groups 443.509 160 2.772   
 Total 453.190 162    
OSS2 
Between 
Groups 9.271 2 4.636 1.451 0.237 
 Within Groups 511.220 160 3.195   
 Total 520.491 162    
OSS3 
Between 
Groups 6.381 2 3.190 1.194 0.306 
 Within Groups 427.595 160 2.672   
 Total 433.975 162    
OSS4 
Between 
Groups 4.729 2 2.365 0.818 0.443 
 Within Groups 462.387 160 2.890   
 Total 467.117 162    
OFS1 
Between 
Groups 2.408 2 1.204 0.403 0.669 
 Within Groups 477.641 160 2.985   
 Total 480.049 162    
OFS2 
Between 
Groups 0.600 2 0.300 0.096 0.909 
 Within Groups 500.811 160 3.130   
 Total 501.411 162    
OFS3 
Between 
Groups 0.601 2 0.301 0.099 0.906 
 Within Groups 484.761 160 3.030   
 Total 485.362 162    
RQCOM1 
Between 
Groups 1.718 2 0.859 0.332 0.718 
 Within Groups 413.472 160 2.584   
 Total 415.190 162    
RQCOM2 
Between 
Groups 1.143 2 0.571 0.313 0.732 
 Within Groups 291.900 160 1.824   
 Total 293.043 162    
RQCOM3 
Between 
Groups 2.153 2 1.077 0.382 0.683 
 Within Groups 451.074 160 2.819   
 Total 453.227 162    
  
 
244 
RQCOM4 
Between 
Groups 3.064 2 1.532 0.570 0.567 
 Within Groups 430.114 160 2.688   
 Total 433.178 162    
RQCOM5 
Between 
Groups 0.161 2 0.080 0.032 0.968 
 Within Groups 396.134 160 2.476   
 Total 396.294 162    
RQCOOR1 
Between 
Groups 1.291 2 0.646 0.310 0.734 
 Within Groups 332.758 160 2.080   
 Total 334.049 162    
RQCOOR2 
Between 
Groups 1.669 2 0.835 0.363 0.696 
 Within Groups 367.521 160 2.297   
 Total 369.190 162    
RQCOOR3 
Between 
Groups 3.784 2 1.892 0.677 0.509 
 Within Groups 446.867 160 2.793   
 Total 450.650 162    
RQCOOR4 
Between 
Groups 0.643 2 0.321 0.152 0.859 
 Within Groups 338.523 160 2.116   
 Total 339.166 162    
RQCOOR5 
Between 
Groups 1.124 2 0.562 0.217 0.805 
 Within Groups 414.262 160 2.589   
 Total 415.387 162    
RQCOOR6 
Between 
Groups 0.481 2 0.241 0.097 0.907 
 Within Groups 395.003 160 2.469   
 Total 395.485 162    
RQCOOP1 
Between 
Groups 0.819 2 0.409 0.149 0.862 
 Within Groups 440.936 160 2.756   
 Total 441.755 162    
RQCOOP2 
Between 
Groups 1.169 2 0.585 0.267 0.766 
 Within Groups 350.794 160 2.192   
 Total 351.963 162    
RQCOOP3 
Between 
Groups 0.666 2 0.333 0.162 0.850 
 Within Groups 328.033 160 2.050   
 Total 328.699 162    
RQCOOP4 
Between 
Groups 0.622 2 0.311 0.126 0.882 
 Within Groups 396.225 160 2.476   
 Total 396.847 162    
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INT2 
Between 
Groups 0.158 2 0.079 0.048 0.953 
 Within Groups 265.474 160 1.659   
 Total 265.632 162    
INT3 
Between 
Groups 1.109 2 0.555 0.253 0.777 
 Within Groups 351.001 160 2.194   
 Total 352.110 162    
INT4 
Between 
Groups 4.351 2 2.176 0.977 0.379 
 Within Groups 356.446 160 2.228   
 Total 360.798 162    
INT5 
Between 
Groups 0.493 2 0.247 0.126 0.881 
 Within Groups 311.985 160 1.950   
 Total 312.479 162    
INT6 
Between 
Groups 0.096 2 0.048 0.018 0.982 
 Within Groups 427.081 160 2.669   
 Total 427.178 162    
PSS1 
Between 
Groups 0.351 2 0.175 0.093 0.911 
 Within Groups 301.956 160 1.887   
 Total 302.307 162    
PSS2 
Between 
Groups 1.073 2 0.536 0.206 0.814 
 Within Groups 415.835 160 2.599   
 Total 416.908 162    
PSS3 
Between 
Groups 2.200 2 1.100 0.370 0.691 
 Within Groups 476.057 160 2.975   
 Total 478.258 162    
PSS4 
Between 
Groups 1.942 2 0.971 0.309 0.735 
 Within Groups 502.525 160 3.141   
 Total 504.466 162    
ROB1 
Between 
Groups 3.508 2 1.754 0.718 0.489 
 Within Groups 391.093 160 2.444   
 Total 394.601 162    
ROB2 
Between 
Groups 0.068 2 0.034 0.013 0.987 
 Within Groups 410.005 160 2.563   
 Total 410.074 162    
ROB3 
Between 
Groups 0.693 2 0.346 0.115 0.891 
 Within Groups 480.179 160 3.001   
 Total 480.871 162    
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ROB4 
Between 
Groups 3.683 2 1.842 0.634 0.532 
 Within Groups 464.722 160 2.905   
 Total 468.405 162    
ROB5 
Between 
Groups 7.712 2 3.856 1.234 0.294 
 Within Groups 500.128 160 3.126   
 Total 507.840 162    
ROB6 
Between 
Groups 0.871 2 0.436 0.157 0.855 
 Within Groups 443.804 160 2.774   
 Total 444.675 162    
RCI1 
Between 
Groups 0.275 2 0.138 0.052 0.949 
 Within Groups 424.952 160 2.656   
 Total 425.227 162    
RCI2 
Between 
Groups 10.015 2 5.007 2.049 0.132 
 Within Groups 391.028 160 2.444   
 Total 401.043 162    
RCI3 
Between 
Groups 0.452 2 0.226 0.087 0.917 
 Within Groups 416.714 160 2.604   
 Total 417.166 162    
RCI4 
Between 
Groups 5.935 2 2.968 0.962 0.384 
 Within Groups 493.549 160 3.085   
 Total 499.485 162    
RUNI1 
Between 
Groups 0.567 2 0.284 0.090 0.914 
 Within Groups 504.218 160 3.151   
 Total 504.785 162    
RUNI2 
Between 
Groups 1.671 2 0.836 0.267 0.766 
 Within Groups 499.936 160 3.125   
 Total 501.607 162    
RUNI3 
Between 
Groups 2.584 2 1.292 0.378 0.686 
 Within Groups 546.202 160 3.414   
 Total 548.785 162    
RUNI4 
Between 
Groups 0.135 2 0.067 0.021 0.979 
 Within Groups 507.841 160 3.174   
 Total 507.975 162    
RUNI5 
Between 
Groups 1.145 2 0.572 0.207 0.814 
 Within Groups 443.162 160 2.770   
 Total 444.307 162    
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TRUST1 
Between 
Groups 0.209 2 0.105 0.038 0.963 
 Within Groups 439.766 160 2.749   
 Total 439.975 162    
TRUST2 
Between 
Groups 0.779 2 0.390 0.137 0.872 
 Within Groups 454.165 160 2.839   
 Total 454.945 162    
TRUST3 
Between 
Groups 2.825 2 1.413 0.553 0.576 
 Within Groups 408.929 160 2.556   
 Total 411.755 162    
TRUST4 
Between 
Groups 3.269 2 1.635 0.608 0.546 
 Within Groups 430.277 160 2.689   
 Total 433.546 162    
TRUST5 
Between 
Groups 4.153 2 2.076 0.687 0.505 
 Within Groups 483.847 160 3.024   
 Total 488.000 162    
IBTSG2 
Between 
Groups 5.092 2 2.546 1.113 0.331 
 Within Groups 366.013 160 2.288   
 Total 371.104 162    
IBTSG3 
Between 
Groups 1.010 2 0.505 0.192 0.825 
 Within Groups 420.008 160 2.625   
 Total 421.018 162    
IBTSG4 
Between 
Groups 7.798 2 3.899 1.551 0.215 
 Within Groups 402.177 160 2.514   
 Total 409.975 162    
IBTSG5 
Between 
Groups 10.923 2 5.461 2.240 0.110 
 Within Groups 390.071 160 2.438   
 Total 400.994 162    
IBTSG6 
Between 
Groups 1.176 2 0.588 0.210 0.811 
 Within Groups 448.370 160 2.802   
 Total 449.546 162    
IBTSN1 
Between 
Groups 3.598 2 1.799 1.047 0.353 
 Within Groups 274.905 160 1.718   
 Total 278.503 162    
IBTSN2 
Between 
Groups 3.381 2 1.691 1.026 0.361 
 Within Groups 263.612 160 1.648   
 Total 266.994 162    
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IBTSN3 
Between 
Groups 0.246 2 0.123 0.074 0.929 
 Within Groups 266.048 160 1.663   
 Total 266.294 162    
CBT1 
Between 
Groups 0.136 2 0.068 0.022 0.978 
 Within Groups 485.005 160 3.031   
 Total 485.141 162    
CBT2 
Between 
Groups 0.042 2 0.021 0.009 0.991 
 Within Groups 357.810 160 2.236   
 Total 357.853 162    
CBT3 
Between 
Groups 0.154 2 0.077 0.028 0.972 
 Within Groups 436.631 160 2.729   
 Total 436.785 162    
TBT1 
Between 
Groups 0.814 2 0.407 0.210 0.811 
 Within Groups 309.836 160 1.936   
 Total 310.650 162    
TBT2 
Between 
Groups 0.167 2 0.083 0.049 0.952 
 Within Groups 272.484 160 1.703   
 Total 272.650 162    
TBT3 
Between 
Groups 2.395 2 1.198 0.628 0.535 
 Within Groups 305.053 160 1.907   
 Total 307.448 162    
KBT1 
Between 
Groups 1.710 2 0.855 0.356 0.701 
 Within Groups 384.131 160 2.401   
 Total 385.840 162    
KBT3 
Between 
Groups 4.857 2 2.429 1.038 0.356 
 Within Groups 374.247 160 2.339   
 Total 379.104 162    
KBT4 
Between 
Groups 1.784 2 0.892 0.409 0.665 
 Within Groups 349.002 160 2.181   
 Total 350.785 162    
KBT7 
Between 
Groups 5.141 2 2.571 1.023 0.362 
 Within Groups 402.024 160 2.513   
 Total 407.166 162    
OUT1 
Between 
Groups 0.112 2 0.056 0.943 0.392 
 Within Groups 9.495 160 0.059   
 Total 9.607 162    
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OUT2 
Between 
Groups 1.119 2 0.560 3.445 0.034 
 Within Groups 25.985 160 0.162   
 Total 27.104 162    
OUT3 
Between 
Groups 2.097 2 1.048 6.880 0.001 
 Within Groups 24.382 160 0.152   
 Total 26.479 162    
STAFF 
Between 
Groups 2.606 2 1.303 1.864 0.158 
 Within Groups 111.836 160 0.699   
 Total 114.442 162    
ISSTAFF 
Between 
Groups 5.888 2 2.944 2.256 0.108 
 Within Groups 208.823 160 1.305   
 Total 214.712 162    
SECTOR 
Between 
Groups 2.842 2 1.421 0.663 0.517 
 Within Groups 343.023 160 2.144   
 Total 345.865 162    
POSITION 
Between 
Groups 3.137 2 1.568 0.892 0.412 
 Within Groups 281.280 160 1.758   
 Total 284.417 162    
BUDGET 
Between 
Groups 1.979 2 0.989 0.362 0.697 
 Within Groups 436.966 160 2.731   
 Total 438.945 162    
OSTYPE 
Between 
Groups 0.605 2 0.303 0.759 0.470 
 Within Groups 63.800 160 0.399   
 Total 64.405 162    
DURATION 
Between 
Groups 0.564 2 0.282 0.462 0.631 
 Within Groups 97.705 160 0.611   
 Total 98.270 162    
TERM 
Between 
Groups 1.094 2 0.547 0.605 0.548 
 Within Groups 144.747 160 0.905   
 Total 145.840 162    
PAYTYPE 
Between 
Groups 2.156 2 1.078 0.900 0.409 
 Within Groups 191.685 160 1.198   
 Total 193.840 162    
SALES 
Between 
Groups 0.409 2 0.204 0.119 0.888 
 Within Groups 274.462 160 1.715   
 Total 274.871 162    
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PROFIT 
Between 
Groups 0.915 2 0.458 0.218 0.804 
 Within Groups 335.797 160 2.099   
 Total 336.712 162    
OFFSHORE 
Between 
Groups 0.066 2 0.033 0.702 0.497 
 Within Groups 7.541 160 0.047   
 Total 7.607 162    
SQTAN1 
Between 
Groups 0.374 2 0.187 0.070 0.933 
 Within Groups 430.325 160 2.690   
 Total 430.699 162    
SQTAN2 
Between 
Groups 1.522 2 0.761 0.344 0.709 
 Within Groups 353.521 160 2.210   
 Total 355.043 162    
SQTAN3 
Between 
Groups 1.073 2 0.536 0.217 0.805 
 Within Groups 395.835 160 2.474   
 Total 396.908 162    
SQTAN4 
Between 
Groups 4.156 2 2.078 1.008 0.367 
 Within Groups 329.966 160 2.062   
 Total 334.123 162    
SQREL1 
Between 
Groups 3.363 2 1.681 0.541 0.583 
 Within Groups 497.386 160 3.109   
 Total 500.748 162    
SQREL2 
Between 
Groups 1.118 2 0.559 0.179 0.837 
 Within Groups 500.931 160 3.131   
 Total 502.049 162    
SQREL3 
Between 
Groups 0.390 2 0.195 0.065 0.937 
 Within Groups 480.359 160 3.002   
 Total 480.748 162    
SQREL4 
Between 
Groups 0.722 2 0.361 0.126 0.882 
 Within Groups 458.346 160 2.865   
 Total 459.067 162    
SQRES1 
Between 
Groups 0.130 2 0.065 0.025 0.976 
 Within Groups 420.581 160 2.629   
 Total 420.712 162    
SQRES2 
Between 
Groups 0.088 2 0.044 0.021 0.979 
 Within Groups 336.084 160 2.101   
 Total 336.172 162    
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SQRES3 
Between 
Groups 1.855 2 0.928 0.375 0.688 
 Within Groups 395.605 160 2.473   
 Total 397.460 162    
SQRES4 
Between 
Groups 0.029 2 0.014 0.007 0.993 
 Within Groups 342.475 160 2.140   
 Total 342.503 162    
SQRES5 
Between 
Groups 1.983 2 0.991 0.341 0.712 
 Within Groups 465.097 160 2.907   
 Total 467.080 162    
SQAS1 
Between 
Groups 0.888 2 0.444 0.140 0.870 
 Within Groups 508.903 160 3.181   
 Total 509.791 162    
SQAS2 
Between 
Groups 0.797 2 0.399 0.138 0.871 
 Within Groups 461.387 160 2.884   
 Total 462.184 162    
SQAS3 
Between 
Groups 2.270 2 1.135 0.549 0.579 
 Within Groups 330.871 160 2.068   
 Total 333.141 162    
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